dismissed L-1B Case: It Consulting

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re: 7605436 
Appeal of Texas Service Center Decision 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date : MAR. 2, 2020 
Form I-129, Petition for L-IB Specialized Knowledge Worker 
The Petitioner , a software design, development, and consulting services business, seeks to continue the 
Beneficiary's temporary employment as a lead consultant - technology under the L-IB nonimrnigrant 
classification for intracompany transferees. Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) 
§ 101(a)(15)(L) , 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L) . The L-IB classification allows a corporation or other legal 
entity (including its affiliate or subsidiary) to transfer a qualifying foreign employee with "specialized 
knowledge" to work temporarily in the United States. 
The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition , concluding that the Petitioner did not 
establish , as required , that the Beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge , that she was employed 
abroad in a capacity involving specialized knowledge , and that she would be employed in a specialized 
knowledge capacity in the United States. The Director also determined that the Petitioner did not 
establish that it is doing business. 
On appeal , the Petitioner contends that the Director's decision did not properly apply the statute , 
regulations , and relevant U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) policy guidance to the 
facts presented. 
In these proceedings , it is the Petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the requested benefit. See 
Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S .C. § 1361. Upon de nova review , we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
To establish eligibility for the L-IB nonimrnigrant visa classification , a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary "in a capacity that is managerial , executive , or involves specialized 
knowledge ," for one continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for 
admission into the United States . Section 101(a)(l5)(L) of the Act. In addition , the beneficiary must 
seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a specialized knowledge capacity. Id. The petitioner 
must also establish that the beneficiary's prior education , training, and employment qualify him or her 
to perform the intended services in the United States . 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3). 
Under the statute, a beneficiary is considered to have specialized knowledge if he or she has: (1) a 
"special" knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets; or (2) an 
"advanced" level of knowledge of the processes and procedures of the company. Section 214( c )(2)(B) 
of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § l 184(c)(2)(B). A petitioner may establish eligibility by submitting evidence that 
the beneficiary and the proffered position satisfy either prong of the statutory definition of specialized 
knowledge. 
Specialized knowledge is also defined as knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning 
organization's product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its 
application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
II. BACKGROUND 
The Petitioner is a publicly-traded software design, development, and IT consulting company with 
over 1700 employees in the United States and more than 20,000 employees worldwide. The record 
reflects that the Beneficiary was previously employed abroad by the Petitioner's Sri Lankan subsidiary 
from December 2009 until December 201 7, where she started as an associate engineer and held the 
position oflead consultant - technology at the time of her transfer to the United States. The Petitioner 
has employed the Beneficiary in the United States since December 2017 and now seeks to continue 
her employment in the position of lead consultant - technology at an annual salary of $52,700. The 
Beneficiary will work primarily at the worksite of the Petitioner's client, The I I I I, inl I Pennsylvania. 
The Beneficiary's resume indicates that she received her bachelor's degree in information technology 
in 2010 and that she has been employed within the Petitioner's group for the entirety of her 
professional career. 
III. SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE 
The primary issue to be addressed is whether the Petitioner established that the Beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge, that she has been employed abroad in position involving specialized knowledge, 1 
and that she will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity in the United States. 
In the denial decision, the Director found that the Petitioner did not establish that the Beneficiary's 
knowledge of the company's internal and proprietary processes, tools, and methodologies equates to 
specialized knowledge, and did not demonstrate how the Beneficiary's previous position abroad or 
current position in the United States require her to possess knowledge that is truly different, 
uncommon, or advanced compared to that possessed by similarly employed workers in the company 
or in the IT services industry. 
On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the Director's decision did not adequately consider the supporting 
statements and evidence submitted in support of the petition or properly apply the relevant law, 
1 The Petitioner did not claim, in the alternative, that the Beneficiary was employed abroad in a managerial or executive 
capacity. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(iv). 
2 
regulations, and policy relating to specialized knowledge. The Petitioner emphasizes that the 
Beneficiary possesses both special and advanced knowledge of its proprietary processes, tools and 
methodologies, as well as knowledge of the client project, and therefore possesses knowledge that 
cannot be found in the United States and cannot be easily transferred to another employee. The 
Petitioner further argues that the Beneficiary possesses characteristics of a specialized knowledge 
employee consistent with USCIS Policy Memorandum PM-602-0111, L-IB Adjudications Policy (Aug. 
17, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/laws/policy-memoranda. 
A. Evaluating Specialized Knowledge 
As a threshold issue, we must determine whether the Petitioner established that the Beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge. If the evidence is insufficient to establish that she possesses 
specialized knowledge, then we cannot conclude that she has been employed abroad in a position 
involving specialized knowledge or would be employed in the United States in a specialized 
knowledge capacity. 
Once a petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type 
of evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized 
knowledge. We cannot make a factual determination regarding a given beneficiary's specialized 
knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature of its products 
and services or processes and procedures, the nature of the specific industry or field involved, and the 
nature of the beneficiary's knowledge. The petitioner should also describe how an employee is able 
to gain specialized knowledge within the organization, and explain how and when the individual 
beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
For the reasons discussed below, the Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge. 
B. Special or Advanced Knowledge 
Here, the Petitioner claims that the Beneficiary possesses both special and advanced knowledge of its 
proprietary processes, tools, and methodologies for delivering IT services to its clients. 
Because "special knowledge" concerns knowledge of the petitioning organization's products or 
services and its application in international markets, a petitioner may meet its burden through evidence 
that the beneficiary has knowledge that is distinct or uncommon in comparison to the knowledge of 
other similarly employed workers in the particular industry. 
With respect to "advanced knowledge," a petitioner may meet its burden through evidence that a given 
beneficiary has knowledge of or expertise in the organization's processes and procedures that is greatly 
developed or further along in progress, complexity, and understanding in comparison to other workers 
in the employer's operations. Such advanced knowledge must be supported by evidence setting that 
knowledge apart from the elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. Knowledge that is 
commonly held throughout a petitioner's industry or that can be readily imparted from one person to 
another is not considered special or advanced knowledge. 
3 
The Petitioner emphasizes that it has invested considerable time and millions of dollars into the 
development of its proprietary processes, tools and methodologies, and has an extensive training, 
testing, and certification framework in place to ensure that its technical staff are well-versed in them. 
The Petitioner acknowledges that other IT service companies are capable of providing similar services 
and have their own internal processes, tools and methodologies for delivering projects to clients. It 
also recognizes that its engineers and consultants, like those employed by its competitors, possess 
expertise in third-party technologies that are common in the industry. However, it claims to have a 
"unique approach to the design, development, installation, testing and deployment process - much like 
a proprietary manufacturing process," and emphasizes that this unique approach is how the company 
differentiates itself from its competitors. 
The Beneficiary is claimed to possess s]iecial and advanced knowledge of the company's I I I ti methodology,! lproject management and tracking 
system, I I code quality governance tool, and I IAPI Accelerator, a cloud-based 
platform for rapid development of API-based banking solutions. Flrther,
1 
the Petitioner indicates that 
she uses these particular tools to perform her assigned duties for the project. 2 
Therefore, the question before us is whether the Beneficiary's knowledge of these proprietary tools, 
processes and methodologies rises to the level of special or advanced knowledge. Knowledge that is 
proprietary or company-specific must still be either special or advanced. Accordingly, the Petitioner 
must establish that qualities of its proprietary tools, processes or methodologies require this 
Beneficiary to have knowledge beyond what is common in the industry. For example, if a Petitioner 
establishes that its proprietary tools and methodologies are sufficiently complex that all of its 
employees who work with them have to undergo considerable training in order to perform their 
assigned duties, this fact may support a finding that knowledge of the proprietary products and tools 
alone constitutes "special knowledge" of the company's services. 
The Petitioner claims its employees must undergo at least one year of formal training, mentoring and 
on-the-job training to acquire even a basic level of knowledge of and proficiency with the proprietary 
processes, tools, and methodologies needed to provide the company's services. On appeal, the 
Petitioner maintains that employees who complete this level of training have special knowledge. It 
further emphasizes that its training departments "have developed and provide advanced training, 
certification and mentoring on its advanced proprietary processes, tools and methodologies - which is 
advanced knowledge once accomplished." The Petitioner states that high performing employees such 
as the Beneficiary are selected for this advanced certification, and explains that such employees "are 
also assigned to certified specialists for months/years long mentoring in the methodologies and tools," 
noting that "it is this training/mentoring combination that really enables [the company] to select and 
place these high performing employees within the on-site teams." The Petitioner indicates that it 
typically requires two to three years for selected employees to obtain the advanced knowledge that the 
Beneficiary is claimed to possess. However, as discussed below, the Petitioner has not adequately 
supported its claim that the Beneficiary completed this extensive period of training and mentoring. 
2 The Petitioner has indicated that the Beneficiary has acquired specialized knowledge of other internal tools including 
.__ ___________ ____,but it does not claim that she will be required to use any of these in her current 
role in the United States. 
4 
The Petitioner submitted a letter from its Sri Lankan subsidiary that listed both the specific training 
courses the Beneficiary has completed since joining the company, and the certification tests she has 
passed. As Jotedl the Petitiyer iudi:atn that the Benf ficiary possesses srecial and advanced 
knowledge o IL,___ __ ___..___ ___ _____, and I APL Based on the 
Petitioner's descript~ training requirements, we would therefore expect the Petitioner to 
provide evidence that she has completed various forms of training, mentoring, and certifications in 
each of these areas. 
The submitted letter indicates that the Beneficiary completed a basic, one day I I Training" 
course on October 10, 2008. 3 It further shows that she completed 20 courses, totaling 71.5 hours, 
between October 2008 and October 201 7. Although the letter indicates that man{ of re courses were 
in the "specialized" or "advanced" category, none of them, but for the one basic course, were in 
the specific tools, methodologies or processes in which she is claimed to have specialized knowledge. 
The subsidiary's letter also listed 19 certifications that the Beneficiary completed via online 
assessments. Fourteen of these certifications were categorized as "basic," and included six D 
I I assessments. Four of the certifications were categorized as "advanced," includinl one I 
completed in January 2010 ( only weeks after her start date with the foreign entity), and two 
I I certifications. The Petitioner highlighted theOcertifications but did not explain the 
significance of the Beneficiary's other certifications. None of them, except for the0 certification, 
appear to relate to her claimed specialized knowledge of the above-referenced company tools, 
processes and methodologies. 
We note that, while there is no requirement that an employee acquire specialized knowledge through 
formal training courses, the Petitioner here has emphasized its well-staffed training departments at all 
company locations and its reliance on proprietary training modules. Its statements consistently 
indicate that knowledge acquisition begins with such training and therefore it is reasonable to ex ect 
the Beneficiary to have completed some formal training inl 11 [,__ ____ --
an~ IAPI. In addition, the Petitioner's statements suggest that there is a dvanced 
course that prepares employees for the advanced certification but the Beneficiary did not complete 
such a course. Although the Petitioner claims that the Benefriary is among a small percentage of 
employees who have completed the advanced certification in the record does not support the 
Petitioner's claim that the knowledge needed to pass it requires extensive training. 
As noted, the Petitioner indicates that its employees acquire special and advanced knowledge not only 
through formal training courses, but also through mentoring. A letter from the foreign entity's Global 
Head of Logistics and Immigration,! I describes the company's formal mentoring 
programs. I lindicates that in addition to completing training courses, "identified high 
performers" are assigned to mentoring relationships. Specifically she describes a process in which 
such employees complete a six-month mentoring program known as the "Buddy Program," after 
which they participate in a "Mini Project Program" that requires another one to six months of 
mentoring. The next step inf e process is t1 be a "sbadoJI team member" on a client project to obtain 
additional mentoring inD ~-------- and I I I explains that once an employee 
3 According to the Beneficiary's resume, she had an internship with the Petitioner's Sri Lank:an subsidiary from October 
2008 until April 2009. 
5 
has completed these steps, they can be assigned to a client team where they will continue to receive 
mentoring and gain more advanced knowledge and proficiency of the company's tools and processes 
for their first "few years." 
Based on I Is statements, it is reasonable to determine that the Beneficiary would have 
completed at least seven to 12 months of mentoring prior to even being assigned to a client team in 
which she was required to use the company's tools, processes and methodologies. The Petitioner 
submitted a chart titled "Formal Mentoring received by the Beneficiary" which indicates that she 
received a total of 132 hours of formal mentoring between March 2013 and the end of 2017. This 
included 12 hours of mentoring in I O I in 2013, 28 hours in 2015, and 28 hours in October 
2017, just prior to her transfer to the United States. During this four-year period, she also received 32 
hours of mentoring in "API Exchange platform -I ~' which appears to relate to thel I 
~ API Accelerator tool. Based on this evidence, we cannot determine that she completing the 
formal mentorin[ program descphed.,by I r or that she was required to undergo extensive 
mentoring on the_ l ol__J Bank API Accelerator tools. Further, the submitte~oes 
not indicate that she received any mentoring with respect to advanced D skills, L__J or 
I I 
Overall, the evidence submitted does not support the Petitioner's claim that the Beneficiary was 
required to undergo two to three years of formal training, mentoring and on-the-job training in order 
to acquire proficiency with the proprietary tools, processes and methodologies in which she is claimed 
to have advanced knowledge. Nor has the Petitioner documented that she completed the one year of 
training and mentoring which the Petitioner claims results in an employee having "special 
knowledge." The Petitioner's evidence reflects that she received approximately 200 hours of training 
and formal mentoring over a period of seven or eight years. While this figure is not insignificant, it 
does not support the Petitioner's claim that its proprietary tools, methodologies and processes are so 
complex, and require such extensive training, that proficiency with them rises to the level of 
specialized knowledge. Because they are proprietary, we acknowledge that they cannot be learned 
outside of the company. However, the robust formal training, certification and mentoring program 
that the Petitioner claims to have in place, and the Beneficiary's completion of such program, is not 
adequately documented in the record. In fact, the Petitioner did not document the Beneficiary's 
completion of any formal training or mentoring in I I orl I two of the tools that are 
claimed to be critical to her current project assignment. 
Given the limited amount of formal training and mentoring that the Petitioner was able to document, 
it is more likely than not that the Beneficiary learned many of the proprietary tools and processes on 
theljob al necessitated by her assignments. For example, the record indicates that she was assigned to 
the project's offshore team in December 2016, and that one of her key duties was to create and 
define customized architecture design and implementation models and APis, as well as 
implementation frameworks, using the proprietad I API accelerator. The record reflects 
that she was assigned to this project in a technical lead role despite having no apparent training or 
prior experience with this proprietary tool, and was provided with 32 hours of mentoring in "API 
Exchange Platform" several months into the project. Proprietary knowledge that can be easily 
transferred to an employee with an appropriate technical background through completion of a short 
period of formal or informal training does not rise to the level of specialized knowledge. 
6 
Overall, while the evidence indicates that the Petitioner's group has its own proprietary methodologies, 
tools and processes for delivering IT services, it has not supported its claim that knowledge of these 
methodologies alone constitutes specialized knowledge. The Petitioner acknowledges that other 
companies providing the same types of services have their own comparable methods for delivering 
those services, and provides comparisons in an attempt to differentiate its own tools and methods from 
those used by its competitors. However it has not supported its claim that its own tools, processes and 
methodologies are so distinct and complex that it would take a significant amount of time to train an 
experienced information technology consultant who had no prior experience with the petitioner's 
family of companies. 
The Petitioner also highlights the Beneficiary's existing knowledge of the ongoingLJproject, 
noting that she possesses knowledge that is not held by any other team member as a result of her 
previous assignment with the project's offshore team. Specifically, the Petitioner states that it would 
take at least six months to retrain another senior level professional from within the organization to 
undertake the role. An organizational chart provided for the on-site project team reflects that the 
Petitioner is one of three lead consultants assigned to the D project. Although requested by the 
Director, the Petitioner did not provide information regarding how the Beneficiary's knowledge, 
training and experience compare to that of similarly employed-workers on her team. 
On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that "the recent trend by the users to demand comparisons to other 
employees within the organization are [sic] incorrect" with respect to special knowledge, and states 
that such comparisons are "not mandated" when evaluating whether a given beneficiary has advanced 
knowledge. 
However, as both "special" and "advanced" are relative terms, determining whether a given 
beneficiary's knowledge is "special" or "advanced" inherently requires a comparison of the 
beneficiary's knowledge against that of others. Further, it is the petitioner's burden to establish a 
favorable comparison. 4 Here, the Petitioner states that the Beneficiary's special knowledge is based, 
in part, on her possession of knowledge that is not held by any other member of her project team, and 
which would require six months to transfer to another similarly experienced company employee. 
Therefore, it was reasonable for the Director to seek information regarding the duties by other 
members of the team and to inquire about their relative training, knowledge, and experience. 
We also acknowledge the Petitioner's claim that specialized knowledge need not be narrowly held 
within a petitioning organization. As noted by the Petitioner, users policy recognizes that multiple 
employees within a company may have obtained the experience, training, or education necessary to 
possess the same type of specialized knowledge, and even acknowledges that some companies may 
use technologies or techniques that are so advanced or complex that nearly all employees working on 
the relevant products or services possess specialized knowledge. 5 As discussed, the Petitioner claims 
that employees within its organization deemed to have special knowledge have completed one year of 
formal training and mentoring, while employees it deems to have advanced knowledge have 
completed two to three years or more of training, mentoring and advanced on-the-job training. 
4 See USCIS Policy Memorandum PM-602-0111, supra, at 7. 
5 Id. at 10. 
7 
The Petitioner claims the Beneficiary possesses advanced knowledge of its proprietary tools, processes 
and methodologies despite the fact that it was able to document her completion of only 200 hours of 
training and formal mentoring. While we do not doubt that she has the knowledge required to perform 
her job duties, the Petitioner has not supported its claims that its employees must undergo extensive 
training in order to gain knowledge of and proficiency with its proprietary tools, methodologies and 
processes. As a result, the Petitioner did not establish that such proprietary knowledge is "special 
knowledge" or that the Beneficiary's own level of knowledge is greatly developed or farther along in 
progress, complexity and understanding than that generally found within the company, such that it can 
be considered "advanced." 
We note that the Petitioner provided a chart indicating that the Beneficiary herself conducted a few 
training sessions between 2013 and 2017, prior to her transfer to the United States, as additional 
evidence of her "advanced knowledge," including training inc=]andl l This evidence 
does not overcome the lack of documentation supporting the Petitioner's claim she herself was 
required to undergo extensive training in order to acquire advanced knowledge of these tools. 
We also acknowledge the Petitioner's claim that the Beneficiary possesses characteristics of a 
specialized knowledge employee consistent with the above-referenced L-lB Adjudications Policy 
Memorandum. However, for the reasons discussed, the Petitioner has not submitted sufficient 
evidence to establish that the Beneficiary possesses knowledge that is either special or 
advanced. While we do not doubt that the Petitioner's internal tools, processes and methodologies for 
delivering client projects are critical to the company's productivity and competitiveness in the 
marketplace, and the Beneficiary is skilled in providing services that rely on these methodologies, this 
characteristic alone is not probative of the Beneficiary's specialized knowledge. As noted in the 
memorandum, the "characteristics" listed by the Petitioner are only "factors that USCIS may consider 
when determining whether a beneficiary's knowledge is specialized." Id. The memorandum 
emphasizes that "ultimately, it is the weight and type of evidence that establishes whether the 
beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge." Id. at 13. The Petitioner here has not submitted 
sufficient evidence to establish how the Beneficiary's knowledge qualifies as "special" or "advanced." 
For the reasons discussed, the Petitioner has not established that knowledge of its proprietary tools 
and methodologies alone is sufficient to establish "specialized knowledge" because it has not shown 
that this proprietary knowledge is sufficiently distinct or uncommon or that it could not be readily 
transferred to another IT professional with the requisite functional and technical background. The 
Petitioner's claim that it would require up to three years to acquire the knowledge needed for the U.S. 
position is simply not supported by the record. 
Because the Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge, we 
need not farther address whether she has been employed abroad in a position involving specialized 
knowledge or would be employed in the United States in a specialized knowledge capacity. 
IV. DOING BUSINESS 
The Director also denied the Petitioner based on a finding that the Petitioner did not establish that it is 
a qualifying organization that is doing business as defined in the regulations. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 
214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G) and (H). 
8 
Specifically, the Director determined that the Petitioner was not registered to do business in 
Pennsylvania and stated that it is "legally required to be authorized to conduct business as a foreign 
corporation in the State where the job is located before it is recognized as a valid business." The 
Director also found that "no employment opportunity exists because there is no legally authorized 
employer" in Pennsylvania. 
We will withdraw the Director's determination with respect to this issue. As noted, the Petitioner is a 
publicly trading U.S. corporation with headquarters in Massachusetts. The Petitioner indicated on the 
petition that the Beneficiary will work at a client site located in Pennsylvania in addition to working 
at its headquarters. There is no requirement that the Petitioner maintain a registered and active office 
in the state where the Beneficiary will engage in off-cite employment, and the record contains ample 
evidence that the Petitioner is doing business as defined by the regulations. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The appeal will be dismissed because the Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
9