dismissed L-1B Case: It Consulting

identifying data deleted to 
prevent clzarly ~nvzlranted 
invasion of' p 2rsonai privacy 
PUBLIC COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
File: EAC 08 077 51945 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: OCT 0 2 2008 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1 1 0 1 (a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
96r/ 
Robert P. Wiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 08 077 5 1945 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary in the position of "project 
leader (technical)" as an L-1B nonimmigrant intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to 
section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 4 1101(a)(15)(L). The 
petitioner, a New Jersey corporation, describes its business in the Form 1-129 as "IS/IT professional 
consulting services." The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary for a period of two years. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary will be 
employed in the United States in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the petitioner has satisfied the criteria for establishing that 
the beneficiary will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101 (a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies hidher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The primary issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary will be 
employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. 8 C.F.R. 4 214.2(1)(3)(ii). 
EAC 08 077 5 1945 
Page 3 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 11 84(c)(2)(B), provides: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
The petitioner describes the beneficiary's claimed specialized knowledge, past experience, and proposed 
duties in the United States in a letter dated December 3, 2007 as follows: 
Since October 2006, [the beneficiary] has been employed with [the foreign employer] in the 
capacity of Project Leader. In this capacity, he has worked primarily on the Global Hub 
project for BDP International, an affiliated company. The Global Hub project integrates 
logistics management and control. Prior to that he worked on the AGS (agent settlement) 
system for BDP International. The AGS System is a web based system used by agents to 
handle monthly settlements with Partners and agents and also updates the existing legacy 
system in real time. Prior to that he worked on the SAEL (South Africa E-Logistic) 
Integration project for BDP International. The purpose of the project was to integrate SAEL 
and BDP systems. SAEL messages were received over SMTP as an XML attachment 
proprietary to SAEL. [The beneficiary's] job was to co-ordinate and lead the onsite team on 
this project which resulted in the application that converted SEAL messages into GIF (Global 
Integration File) which is proprietary to BDP International. 
Since commencing employment with [the foreign employer] he has worked on the activities 
as described above. Thus, he has the required and necessary specialized and advanced 
knowledge of our projects and their management, required for the position in the US as an 
employee of [the petitioner] working on the projects for BDP International. He is being 
transferred because of this specialized and advanced knowledge of these projects, the 
development of which he is going to coordinate and work on. 
The purpose of the transfer is to have him work on, coordinate and manage this family of 
projects, on-site, at BDP International in Philadelphia, PA. Currently, he has been working 
on the Global Hub project. His role has been to co-ordinate with the on-site team users to 
understand the business needs and requirements, prepare the specifications and lead the team 
EAC 08 077 5 1945 
Page 4 
in the development, implementation and integration of the software. He will continue to 
work on these and other similar projects. 
In the capacity of Project Leader (Technical), he will be working with BDP International 
Management and staff to determine user requirements; work with the Project Manager and 
Architect to devise a solution; put together the business specifications (a road map, as it were) 
and convert these to technical specifications; co-ordinate the on-site team to convert these 
specifications into code and integrate into the system. He may also be involved in per see 
[sic] software development and as a technical lead. However, do note that we are transferring 
him because of his advanced and specialized knowledge of the business and the projects 
rather than because of his managerial capabilities. 
The petitioner also submitted a document titled "project plan" which describes the "global hub" project. The 
plan summarizes the project as the implementation of an accounting project across all of BDP International's 
offices using "Microsoft Dynamics AX - accounting software." The plan also describes the project as the 
"AX Integration Project." 
On January 29, 2008, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, evidence 
that the beneficiary's proposed job duties require specialized knowledge; evidence demonstrating that the 
beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some unusual quality and is not 
generally known by practitioners in the beneficiary's field of endeavor; and evidence that the beneficiary's 
knowledge distinguishes him from those with only elementary or basic knowledge. 
In response, the petitioner submitted a letter dated February 8, 2008, in which it claims that the beneficiary's 
knowledge could only be gained through prior experience with the described projects abroad and that "any 
other individual who has not worked on these projects will be unable to work in the US since he will lack the 
requisite specialize[d] and advanced knowledge." 
On February 22, 2008, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will be employed in the United States in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the petitioner has satisfied the criteria for establishing that 
the beneficiary will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. 
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive in demonstrating that the beneficiary will be 
employed in the United States in a specialized knowledge capacity as defined at 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties. 
 See 8.C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3). 
 The petitioner must submit a detailed job 
description of the services performed sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. 
 In this matter, the 
petitioner fails to establish that the proffered United States position requires an employee with specialized 
knowledge or that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge. 
Although the petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary will be employed in the United States in a 
EAC 08 077 51945 
Page 5 
"specialized knowledge" capacity, the petitioner has not adequately articulated any basis to support ths claim. 
The petitioner has failed to identify any special or advanced body of knowledge which would distinguish the 
beneficiary's role from that of other similarly experienced and educated computer workers employed by the 
petitioning organization or in the industry at large. Going on record without documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 
158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 
1972)). Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties involve specialized 
knowledge; otherwise, meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. See 
Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724, F. Supp. 1 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905, F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
Furthermore, and as noted above, the director specifically requested evidence establishing that the 
beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some unusual quality and is not 
generally known by practitioners in the beneficiary's field of endeavor. The director also requested evidence 
that the beneficiary's knowledge distinguishes him from those with only elementary or basic knowledge. 
However, in response to the Request for Evidence, the petitioner submitted a materially identical description 
of the beneficiary's knowledge and duties and adds, without any elaboration or corroborating evidence, that 
the beneficiary's knowledge could only be gained through prior experience abroad and that "any other 
individual who has not worked on these projects will be unable to work in the US since he will lack the 
requisite specialize[d] and advanced knowledge." Such conclusory, self-serving statements will not satisfy 
the petitioner's burden of proof. Therefore, the petitioner failed to submit any evidence responsive to the 
director's request. Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be 
grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. tj 103.2(b)(14). 
In this matter, the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge of the petitioning 
organization's "projects and their management," e.g., the Global Hub project for BDP International and other 
projects. However, despite this claim, the record does not establish how, exactly, this knowledge materially 
differs from knowledge possessed by other workers employed by the petitioning organization or in the 
industry at large. The record also does not establish why, exactly, this knowledge cannot be imparted to a 
similarly experienced and educated computer worker in a relatively short period of time. Finally, the record 
does not establish that this knowledge differs from general computer knowledge in the context of integration 
and data migration projects, or why experience abroad with the petitioning organization's projects is necessary 
for the proffered position. Again, going on record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for 
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing 
Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190)). It is also important to note that neither counsel 
nor the petitioner corroborates any of their assertions regarding the beneficiary's purported specialized 
knowledge with evidence. The record is devoid of evidence addressing the knowledge of other workers 
employed by the petitioning organization as well as evidence pertaining to the beneficiary's knowledge. 
Without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel and the petitioner will not 
satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. 
Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); 
Matter of Ramivez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503,506 (BIA 1980). 
EAC 08 077 5 1945 
Page 6 
Overall, the record does not establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is substantially different from the 
knowledge possessed by computer workers generally throughout the industry or by other employees of the 
petitioning organization. The fact that few other workers possess very specific knowledge of certain aspects 
of the petitioning organization's project does not alone establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is indeed 
uncommon, advanced, distinguished, or noteworthy. All employees can be said to possess uncommon and 
unparalleled skill sets to some degree; however, a skill set that can be easily imparted to another similarly 
educated and generally experienced accountant is not "specialized knowledge." Moreover, the proprietary or 
unique qualities of the petitioner's projects do not establish that any such knowledge is "special" or 
"advanced." Rather, the petitioner must establish that qualities of the projects require this employee to have 
knowledge beyond what is common in the industry. This has not been established in this matter. The fact 
that other workers outside of the petitioning organization may not have very specific knowledge regarding the 
petitioner's ongoing projects is not relevant to these proceedings if this knowledge gap could be closed by the 
petitioner by simply revealing the information to a newly hired, generally experienced computer worker. 
Furthermore, while the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary acquired his purported "specialized knowledge" 
through work experience, the record is not persuasive in establishing that this truly imparted "specialized 
knowledge" to the beneficiary. The record is devoid of persuasive evidence establishing that the beneficiary's 
experience with the petitioning organization abroad instilled him with specialized knowledge. Again, going 
on record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N 
Dec. 190)). 
The AAO does not dispute the possibility that the beneficiary is a skilled and experienced employee who has 
been, and would be, a valuable asset to the petitioning organization. However, it is appropriate for the AAO 
to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the beneficiary's knowledge of the 
business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N 
Dec. 1 17, 120 (Comm. 198 1) (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8 (R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 
13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)). As stated by the Commissioner in Matter of Penner, when considering 
whether the beneficiaries possessed specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find 
that the occupations inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled 
worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business firm's operation. 
Id. at 53. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized 
knowledge" is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney 
EAC 08 077 5 1945 
Page 7 
General, "[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 
F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended 
for "key personnel." See generally, H.R. REP. NO. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key 
personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's II 
New College Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be 
considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic 
success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of 
"crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. 
Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that 
term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and 
the general labor market, but also between the employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. 
While it may be correct to say that the beneficiary in the instant case is a highly skilled and productive 
employee, this fact alone is not enough to bring the beneficiary to the level of "key personnel." 
Moreover, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the 
specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982). The decision noted that the 1970 House 
Report, H.R. REP. NO. 91-85 1, stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be 
large" and that "[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimrnigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be 
carefully regulated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 5 1. The decision further noted that 
the House Report was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge, but that during the course of the sub- 
committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary 
to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses 
responded that they understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with 
"unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craR workers." Matter 
ofPenner, 18 I&N at 50 (citing H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings 
on H.R. 445, 91St Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner that an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is 
not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that the specialized knowledge worker classification was not 
intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 53. 
Or, as noted in Matter of Colley, "[mlost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given 
specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees 
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. at 119. According to Matter of Penner, "[sluch a conclusion would 
permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1' visa" rather than the "key personnel" that 
Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F. Supp. at 
15 (concluding that Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees 
with specialized knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives.") 
As the petitioner has failed to document any materially unique qualities to the beneficiary's knowledge, the 
petitioner's claims are not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary, while perhaps highly skilled, would 
be a "key" employee. There is no indication that the beneficiary has any knowledge that exceeds that of any 
EAC 08 077 5 1945 
Page 8 
other similarly experienced computer worker or that he has received special training in the company's 
methodologies or processes which would separate him from other workers employed with the petitioning 
organization or elsewhere. It is simply not reasonable to classify this employee as a key employee of crucial 
importance to the organization. 
The legislative history of the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded 
that the beneficiary will not be employed in the United States in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. 
For these reasons, the director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary was 
employed abroad in a position which required specialized knowledge for the requisite one-year period. 8 
C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(iv). 
For similar reasons, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a 
specialized knowledge capacity. The petitioner has failed to identify any special or advanced body of 
knowledge which would distinguish the beneficiary's role from that of other similarly experienced and 
educated computer workers employed by the petitioning organization. Going on record without documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soflci, 
22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190). Specifics are clearly 
an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties involved specialized knowledge; otherwise, meeting 
the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. See Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724, 
F. Supp. 1 103, aff'd, 905, F.2d 41. 
Moreover, the petitioner claims that the beneficiary began working for the petitioning organization in October 
2006. 
 The instant petition was filed approximately 15 months later in January 2008. 
 Therefore, the 
beneficiary would have needed to have acquired the purported specialized knowledge in just three months of 
employment by the petitioning organization in order for him to have been employed for one full year in a 
specialized knowledge capacity. It is not credible that knowledge of a software project which can be imparted 
to a newly hired worker in just three months of on-the-job experience constitutes "specialized" knowledge 
possessed by a key employee. 
Accordingly, petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a position which 
required specialized knowledge for the requisite one-year period, and the petition may not be approved for 
this additional reason. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner failed to establish that it has a qualifying relationship with 
the foreign employer. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. !j 214.2(1)(3)(i) states that a petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be accompanied by 
"[elvidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien are qualifying 
EAC 08 077 51945 
Page 9 
organizations." Title 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G) defines a "qualifying organization" as a firm, corporation, 
or other legal entity which "meets exactly one of the qualifying relationships specified in the definitions of a 
parent, branch, affiliate or subsidiary specified in paragraph (l)(l)(ii) of this section" and "is or will be doing 
business." "Affiliate" is defined in pertinent part as "[olne of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and 
controlled by the same parent or individual." 8 C.F .R. 9 2 14.2(1)(1)(ii)(L)(l). 
In this matter, the record is devoid of evidence establishing that the foreign employer and the petitioner are 
affiliates. The petitioner claims that it is 100% owned and controlled by a Singapore-based company called 
Cyberlog Technologies International Pte. Ltd. The petitioner submits organizational documents pertaining to 
this claim of ownership and control. The petitioner claims that the beneficiary's foreign employer is 
AurionPro Solutions Pte. Ltd., and that this company is wholly owned by AurionPro Solutions Limited, 
which is purportedly listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange. 
However, the record is devoid of evidence establishing that the petitioner and the foreign employer share 
ownership and control. Although the petitioner claims that some of the same individuals occupy leadership 
posts in both companies, this does not establish that the companies are owned and controlled by the same 
parent or individual, or group of entities or individuals. In the context of this visa petition, ownership refers 
to the direct or indirect legal right of possession of the assets of an entity with full power and authority to 
control; control means the direct or indirect legal right and authority to direct the establishment, management, 
and operations of an entity. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 595 (Cornrn. 
1988). Similarly, the record is devoid of evidence establishing that Arshiya International Ltd. truly owns and 
controls both the petitioner's and the foreign employer's controlling shareholders. Once again, going on 
record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N 
Dec. 190). 
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that it has a qualifying relationship with the foreign 
employer, and the petition may not be approved for this additional reason. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.