dismissed L-1B Case: Information Technology Consulting

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U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
I 
File: SRC 04 092 5241 1 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: JAN 7 2006 
Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U. S .C. 5 1 10 1 (a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any firther inquiry must be made to that office. 
at~ve Appeals Office 
SRC 04.092 5241 1 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonirnmigrant visa. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seelung to employ the beneficiary as an L-1B nonimmigrant 
intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 10 1 (a)( 15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner provides information technology 
consulting services for clients in various industries. The petitioner claims to be an affiliate of the beneficiary's 
foreign employer, located in Mumbai, India. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary as a project 
managerlsenior consultant for a three-year period. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that the U.S. position offered to the beneficiary requires an individual with 
specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director 
"created an incoherent new definition" of specialized knowledge which contradicts the actual definition as set 
forth in the regulations. Counsel contends that the director failed to consider evidence the petitioner submitted 
in response to the request for evidence and claims that the petitioner recently received approvals for other L- 
1B petitions. Counsel concludes that the petitioner has submitted "exhaustive probative evidence" to establish 
the beneficiary's qualifications for classification as an L-IB specialized knowledge employee. Counsel 
submits a brief in support of the appeal. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1101(a)(15)(L). Specifically, a qualifying 
organization must have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a 
specialized knowledge capacity, for one continuous year within the three years preceding the beneficiary's 
application for admission into the United States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United 
States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate 
thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (I)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
SRC 04 092 5241 1 
Page 3 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies hirnher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
This matter presents two related, but distinct issues: (1) whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge; and (2) whether the proposed employment is in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes or procedures. 
In a February 5, 2004 letter submitted with the 1-129 Petition, the petitioner described the beneficiary's 
proposed position in the United States as follows: 
[T]he Company requires the full-time services of an individual for the position of Project 
ManagerISenior Consultant. The Project ManagerISenior Consultant will utilize and apply 
highly specialized knowledge of the Company's VCM solutions and practices, SAP' 
implementation procedures, and in-house processes and methodologies to work with clients 
on the design, development, and testing of project implementation and delivery. 
The Project ManagerISenior Consultant will be responsible for customer interfacing and 
coordination to discuss SAP implementation and methodologies, establishing and ensuing 
compliance with requirements and scope capture for assigned projects using in-house 
processes and procedures; implementing and establishing operating policies and procedures 
for client projects; working with project teams in the U.S. and India to ensure delivery is 
consistent with established project delivery processes and methodologies; and data modeling. 
Additional duties will include system analysis and evaluation; program development; testing, 
I The petitioner provided the following explanation of "SAP" in a glossary of acronyms attached to its 
supporting letter: "SAP - Systems, Applications & Products in Data Processing. The world premier provider 
of clientlserver business solutions[.]" 
SRC 04 092 5241 1 
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design documentation, and program installations; and finalizing user and operations 
procedures. 
The petitioner indicated that the beneficiary holds a degree in mechanical engineering and is certified as an 
SAP Application Consultant in Production Planning for SAP System lU3, Release 4.0, and is also certified in 
IS0 9000: 1994 Internal Auditing. The petitioner submitted copies of the beneficiary's SAP and IS0 9000 
certificates. The petitioner stated that the beneficiary joined the petitioner's foreign affiliate in September 
1999 and is currently employed as a project managerlsenior consultant. The petitioner described the 
beneficiary's specialized knowledge and current job duties as follows: 
In this role, he has gained highly specialized knowledge which is different from that generally 
found in our industry. [The petitioner's group] has developed our own processes and 
methodologies for project implementation and delivery. These processes and methodologies 
are developed in-house and to our knowledge are not used or produced by other companies in 
the U.S. or abroad. [The beneficiary] has specialized knowledge in our custom project 
execution methodologies which are based on standard industry practices that have been 
adapted and designed for flexibility to fit the unique needs of each of our customers. 
In his present position, [the beneficiary] is responsible for duties which include leading 
discussions with clients and internal teams on existing SAP competencies and systems; 
analyzing test procedures, ABAP developments, and SAP interface complexities; preparing 
models of proposed competency centers; planning and coordinating project activities; 
managing and training project resources; performing gap analysis and business information 
analysis; testing plan preparation and execution; and working with various departments 
within [the foreign entity]. 
The petitioner further indicated that the beneficiary has "highly specialized and extensive experience in 
handling large account teams and understanding the clients' business blueprint," and knowledge in Advanced 
Business Application Programming (ABAP), Dbase IV, and computer aided manufacturing (CAM). The 
petitioner indicated that the beneficiary "will utilize this specialized knowledge to perform work in the US." 
The petitioner concluded: "The Company will experience significant interruption of business if we cannot 
employ [the beneficiary] in the U.S. In addition, the Company will be subject to economic inconvenience and 
tremendous delays in project deployment if we have to train a U.S. worker for this position." 
In support of the petition, the petitioner submitted excerpts fkom its web site, including its corporate profile 
and graphic illustrations of the company's "Methodology for Custom Development Projects" and "SAP 
Implementation Methodology." 
The director requested additional evidence on May 10,2004. The director discussed the regulatory definition 
of "specialized knowledge" and CIS interpretations of the term as addressed in a March 9,2004 memorandum 
signed by then Acting Executive Associate Commissioner for the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
The director advised that the petitioner must provide evidence that the beneficiary's 
knowledge is "uncommon, noteworthy or distinguished by some unusual quality and not generally known by 
SRC 04 092 5241 1 
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practitioners in the field." The director further noted: "The evidence must also establish that the beneficiary's 
knowledge of the processes and procedures of your company is apart from the elementary or basic knowledge 
possessed by others." Specifically, the director instructed the petitioner to: 
Submit evidence relating to the unique methodologies, tools, programs, and/or 
applications that your company uses. . . .Please describe in detail how these are different 
fi-om the methodologies, tools, programs andlor applications used by other companies. 
Explain, in more detail, exactly what is the equipment, system, product, technique or 
service of which the beneficiary of this petition has specialized knowledge, and indicate 
if it is used or produced by other employers in the United States and abroad. 
Please submit a record - as opposed to merely a letter - from your human resources 
department detailing the manner in which the beneficiary has gained hisker specialized 
knowledge. Documentation should indicate the pertinent training courses in which the 
beneficiary has been enrolled while worlung for your company as well as the duration of 
the courses, the number of hours spent taking the courses each day, and certificates of 
completion of these courses. 
Indicate the minimum amount of time required to train an employee to fill the proffered 
position. Specify how many workers are similarly employed by your organization. Of 
these employees, please indicate how many have received training comparable to the 
training administered to the beneficiary. 
Submit the beneficiary's resume and all training certificates . . . 
Provide a clear and concise explanation of the systems/methodologies that the beneficiary 
has specialized knowledge and how this knowledge is fundamentally different from 
other, similar systems/methodologies found throughout your company. Define all 
technical terms that are outlined in you support letter and how these systems operate in 
your company. (i.e. SAP Systems Rl3, ABAP, CAM, VCM) 
The petitioner responded to the director's request on May 21, 2004. The petitioner's response included an 
April 21, 2004 letter from the head of human resources for the foreign entity explaining that the beneficiary 
has achieved "excellent" or "very good" performance ratings since joining the company, and "has held 
progressively responsible roles and been a key employee of the company, involved in several key projects." 
The foreign entity's representative stated that the beneficiary was introduced to the company's proprietary 
and specialized products and services in the information technology field and "established himself as a very 
well qualified professional with an advanced level of knowledge and understanding of all the company's 
specialized products and processes." The foreign entity emphasized that the beneficiary's knowledge was 
gained over a period of more than 54 months, and noted that not all of its professionals have gained the type 
of knowledge and experience held by the beneficiary "and a select few other professionals." The foreign 
entity claimed that the beneficiary's knowledge is "way advanced to the basic knowledge of our other 
software professionals" and that his knowledge of the foreign entity's operating procedures, systems and 
products could not be easily taught or transferred to others, as evidenced by: 
His knowledge of our proprietary products and methodologies which is roughly held by 
only 8% of our IT professionals. 
SRC 04 092 5241 1 
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The number of projects assigned and supervised to him, several for overseas customers. 
The billings generated through projects assigned to him. 
His consistently excellent performance appraisals over the years. 
The foreign entity further noted that the beneficiary's projects have been successfully completed, "thus 
enhancing the company's competitiveness, productivity and financial position in the market." The foreign 
entity emphasized one project in particular, and its relevance to the United States position: 
In 2002, [the beneficiary] played a key role in defining the SAP operational processes, 
configuring the systems, and implementing SAP'S Planning and Optimizer Tool at M&M 
India. Mahindra USA has decided to implement the following at their US-based locations: (a) 
Planning Strategy, (b) Materials Planning and (C) Procurement Planning - using SAP. They 
have also decided to integrate their SAP and manufacturing related systems in line with 
M&M India's Farm Equipment Sector, to enable seamless integration of transactions and 
information. 
Having worked and indeed, managed this project in India, [the beneficiary's] thorough 
knowledge of M&M India's Planning Strategies, Operational Materials Planning and 
Procurement Planning are now essential for integrating Mahindra USA's processes in line 
with those of M&M India's Farm Equipment Sector. He will use his deep knowledge of 
M&M7s SAP and Operational Processes to carry out the following activities: 
Integrating Mahindra USA's SAP, Planning and Materials Systems with those of M&M 
India's Farm Equipment Sector 
Defining Inventory Levels 
Identifying Cost Effective Planning and Operational Measures 
Providing End-User Training on SAP and Materials Processes and Execution 
Providing Support 
[The beneficiary] is also trained on [the foreign entity's] Proprietary Project Execution 
Methodology and will use this expertise on the Mahindra USA Project. Hence, his knowledge 
of foreign operating conditions and the precise procedures and methodologies that are 
followed by the parent company in India will be invaluable in allowing the US company to 
develop similar systems and operating procedures. 
The foreign entity concluded that the beneficiary "is indeed one of a small percentage of our employees who 
is equipped with a unique level of knowledge of [company] products, services and operating systems and 
methodologies." 
The petitioner also submitted a May 3, 2004 letter that further explains the beneficiary's assignments with the 
foreign entity and the "unique and proprietary" tools he has used, including tools for disaster recovery, "fast- 
track implementation methodology," risk analysis, organization readiness, data migration, end-user 
SRC 04 092 5241 1 
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documentation creation, the Mahindra Online SAP Support (MOSS) tool for implementing SAP systems, and 
"PLASMA" for enhancing the efficiency of upgrade implementation. 
The petitioner also mentioned the beneficiary's involvement in the project for M&M Limited's Farm 
Equipment Sector, and emphasized that he was chosen for the U.S. assignment based on his knowledge of the 
group's global operating systems and his "specific and specialized prior knowledge" of a similar project for 
the Indian parent company. The petitioner stated that the beneficiary received his knowledge and training 
during the course of four and a half years with the foreign entity, and noted: "There are no specially run 
courses or programs conducted [by the foreign entity] that we can document." Finally, the petitioner stated 
that it employs "6 SAP PP Project ManagerISenior Consultants who have the same qualifications" as the 
beneficiary. 
The petitioner also submitted the beneficiary's resume, a letter from the head of IT strategy and ERP for the 
petitioner's parent company's farm equipment sector, discussing the project to be undertaken by its U.S. 
subsidiary and confirming that the beneficiary is "best equipped" to manage the project in the United States, 
copies of company literature fixther describing its project execution methodology and proprietary tools, and 
copies of two CIS policy memoranda addressing the interpretation of "specialized knowledge." 
In a letter dated May 20, 2004, counsel for the petitioner noted the Texas Service Center had recently 
approved two cases filed by the petitioner "which raised the same questions," and stated that "virtually all of 
the questions were addressed by evidence submitted with the initial petition." Counsel claimed that the tools, 
processes and methodologies described in the attached literature "are developed in-house and it is impossible 
for any other company in the industry to have access to them." Counsel indicated that it was not clear why 
the director requested clarification as to whether products and techniques utilized by the beneficiary are used 
by others in the U.S. and abroad, and notes "of course there are other entities offering high-level SAP 
consulting services." Counsel emphasized that the petitioner is a highly successfiil company with well-known 
U.S. and foreign clients. 
Counsel further asserted that the director's request for the beneficiary's training records "indicates a 
fundamental misunderstanding of what specialized knowledge is and how it is acquired." Counsel claimed 
"as an executive-level employee serving as SAP Project Manager and Senior Consultant with the company 
abroad for the past four and a half years, it should be abundantly clear that [the beneficiary] would have to 
have acquired an extremely specialized and advanced level of knowledge with respect to all the unique tools 
and methodologies." 
Counsel objected to the director's request that the petitioner indicate the minimum amount of time required to 
train an employee to fill the proffered position, the number of workers similarly employed by the 
organization, and how many of those have received training comparable to the training administered to the 
beneficiary. Counsel asserted: "With 12,000 employees, it is unreasonable, unduly burdensome, 
impracticable, meaningless, and even impossible for [the petitioner] to determine how many employees" have 
comparable qualifications. Counsel noted the petitioner's statements that the beneficiary's knowledge is 
estimated to be held by only 8 percent of IT professionals employed by the organization, and that the 
petitioner only employs six employees in the same position with the same qualifications as the beneficiary. 
SRC 04 092 5241 1 
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Counsel objected to the director's request for a clear and concise explanation of the systems and 
methodologies utilized by the beneficiary, noting that he "has a level of specialized knowledge that exceeds 
four times over the one year required by the regulations, and "because the job is so highly technical, it is not 
possible to give a 'clear and concise' job explanation that would make any sense to a layperson, any more 
than the original job description does." 
Finally, counsel addressed several possible criteria of a "specialized knowledge" employee as discussed in a 
March 9, 1994 Immigration and Naturalization Service memorandum, and reiterated by Associate 
Commissioner for Service Center Operations in a December 20, 2002 memorandum. See 
Memorandum of-ting Executive Associate Commissioner, Office of Operations, USINS, 
to All District Directors, et al, Interpretation of Special Knowledge, CO 214L-P (March 9, 2004)(Puleo 
memo); Memorandum of Fujie 0. Ohata, Associate Commissioner, Service Center Operations, USINS, 
Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge, HQSCOPS 7016.1 (December 20,2002)(0hata memo). Specifically, 
counsel claimed that the evidence submitted established that the beneficiary possesses more than "mere 
familiarity" with the organizati,onYs products and service, and knowledge that is not generally held by other 
project managers in the same industry. Counsel conceded that there would be similarities between the 
beneficiary's duties and those performed by project managershenior consultants in other companies, but the 
majority of his duties require knowledge and experience unique to the petitioner's organization, noting that it 
would take years to train another worker. 
The director denied the petition on June 3, 2004, concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the 
beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that he will serve in a specialized knowledge capacity in the 
United States. Specifically, the director observed that the petitioner did not furnish evidence sufficient to 
demonstrate that the beneficiary's duties involve knowledge or expertise that make him "key personnel," and 
noted that mere familiarity with the petitioner's product or services does not constitute special knowledge. 
The director noted that the L program is intended to be limited, and observed that if the same training is given 
to all project managerlsenior consultants working for the petitioner, "then the key to success is the training, 
not the person." The director also noted that the petitioner had not submitted evidence to establish that the 
beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy or distinguished by some unusual quality and not 
generally known by practitioners in the field. Finally, the director referred to the restrictive nature of the L-1B 
program as affirmed by 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990), stating that the 
intention of the L-1B program sets a higher bar than simply that of a highly skilled worker. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the director failed to apply the existing definition of the term "specialized 
knowledge" found at 8 C.F.R. fj 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) and in the above-cited-memoranda, noting 
that the director did not analyze the beneficiary's qualifications in light of the plain language of the regulatory 
definition. Counsel claims that the petitioner's evidence establishes that the beneficiary meets the standard of 
specialized knowledge as defined in the regulations and as interpreted by subsequent CIS memoranda. 
Counsel further contends that the director ignored the evidence submitted in response to the request for 
evidence, as none of the evidence was acknowledged in the Notice of Decision, notwithstanding the 
requirement that the director base her decision on the entire record. 
SRC 04 092 5241 1 
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Counsel objects to the director's determination that the petitioner had not established that the beneficiary is 
"key personnel," asserting "nothing in the regulatory definition or the two interpreting memoranda supports a 
requirement that specialized knowledge be limited to "key personnel." Counsel questions the director's 
reference to 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General as restricting the L-1B visa category, asserting that he could not 
locate the case and the director had not supported his claim that the specialized knowledge test "sets a higher 
bar than simply that of a highly skilled worker." Counsel also asserts that the director's implication that the 
beneficiary possesses only "mere familiarity" with the petitioner's services or procedures suggests that the 
director did not review the submitted evidence. 
In addition, counsel objects to the director's comment that because all employees in the beneficiary's position 
receive the same training, "the key to success the training, not the person." Counsel notes that specialized 
knowledge is based upon training and experience, rather than on the beneficiary's "innate abilities." Counsel 
refers to the memorandum, which confirms "advanced knowledge need not be narrowly held 
throughout the company," but states that the petitioner nevertheless established that only six employees out of 
12,000 have the same qualifications as the beneficiary. 
Finally, counsel again notes that the director had already approved a number of petitions filed by the same 
petitioner "for persons whose specialized knowledge was less extensive than that of the beneficiary." Counsel 
concludes that the director's actions were unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. 
As a preliminary matter, the AAO agrees with counsel that the reasons given for the denial are conclusory 
with few specific references to the evidence entered into the record. When denying a petition, a director has 
an affirmative duty to explain the specific reasons for the denial; this duty includes informing a petitioner why 
the evidence failed to satisfy its burden of proof pursuant to section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. See 8 
C.F.R. tj 103.3(a)(l)(i). As the AAO's review is conducted on a de novo basis the AAO will herein address 
the petitioner's evidence & eligibility. See Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). However, the 
AAO does not concur with counsel's assertion that the director "created an incoherent new definition" of the 
term "specialized knowledge." The director applied the appropriate standard of review and correctly 
concluded that the petitioner had not established its burden of proof. 
On review, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary possesses "specialized knowledge" as 
defined in section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 
tj 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D), or that the intended position requires an employee with specialized knowledge. 
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed description 
of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. Id. 
In the instant matter, the petitioner submitted a detailed description of the beneficiary's employment in the 
foreign entity and his intended employment in the United States entity. However, the petitioner has not 
documented that the job duties to be performed require specialized knowledge as defined at 8 C.F.R. 
tj 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). The beneficiary's job description, particularly the initial job description provided by the 
petitioner, does not distinguish his knowledge as more advanced or distinct among other project 
SRC 04 092 5241 1 
Page 10 
managers/technical consultants employed by the foreign or U.S. entities or by other unrelated companies. The 
majority of the beneficiary's duties relate to implementation of information technology solutions based on 
software and systems developed by an unrelated company (SAP AG), and general consulting and project 
management skills, such as understanding customer requirements, systems analysis, establishing project 
procedures, program development, data modeling, creating design and test documentation, and establishing 
user and operations procedures. The petitioner initially referred to the petitioner's "specialized knowledge" as 
including advanced business application programming (ABAP), Dbase IV, computer aided manufacturing, 
and indicated that he has "advanced knowledge" in "performing integration tests, gap analysis, cut over and 
post live support activities." None of this "specialized" or "advanced" knowledge relates specifically to the 
petitioner. The technical environments in which the beneficiary has been and would be working are typical of 
SAP implementation projects in general and require technical and business knowledge and technical skills 
that can easily be gained in the industry. An experienced SAP project manager or consultant at an information 
technology consulting company unrelated to the petitioner would be expected to possess similar expertise. 
The AAO notes that the petitioner's initial description did not mention a specific project to which the 
beneficiary would be assigned in the United States, or explain how his particular experience and knowledge 
would be applied in the United States. The petitioner simply stated that it had developed its own processes 
and methodologies for project implementation and delivery that are based on standard industry practices 
adapted to fit the needs of the company's customers and not generally found in its industry. The petitioner 
claimed that the beneficiary has gained "highly specialized knowledge" of the processes and methodologies 
by virtue of his employment with the foreign entity since 1999. These statements were supported by copies 
of two pages from the company's web site briefly describing its "methodology for custom development 
projects" and "SAP Implementation Methodology." Notwithstanding counsel's strong objections to the 
director's request for additional evidence in this matter, the evidence submitted with the initial petition was 
clearly deficient to establish that the beneficiary possessed specialized knowledge, or that he would be serving 
in a position involving specialized knowledge in the United States. 
In response to the request for evidence and on appeal, the petitioner and counsel have repeatedly asserted that 
the beneficiary has gained advanced knowledge of in-house processes, methodologies and tools that are 
proprietary and unique to the petitioner and its foreign parent company, including the company's "project 
execution methodology," systems analysis tools, Plasma, MOSS, and risk analysis tools. The petitioner 
suggests that knowledge of these methodologies and tools is essential for performance of the beneficiary's job 
duties, and also differentiates his knowledge from that which is generally known by similarly employed 
professionals in the beneficiary's field. However, the petitioner not shown that knowledge of these procedures 
and tools constitutes specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner's processes and tools have not been shown to be significantly different from those used by 
other information technology consulting firms, which necessarily also utilize project execution 
methodologies, and automated tools for assessing customer readiness and requirements, data migration, 
documentation, test scripts, upgrades, project tracking, risk analysis, etc., in order to efficiently manage 
similar client projects. The petitioner did not specify the amount or type of training or experience required for 
its technical staff members to become proficient with using the company's tools and procedures and therefore 
it is impossible for the AAO to assess whether these processes are particularly complex or different compared 
SRC 04 092 5241 1 
Page 11 
to those utilized by other companies in the industry, or whether it would take a significant amount of time to 
train an experienced information technology consultant who had no prior experience with the petitioner's 
family of companies. Based on the petitioner's representations, its proprietary processes and tools, while 
highly effective and valuable to the petitioner, are simply customized versions of standard methods, processes 
and tools used in the industry. For this reason, the petitioner has not established the beneficiary's familiarity 
with the petitioner's processes and procedures constitutes specialized knowledge. 
In addition, it is also appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the 
importance of the beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or 
decision-malung process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 11 7, 120 (Cornrn. 198 l)(citing Matter of Raulin, 13 
I&N Dec. 618 (R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)).~ As stated by the 
Commissioner in Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 (Comm. 1982), when considering whether the 
beneficiaries possessed specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find that the 
occupations inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries 
were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The 
Commissioner also provided the following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose slulls and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business' operation. 
Id. at 53. The evidence of record demonstrates that the beneficiary is more akin to an employee whose skills 
and experience enable him to provide a service, rather than an employee who has unusual duties, shlls, or 
knowledge beyond that of a slulled worker. 
Counsel claims on appeal that the director erred by applying a requirement that petitioner establish that the 
beneficiary can be deemed "key personnel" and also disputed the director's reliance on 1756, Inc. v. Attorney 
General, 745 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1990). In 1756, Inc., the court upheld the denial of an L-1 petition for a chef, 
where the petitioner claimed that the chef possessed specialized knowledge. The court noted that the 
legislative history demonstrated a concern that the L-1 category would become too large: The class of persons 
eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be carefully regulated and monitored by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 16. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750, 
2 Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," the AAO 
finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had to be 
"proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized knowledge" from the prior 
INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The Committee Report simply states that the 
Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vlarying [i.e., not specifically incorrect] 
interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the 
Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO 
concludes, therefore, that the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, remain useful guidance concerning the 
intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-1B classification. 
SRC 04 092 5241 1 
Page 12 
2754, 1970 WL 5815). The court stated: "[Iln light of Congress' intent that the L-1 category should be 
limited, it was reasonable for the INS to conclude that specialized knowledge should not extend to all 
employees with specialized knowledge. On this score, the legislative history provides some guidance. 
Congress referred to 'key personnel' and executives." 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 16. While the AAO 
acknowledges that the 1756, Inc. decision cited by the director pre-dates the 1990 amendment to the 
definition of specialized knowledge, it has been noted above that Congress' 1990 amendments to the Act did 
not specifically overrule 1756, Inc. nor any administrative precedent decision, or did the 1990 amendments 
otherwise mandate a less restrictive interpretation of the term "specialized knowledge." 
Accordingly, the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make comparisons in 
order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized knowledge" is not an 
absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, "[s]imply put, 
specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 
1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key personnel." 
See generally, H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key personnel" denotes a position 
within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's I1 New College Dictionary 605 
o. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be considered "important" to a 
petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic success of an enterprise, 
there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of "crucial importance" or 
"key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. Accordingly, based on the 
definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that term, the AAO must make 
comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and the general labor market, but 
also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. 
Moreover, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the 
specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Cornrn. 1982). The decision noted that the 1970 House 
Report, H.R. No. 91-85 1, stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be large" 
and that "[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimrnigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be carefully 
regulated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 5 1. The decision further noted that the House 
Report was silent on the subject of specialized howledge, but that during the course of the sub-committee 
hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of slull necessary to qualify 
under the proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that 
they understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, 
and that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "slulled craft workers." Matter of Penner, id. at 
50 (citing H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Cornrn., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445, 91st 
Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner that an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is 
not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that the specialized knowledge worker classification was not 
intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter ofPenner, 18 I&N Dec. at 53. 
Or, as noted in Matter of Colley, "[mlost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given 
specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees 
SRC 04 092 5241 1 
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with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. 117, 119 (Comm. 1981). According to Matter of Penner, "[sluch a 
conclusion would permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1' visa" rather than the 
"key personnel" that Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also, 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 
15 (concluding that Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend all employees 
with specialized knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives.") 
Therefore, based on the intent of Congress in its creation of the L-IB visa category, as discussed in Matter of 
Penner, even showing that a beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge does not necessarily establish 
eligbility for L-1B intracompany transferee classification. The petitioner should also submit evidence to 
show that the beneficiary is being transferred to the United States as a crucial employee. 
In her request for evidence, the director instructed the petitioner to provide information and documentation 
which would assist her in determining whether the beneficiary's knowledge could be considered "advanced" 
within the petitioner's organization, including information regarding how long it would typically take to train 
an employee to fill the position, the number of similarly employed workers within the organization, and the 
number who have received training comparable to that received by the beneficiary. In response, counsel 
claimed that specialized knowledge is not obtained through completion of training courses, and noted that the 
company does not maintain records of specific training courses taken by each of its 12,000 employees. 
Counsel claimed that it would be "impossible" for the foreign entity to identify the number of employees with 
comparable training. Counsel asserted that since the beneficiary has been employed with the foreign entity as 
a project managertsenior consultant for over four years, it should be "abundantly clear" that the beneficiary is 
an "executive employee" who has "an extremely specialized and advanced level of knowledge with respect to 
all the unique tools and methodologies." The foreign entity's representative stated: "[Ilt is only a few of our 
employees who we designate as having special knowledge and skills that is way advanced to the basic 
knowledge of our other software professionals." The foreign entity noted that the beneficiary's knowledge is 
held by 8 percent of its IT professionals, emphasized the number of projects assigned to him, and noted his 
excellent performance appraisals as evidence of his specialized knowledge. The petitioner noted "there are no 
specially run courses or programs conducted. . .that we can document," but went so far as to state that the 
organization only employs "6 SAP PP Project ManagerISenior Consultants" who have the same qualifications 
as the beneficiary. 
Accordingly, the petitioner's response appears to concurrently indicate that: (1) it is impossible to determine 
how many similarly qualified workers are employed within the company; (2) the beneficiary is one of 960 
employees (8 percent of the petitioner's workforce of 12,000) possessing the same knowledge and experience 
with the petitioner's processes and methodologies; and (3) the beneficiary is one of six employees possessing 
the same knowledge and experience with the petitioner's processes and methodologies. The AAO is not in a 
position to determine which one of these statements is the most accurate and it is therefore difficult to 
compare the beneficiary to similarly employed workers within the petitioner's organization. The petitioner is 
obligated to clarify the inconsistent and conflicting testimony by independent and objective evidence. Matter 
of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Further, the fact that the petitioner's organization does not keep 
detailed records of training courses completed by its employees "in a database" should not prevent the 
company from providing some estimate of the training and experience requirements for a project 
SRC 04 092 5241 1 
Page 14 
managerlsenior consultant position, or some general overview of its training program, particularly with 
respect to training in its in-house tools and methodologies. Going on record without supporting documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 
22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Cornm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of Calfomia, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. 
Comm. 1972)). 
Accordingly, petitioner has not adequately substantiated its claim that the beneficiary possesses "advanced" 
knowledge of the company's processes, procedures and tools. As noted above, the petitioner has not identified 
with any specificity the type or length of training received by the beneficiary as compared to that received by 
other employees, nor provided evidence that he actually completed any training in the company's processes 
and tools. In addition, as a consultant providmg services to customers, the beneficiary is primarily a user of 
the company's internal processes and tools, not a developer, designer or trainer. The beneficiary undoubtedly 
uses the company tools and procedures to facilitate and ensure the quality of his work, but the record reflects 
that his primary role is as a technical consultant utilizing technologies, such as SAP, that were developed by 
other companies rather than proprietary or specific to the petitioner. 
The petitioner attempts to narrowly define the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's processes and tools 
in an effort to establish that his knowledge is advanced. Specifically, the petitioner claims that the beneficiary 
played a key role in defining SAP and operational processes, system configuration and implementation of 
SAP'S Planning and Optimizer Tool for the petitioner's and foreign entity's parent company. The petitioner 
indicated that its affiliate, Mahindra USA, intends to implement similar tools in order to integrate its SAP and 
manufacturing systems in line with the parent company's systems, and that the beneficiary's experience with 
the foreign project is essential to ensure successful completion of the systems integration project. The 
beneficiary's resume confinns that he worked on the project for the Indian parent company fi-om April to May 
2002, almost two years prior to the filing of the petition. His role within the project appeared to be limited to 
leading the creation and implementation of uniform product codes across the foreign entity's supply chain 
network using standard SAP tools. The beneficiary's two months of experience with a relevant overseas 
project is insufficient to establish that he has acquired advanced knowledge of the petitioner's internal 
procedures and tools compared to the petitioner's other project managerlconsultants working on similar 
projects for similar clients. Although the knowledge need not be narrowly held within an organization in 
order to be specialized knowledge, the L-IB visa category was not created in order to allow the transfer of 
employees with any degree of knowledge of a company's products, services or processes. 
Finally, even assuming that the petitioner had established that the beneficiary possesses advanced knowledge 
of the petitioner's processes and procedures, there is no evidence in the record to establish that the position 
with the United States entity requires such knowledge. As noted above, the beneficiary will be performing 
duties typical of an IT consultant, using technologies and skills that are common in his profession. While it is 
clear that he would use the petitioner's internal tools plan and monitor project activities, the record does not 
establish that the beneficiary will be performing any duties which would require more than proficiency with 
the company's internal procedures. 
In sum, the beneficiary's duties and technical skills, while impressive, demonstrate knowledge that is 
common among SAP consultants in the information technology field. The petitioner has failed to 
SRC 04 092 5241 1 
Page 15 
demonstrate that the beneficiary's training, work experience, or knowledge of the company's processes is 
more advanced than the knowledge possessed by others employed by the petitioner, or that the processes used 
by the petitioner are substantially different from those used by other technology consulting companies. It is 
clear that the petitioner considers the beneficiary to be an important employee of the organization. The AAO, 
likewise, does not dispute the fact that the beneficiary's knowledge has allowed him to successfulIy perform 
his job duties for the foreign entity. However, the successful completion of one's job duties does not 
distinguish the beneficiary as "key personnel," nor does it establish employment in a specialized knowledge 
capacity. As discussed, the petitioner has not submitted probative evidence to establish that the beneficiary's 
knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some unusual quality and not generally known in 
the beneficiary's field of endeavor, or that his knowledge is advanced compared to the knowledge held by 
other similarly employed workers within the petitioner and the foreign entity. 
Rather, a review of the record reveals that other information technology companies utilize comparable 
procedures and tools, that the claimed specialized knowledge is itself widely available within the petitioner's 
organization, and that other organizations, although they do not utilize exactly the same project planning and 
execution procedures, may employ workers with technical knowledge and skills equivalent to that of the 
beneficiary. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to document that the beneficiary has actually received 
training in the company's internally developed procedures and tools, much less established that his training 
and experience have resulted in advanced knowledge of such procedures which would elevate him to the level 
of key personnel. Thus, as the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary possesses a special 
knowledge of the petitioner's product or an advanced level of knowledge of the company's processes or 
procedures, the director reasonably determined that the beneficiary does not qualify as a specialized 
knowledge worker. 
Counsel's reliance on the-emorandum as a means for establishing the beneficiary's qualification for 
classification as a specialized knowledge worker is not persuasive. In reference to thmmemorandum, 
counsel claims that the beneficiary's knowledge is valuable to the petitioner's competitiveness and is critical to 
preventing significant interruption of business and potential monetary penalties. While the beneficiary's skills 
and knowledge may contribute to the success of the petitioning organization, this factor, by itself, does not 
constitute the possession of specialized knowledge. Therefore, while the beneficiary's contribution to the 
economic success of the corporation may be considered, the regulations specifically require that the beneficiary 
possess an "advanced level of knowledge" of the organization's process and procedures or a "special knowledge" 
of the petitioner's product, service, research, equipment, techniques, or management. 8 C.F.R. 
$214.2(1)(l)(ii)@). As determined above, the beneficiary does not satisfy the requirements for possessing 
specialized knowledge. 
Counsel notes that CIS approved other L-1B nonimmigrant petitions that had been previously filed on behalf 
of beneficiaries by the same petitioner for similar or less specialized positions. It must be emphasized that 
each nonimmigrant petition is a separate record of proceeding with a separate burden of proof; each petition 
must stand on its own individual merits. If other nonimmigrant petitions were approved based on the same 
assertions that are contained in the current record, the approvals would constitute material and gross error on 
the part of the director. The AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not 
been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, e.g. Matter of 
SRC 04 092 524 1 I 
Page 16 
Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Cornm. 1988). It would be absurd to suggest that 
CIS or any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery, 
825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). 
Furthermore, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a court 
of appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonimrnigrant petitions by 
the petitioner for similar positions, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a 
service center. Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), afyd, 248 F.3d 1139 
(5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001). 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. The record does not establish that the 
beneficiary has specialized knowledge or that the position offered with the United States entity requires 
specialized knowledge. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.