dismissed L-1B Case: Seafood Processing

identifying data deleted to 
prevent clearly unwarr~nted 
invasion of personal pnvacy 
PUBLIC copy 
u.s. Department of Homeland Security 
U.S. Citizenship and Irrnnigration Services 
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
DATE: JUN 1 7 2011 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: 
INRE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 
PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker under Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.c. § 1101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents 
related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that 
any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional 
information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The 
specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be 
submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, 
with a fee of $630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed 
within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen. 
Thank you, 
Perry Rhew 
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
www.uscis.gov 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office ("AAO") on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the 
appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition to employ the beneficiary an L-lB intracompany transferee 
with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 101 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (lithe Act"), 
U.S.c. § 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner, a seafood processing company, is a subsidiary 
_. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary in the position of Seafood Processing Technical Advisor for a 
period of three years. The petitioner indicates that the beneficiary will work onsite at seafood processing plants 
operated by its affiliates and suppliers. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner emphasizes that the 
beneficiary has 27 years of experience as a seafood processing specialist for the petitioner's parent company 
and has a very advanced level of knowledge about the petitioner's seafood processing systems and techniques 
and the special requirements of the Japanese market. Counsel contends that the director erred in concluding 
that the beneficiary possesses knowledge or performs duties that are common in the petitioner's industry. 
Counsel submits a brief and copies of previously provided evidence in support of the appeal. 
I. The Law 
To establish L-l eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must demonstrate that the 
beneficiary, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, has 
been employed abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge, for one continuous year by a qualifying organization. The petitioner must also demonstrate that the 
beneficiary seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(1)(ii)(G) ofthis section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
Page 3 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
Under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, an alien is eligible for classification as a nonimmigrant if the alien, 
among other things, will be rendering services to the petitioning employer "in a capacity that is managerial, 
executive, or involves specialized knowledge." Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(B), 
provides the statutory definition of specialized knowledge: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special knowledge 
of the company product and its application in international markets or has an advanced level of 
knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as: 
[S]pecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
Section 214(c)(2)(F) ofthe Act, 8 U.S.c. § 1 1 84(c)(2)(F) (the "L-l Visa Reform Act"), in tum, provides: 
An alien who will serve in a capacity involving specialized knowledge with respect to an 
employer for purposes of section 1 0 1 (a)( 15)(L) and will be stationed primarily at the worksite of 
an employer other than the petitioning employer or its affiliate, subsidiary, or parent shall not be 
eligible for classification under section 101(a)(15)(L) if-
(i) the alien will be controlled and supervised principally by such unaffiliated 
employer; or 
(ii) the placement of the alien at the worksite of the unaffiliated employer is 
essentially an arrangement to provide labor for hire for the unaffiliated 
employer, rather than a placement in connection with the provision of a product 
or service for which specialized knowledge specific to the petitioning employer 
IS necessary. 
Section 214( c )(2)(F) of the Act is applicable to all L-lB petitions filed after June 6, 2005, including petition 
extensions and amendments for individuals that are currently in L-IB status. See Pub. L. No. 108-447, Div. I, 
Title IV, § 412, 118 Stat. 2809, 3352 (Dec. 8,2004). 
Page 4 
II. Specialized Knowledge 
The first issue addressed by the director is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary has been 
and will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity and whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge. 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(l)(3)(ii) and (iv). 
The petitioner filed the Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, on January 30,2009. The petitioner 
indicated on the Form 1-129 that the beneficiary has been employed in the position of seafood processing 
technician for the petitioner's parent company and its affiliates since March 1981, where he has been engaged in 
seafood processing of bottom fish, crab, Pollock roe and salmon roe. The petitioner stated that his role as a 
seafood processing technical advisor for the U.S. company will require him to "provide technical advice and 
assistance on processing of Pollock roe, surimi and crab for export to Japan and other countries." 
In a letter dated January 23, 2009, the petitioner described the beneficiary's proposed role as follows: 
[The beneficiary] will provide technical advice and assistance in connection with the seafood 
processing operations of our u.S. subsidiaries and suppliers in Alaska. He will make sure that 
the seafood products we purchase for export to Japan meet the quality control standards of [the 
parent company] and the Japanese market. He will inspect the raw materials and work in 
progress, he will recommend changes and adjustments to the seafood processing equipment, he 
will supervise and train the factoyr workers, and he will troubleshoot problems and issues that 
arise during the seafood processing operation. [The beneficiary] will also make 
recommendations concerning ongoing quality control and continuous product improvement 
measures. 
[The beneficiary's] initial assignment will be to supervise the quality control of the crab 
processing operation on the Baronof catcher processor vessel. After that he will be assigned to 
other seafood processing plants that are owned and operated by our U.S. affiliates and suppliers. 
The petitioner provided a description of the seafood processing operations carried out by its u.s. affiliate, Unisea, 
Inc., and other affiliates, subsidiaries and suppliers. The vessel to which the beneficiary will be assigned, 
•••• produces crab for export to Japan. The petitioner indicated that its agreement with the vessel requires it 
to place one technical advisor on board to supervise the quality control of the crab being exported, during the 
months of February and March each year. The petitioner explained that "the Japanese technical advisors playa 
critical role in ensuring that the products meet the strict standards of the Japanese market and achieve the highest 
price for the U.S. exporters." 
The petitioner stated that its affiliates and suppliers in Alaska produce snow crab, red king crab, blue king crab 
and brown king crab for the food service industry, retail and other distributors. The petitioner indicated that "crab 
products exported to Japan require specialists to evaluate the freshness ofthe raw material and to grade the quality 
of the crab meat based on the quality of the crab meat, taste, density, size and change of appearance." The 
petitioner further stated that "the specialists must also provide technical assistance on the use of anti-blackening 
agents and anti-oxidants, as well as strict temperature control during cooking and freezing." 
Page 5 
Finally, the petitioner described the beneficiary's experience as follows: 
He joined [the parent company] in March 1981 and he is one of their most senior Seafood 
Processing Technicians. From 1981 to 1983, he worked mainly on processing of crab, salmon, 
salmon roe (salmon eggs), Pollock roe and tuna in shoreside plants in Japan and other countries 
all over the world. From 1983 to present, he has engaged in processing of crab, salmon roe, 
herring roe and capelin at shoreside plans in East Canada, Alaska and other countries in Europe. 
The petitioner submitted a copy of its parent company's annual report; a company profile for its U.S. affiliate, 
which operates processing facilities in Dutch Harbor, Alaska; general organizational charts 
depicting the organization of the processing plants; the beneficiary's brief resume; and a letter from the Japan Fish 
Trader's Association verifying that beneficiary, with 27 years in the industry, has the "necessary experience and 
knowledge to process and grade Salmon, Pollock Roe, Crab and other marine products which are exported to 
Japan." 
The director issued a request for additional evidence ("RFE") on February 20, 2009, in which she instructed the 
petitioner to submit, inter alia, the following: (1) a more detailed description of the beneficiary's duties in the 
U.S.; (2) a more detailed explanation of exactly what is the equipment, product, system, technique, research or 
service of which the beneficiary has specialized knowledge, along with information regarding whether the 
product is produced by other employers in the United States and abroad; (3) an explanation of how the duties the 
beneficiary will perform in the U.S. are special, advanced or otherwise different from those performed by other 
workers employed by the petitioner or other U.S. employers in the industry; (4) information regarding the training 
the beneficiary will provide, if applicable; and (5) the impact on the petitioner's business if the petitioner is unable 
to obtain the beneficiary's services. The director requested similar information with respect to the beneficiary's 
duties abroad, as well as timelines for the beneficiary's training and experience with the foreign entity. The 
director advised the petitioner that any assertion that the beneficiary possesses an advanced level of knowledge of 
the petitioner's processes and procedures must be supported by evidence describing and setting apart that 
knowledge from the elementary knowledge possessed by others. The director advised that it is the weight and 
type of evidence that establishes whether or not the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. 
In a response dated April 2, 2009, counsel further discussed the beneficiary's role and responsibilities as follows: 
Quality control of crab processing involves maintaining freshness and cleanliness as well as 
proper temperature during the entire process of catching, holding, butchering, gilling, boiling, 
cooling, chilling, brine freezing, glazing, de-blooding, packing, storing and shipping. Mistakes 
are costly in terms of the quality of the end product and health and safety of food customers. 
[The foreign entity] has developed its own processing methods and techniques to ensure the 
quality of its fresh, cooked and frozen crab products meet the requirements of the Japanese 
market, including the appearance of the final product which is critical to the reputation of our 
brand. 
In response to the director's request that the petitioner describe any special or advanced duties the beneficiary 
performs, counsel emphasized that the beneficiary has 27 years of experience in seafood processing, and is one of 
its most experienced quality control specialists for crab processing having worked for the parent company's 
Page 6 
affiliates and suppliers all over the world. Counsel asserted that the quality control responsibilities to be 
performed "can only be done by a specialist with experience in such type of seafood processing for the Japanese 
market." Counsel emphasized that most seafood processing work is done by U.S. workers, while the job of the 
technical advisor is to ensure that the work is done properly and that the quality of the end product meets the 
standards and requirements of the parent company and the Japanese market. Counsel further indicated that the 
beneficiary would help to supervise and train U.S. workers, citing high employee turnover as a factor. 
In response to the director's query about the impact the beneficiary's absence would have on its business, counsel 
stated that his inability to undertake the L-lB assignment may result in a reduced price for the U.S. exports sold to 
the Japanese markets or require the foreign entity to purchase its crab from another supplier in another country 
where it can ensure the quality control of the crab processing operation. 
Finally, with respect to the director's request that the petitioner provide more detailed information regarding the 
beneficiary's qualifying employment abroad, counsel reiterated that the beneficiary has 27 years of experience in 
seafood processing operations, making him one of the foreign entity's most experienced employees for crab 
processmg. 
In addition, the petitioner submitted a separate statement "explaining how [the beneficiary] possesses all of the 
characteristics of an employee who has specialized knowledge." In this regard, the petitioner stated that the 
beneficiary possesses knowledge that is valuable to the employer's competitiveness in the marketplace, noting 
that the beneficiary's knowledge about crab processing for the Japanese market "is important to the quality control 
of the processing operation and the reputation and price of the products exported to Japan." 
The petitioner further indicated that the beneficiary is qualified to contribute to the U.S. company's knowledge of 
foreign operating conditions as a result of specialized knowledge not generally found in the industry. The 
petitioner explained that the beneficiary will contribute to the knowledge of Japanese crab processing methods at 
the U.S. plants of the petitioner's affiliates and suppliers, and that his advanced level of knowledge in this area is 
not generally found in the seafood industry. 
In addition, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary's services have been utilized abroad in a capacity involving 
significant assignments which have enhanced the company's productivity, competitiveness, image or financial 
position. Specifically, the petitioner indicated that the beneficiary has worked for the foreign entity's affiliates 
and suppliers all over the world, engaged in the quality control of all aspects of crab processing operations. The 
petitioner emphasized that mistakes are costly in terms of the quality of the product and the health and safety of 
food consumers. 
The petitioner stated that the beneficiary also possesses knowledge which normally can only be gained through 
prior experience with the company, noting that the parent company "has developed its own processing methods 
and techniques to ensure the quality of its fresh, cooked and frozen crab products meet the requirements of the 
Japanese market, including the appearance of the fmal product which is critical to the reputation of the brand. 
The petitioner noted that the beneficiary's knowledge of the company's methods cannot easily be taught or 
transferred to another person, as it was acquired over a period of 27 years. The petitioner emphasized that there is 
a high turnover among the Alaskan workforce due to the isolated location and difficult working conditions. 
Page 7 
Finally, the petitioner indicated that the beneficiary's 27 years as a crab processing specialist for its parent 
company has given the beneficiary knowledge of crab processing requirements for the Japanese market that is not 
generally known in the United States. 
In a separate statement, the petitioner noted that, since joining the petitioner's parent company in 1981, the 
beneficiary has spent most of his career specializing in crab processing. The petitioner noted that the beneficiary 
"has specialized training in using [the foreign entity's] methods for producing top quality crab products for the 
Japanese market." The petitioner emphasized that its U.S. affiliates and suppliers have plenty of U.S. workers to 
perform "regular crab processing work," and that it requires the beneficiary to provide technical assistance and 
ensure the quality control of the processing operation. 
The petitioner's response to the RFE also included a chart outlining the steps in the crab processing operation, 
from off-loading to cold storage of processed crab. The chart indicates that raw crab section frozen products 
destined for export to the Japanese market undergo one extra step, "de-blooding," during the process, and are 
subject to an extra chemical process during the pre-chilling phase to control blackening. The chart indicates that 
the Japanese authority established a strict residual level for this chemical additive (sulfite) for imported products. 
The petitioner summarized the role of the Japanese crab processing specialist as follows: 
Historically speaking, unlike surimi and pollock roe technicians, Japanese crab technicians in the 
Alaska fishing industry tend to take the buyers' perspective. Crabs are highly valued products 
and there are many specialized products solely targeted to the Japanese market, such as raw crab 
sections, small box products with the combination of raw and boiled crabs, the boiled round crab 
in which the appearance is critical, air-shipped live crabs, and crab guts (kanimiso). Technicians 
who have the buyers' perspective are needed, not only because buyers need the quality assurance, 
but also because buying policies vary depending on market conditions, catch and prices. Thus 
production conditions need to vary complying with those policies. 
The petitioner also submitted an "onboard history" for the beneficiary which provides his dates of assignment, 
ship name, and the types of products with which he worked, since joining the foreign entity in 1981. 
The director denied the petition on June 3, 2009, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the 
beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a capacity involving 
specialized knowledge. In denying the petition, the director emphasized that the duties the beneficiary has 
performed for the foreign entity appear to have been essentially those of a skilled worker, and require skills 
and knowledge which is common among seafood processing specialists employed by the foreign entity and 
others in the seafood processing industry. The director reached a similar conclusion regarding the 
beneficiary's proposed employment in the United States, noting that the knowledge possessed by seafood 
processing specialists has not been shown to be unique to a particular employer, but rather appears to be 
common throughout the petitioner's industry. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director erred by concluding that the beneficiary is an 
ordinary skilled worker. Counsel emphasizes that the beneficiary has 27 years of experience working as a 
seafood processing specialist for the parent company in Japan and "has a very advanced level of knowledge 
Page 8 
about the petitioner's seafood processing systems and techniques and the special requirements of the Japanese 
market." Counsel stresses that the beneficiary'S role is "much different that the thousands of other seafood 
processing workers who are employed at the plants in Alaska," and contends that "the record is clear that the 
beneficiary has specialized knowledge about the petitioner's products and that he will be employed in a 
position that requires specialized knowledge about the petitioner's seafood processing systems that are 
specially designed for the Japanese market." 
Counsel incorporates all previously submitted statements provided by the petitioner into his brief and asserts 
that such statements provide "substantial evidence" concerning the beneficiary'S specialized knowledge. 
Counsel contends that USCIS simply overlooked or ignored the evidence submitted, and emphasizes that its 
parent company "has developed its own processing methods and techniques to ensure the quality of its fresh, 
cooked and frozen crab products meet the requirements of the Japanese market, including the appearance of 
the final product which is critical to the reputation of its brand." 
Finally, counsel notes that USCIS had recently approved 13 similar L-IB petitions for the petitioner's seafood 
processing specialists, thereby making the denial of the instant petition "arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of 
discretion. " 
Upon review, and for the reasons discussed herein, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge or that he has been or would be employed in a capacity requiring specialized 
knowledge. 
The Standard for Specialized Knowledge 
Looking to the language of the statutory definition, Congress has provided USCIS with an ambiguous definition 
of specialized knowledge. In this regard, one Federal district court explained the infeasibility of applying a 
bright-line test to define what constitutes specialized knowledge: 
This ambiguity is not merely the result of an unfortunate choice of dictionaries. It reflects the 
relativistic nature of the concept special. An item is special only in the sense that it is not 
ordinary; to define special one must first define what is ordinary .... There is no logical or 
principled way to determine which baseline of ordinary knowledge is a more appropriate reading 
of the statute, and there are countless other baselines which are equally plausible. Simply put, 
specialized knowledge is a relative and empty idea which cannot have a plain meaning. Cj 
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1982). 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 9, 14-15 (D.D.C., 1990).1 
While Congress did not provide explicit guidance for what should be considered ordinary knowledge, the 
principles of statutory interpretation provide some clue as to the intended scope of the L-l B specialized 
Although 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General was decided prior to enactment of the statutory definition of 
specialized knowledge by the Immigration Act of 1990, the court's discussion of the ambiguity in the legacy 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) definition is equally illuminating when applied to the definition 
created by Congress. 
Page 9 
knowledge category. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) 
(citinglNSv. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,107 S.Ct. 1207,94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). 
First, the AAO must look to the language of section 214(c)(2)(B) itself, that is, the terms "special" and 
"advanced." Like the courts, the AAO customarily turns to dictionaries for help in determining whether a word in 
a statute has a plain or common meaning. See, e.g., In re A.H Robins Co., 109 F.3d 965,967-68 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(using Webster's Dictionary for "therefore"). According to Webster's New College Dictionary, the word "special" 
is commonly found to mean "surpassing the usual" or "exceptional." Webster's New College Dictionary, 1084 
(3rd Ed. 2008). The dictionary defines the word "advanced" as "highly developed or complex" or "at a higher 
level than others." Id. at 17. 
Second, looking at the term's placement within the text of section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the AAO notes that 
specialized knowledge is used to describe the nature of a person's employment and that the term is listed among 
the higher levels of the employment hierarchy together with "managerial" and "executive" employees. Based on 
the context of the term within the statute, the AAO therefore would expect a specialized knowledge employee to 
occupy an elevated position within a company that rises above that of an ordinary or average employee. See 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 14. 
Third, a review of the legislative history for both the original 1970 statute and the subsequent 1990 statute 
indicates that Congress intended for USCIS to closely administer the L-lB category. Specifically, the original 
drafters of section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Act intended that the class of persons eligible for the L-l classification 
would be "narrowly drawn" and "carefully regulated and monitored" by USCIS. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91-
851 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750, 2754, 1970 WL 5815. The legislative history of the 1970 Act 
plainly states that "the number of temporary admissions under the proposed 'L' category will not be large." Id In 
addition, the Congressional record specifically states that the L-l category was intended for "key personnel." 
See generally, id The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "[o]f 
crucial importance." Webster's New College Dictionary 620 (3rd ed., Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing 
Co. 2008). Moreover, during the course of the sub-committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically 
questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response 
to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow 
"high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower 
categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." See H.R. Subcomm. No.1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration 
Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445, 91 5t Congo 210,218,223,240,248 (Nov. 12, 1969). 
Neither in 1970 nor in 1990 did Congress provide a controlling, unambiguous definition of "specialized 
knowledge," and a narrow interpretation is consistent with so much of the legislative intent as it is possible to 
determine. H. Rep. No. 91-851 at 6, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2754. This interpretation is consistent with legislative 
history, which has been largely supportive of a narrow reading of the definition of specialized knowledge and the 
L-l visa classification in general. See 1756, Inc. V. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 15-16; Bot Na Braza 
Atlanta, LLC V. Upchurch, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2372846 at *4 (N.D.Tex., 2005), affd 194 
Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006); Fibermaster, Ltd V. INS., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1990 WL 99327 (D.D.C., 
1990); Delta Airlines, Inc. V. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Action 00-2977-LFO (D.D.C. April 6, 2001)(on file with 
AAO). 
Page 10 
Further, although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized 
knowledge" in section 214( c )(2) of the Act, the definition did not generally expand the class of persons eligible 
for L-IB specialized knowledge visas. Pub.L. No. 101-649, § 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1990). Instead, 
the legislative history indicates that Congress created the statutory definition of specialized knowledge for the 
express purpose of clarifying a previously undefined term from the Immigration Act of 1970. H.R. Rep. 101-
723(1) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6749, 1990 WL 200418 ("One area within the L visa that 
requires more specificity relates to the term 'specialized knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have 
exacerbated the problem."). While the 1990 Act declined to codify the "proprietary knowledge" and "United 
States labor market" references that had existed in the previous agency definition found at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(D) (1988), there is no indication that Congress intended to liberalize its own 1970 definition of 
the L-l visa classification. 
If any conclusion can be drawn from the enactment of the statutory definition of specialized knowledge in section 
214(c)(2)(B), it would be based on the nature of the Congressional clarification itself. By not including any strict 
criterion in the ultimate statutory definition and further emphasizing the relativistic aspect of "special knowledge," 
Congress created a standard that requires USCIS to make a factual determination that can only be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, based on the agency's expertise and discretion. Rather than a bright-line standard that would 
support a more rigid application of the law, Congress gave the INS a more flexible standard that requires an 
adjudication based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. Cj Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 
369,377 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89, 91 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
To determine what is special or advanced, USCIS must first determine the baseline of ordinary. As a 
baseline, the terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than simply "skilled" or "experienced." By 
itself, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex products will not equal "special 
knowledge." See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Comm. 1982). In general, all employees can 
reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the 
overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. 
An employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average 
employee. In other words, specialized knowledge generally requires more than a short period of experience; 
otherwise special or advanced knowledge would include every employee in an organization with the 
exception of trainees and entry-level staff. If everyone in an organization is specialized, then no one can be 
considered truly specialized. Such an interpretation strips the statutory language of any efficacy and cannot 
have been what Congress intended. 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's, not USCIS's, burden to articulate 
and establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(B). USCIS cannot make a factual 
determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, 
articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is 
typically gained within the organization, and explain how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
Once the petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of 
evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. A 
petitioner's assertion that the beneficiary possesses advanced knowledge of the processes and procedures of 
Page 11 
the company must be supported by evidence describing and distinguishing that knowledge from the 
elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" are comparative 
terms, the petitioner should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary's knowledge 
relative to others in the petitioner's workforce or relative to similarly employed workers in the petitioner's 
specific industry. 
Analysis 
Upon review, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary possesses knowledge that may be 
deemed "specialized" or "advanced" under the statutory definition at section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. The 
decision of the director will be affirmed as it relates to this issue and the appeal will be dismissed. 
In examining the specialized knowledge of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's description of 
the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(J)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services to be performed sufficient to 
establish specialized knowledge. Merely asserting that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge will not suffice to meet the petitioner's burden of proof. 
The petitioner in this case has failed to establish either that the beneficiary's position in the United States or 
abroad requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge. 
Although the petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary has been and will be employed in a "specialized 
knowledge" capacity, the petitioner has not adequately articulated or documented any basis to support this 
claim. The petitioner has failed to identify any special or advanced body of knowledge which would 
distinguish the beneficiary's role from that of other similarly experienced seafood processing specialists 
employed by the petitioning organization or in the petitioner's industry. Going on record without 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter ofSoffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm'r. 1972)). Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's 
duties involve specialized knowledge; otherwise, meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of 
reiterating the regulations. See Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724, F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905, 
F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). The petitioner failed to articulate, with specificity, the nature of the claimed 
specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner claims that the beneficiary's specialized knowledge is based upon his knowledge of the 
petitioner's parent company's seafood processing systems and techniques, quality control standards and the 
special requirements of the Japanese market. However, the petitioner has not differentiated its processing 
methods or quality standards from those of any other seafood company. Merely claiming that the beneficiary 
is familiar with internal processes and standards is insufficient if those standards are not materially different 
from those that are generally known and used by similarly experienced workers. While the petitioner claimed 
that the beneficiary underwent training in its internal processes, the petitioner has not specified the amount or 
type of training the beneficiary completed or provided evidence that he completed the training. Going on 
record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof 
in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft 
of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
Page 12 
It is reasonable to believe that the petitioner's industry is highly regulated in the United States and Japan, with 
quality control standards that must be met by any licensed seafood processer. While the petitioner provided a 
fairly detailed description of the steps that occur during crab processing at its affiliate's Alaskan plant, and noted 
that a few additional steps are needed for certain products exported to Japan, it remains unclear what, if any, 
specialized knowledge is required to supervise these operations, or what differences exist between the Japanese 
market and other markets in terms of seafood processing, appearance and quality control. Japan is the leading 
export market for Alaska's seafood, and seafood is Alaska's largest export commodity? Given the long-standing 
trade relationship, the petitioner's claim that Alaskan seafood processors, apparently including its own U.S. based 
affiliate which has been operating a plant in Alaska since 1974, are unfamiliar with Japanese market requirements 
is not entirely credible. Even if the petitioner could establish that knowledge of Japanese market requirements 
constitutes specialized knowledge for the purposes of employment in the United States, the petitioner is also 
required to establish that the beneficiary'S qualifYing period of employment abroad involved specialized 
knowledge. The petitioner has not claimed that Japanese seafood processing specialists working in Japan are 
unfamiliar with Japanese market requirements, and the AAO assumes that such knowledge is in fact commonly 
held among the foreign entity's workforce. 
As the petitioner has not specified the amount or type of training its technical staff members receive in the 
company's tools and procedures, it cannot be concluded that its processes are particularly complex or 
different compared to those utilized by other companies in the industry, or that it would take a significant 
amount of time to train an experienced seafood processing specialist who is familiar with the Alaskan and 
Japanese seafood industries. 
Overall, the evidence submitted does not establish that knowledge of the petitioner's processing or quality control 
techniques or familiarity with the Japanese seafood market constitutes specialized knowledge or that this 
knowledge is so complex that it could not be readily transferred to similarly trained and experienced employees 
from outside the petitioning organization. 
To establish eligibility in this proceeding, the petitioner must establish that the beneficiary possesses an advanced 
level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's processes and procedures and that the position requires such 
knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(D). 
In this regard, the petitioner relies on the beneficiary'S long tenure with the foreign entity working in crab and 
other seafood processing operations all over the world. The petitioner has not explained in any detail the specific 
capacities in which the beneficiary has worked, and it is not clear to what extent he has been employed as a 
regular processing technician, or to what extent he has been employed in a "specialist" or "technical advisor" 
position. The evidence submitted does not demonstrate a progression in his skills, assignments or lev=e ..... t -=o"'"f---­
authority over his long tenure with the company or suggest that he has achieved a role that is reserved for those 
with an advanced knowledge of the company's policies and procedures. It is unclear at what point in the 
beneficiary'S 27-year tenure he was considered to have acquired specialized knowledge. The petitioner has also 
not provided any information that would assist US CIS in comparing the beneficiary'S skills and knowledge to that 
2 See "2007 Exports," State of Alaska, Office of the Governor < http://www.gov.state.ak.us/trade/pdf/State% 
200fOIo20 Alaska%202007%20Annual%20Report%200fOIo20Exports.pdf> (accessed on June 1, 2011, copy 
incorporated into record of proceeding) 
Page 13 
of other similarly employed workers within the organization, many of which may have a similarly long tenure 
with the company. 
According to the reasoning of Matter of Penner, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex 
products will not equal "special knowledge." USCIS must interpret specialized knowledge to require more than 
fundamental job skills or a short period of experience. However, an expansive interpretation of specialized 
knowledge in which any experienced employee would qualify as having special or advanced knowledge would be 
untenable, since it would allow a petitioner to transfer any experienced employee to the United States in L-lB 
classification. The term "special" or "advanced" must mean more than experienced or skilled. In other terms, 
specialized knowledge requires more than a short period of experience, otherwise, "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge would include every employee with the exception of trainees and recent recruits. 
Although it is accurate to say that the statute does not require that the advanced knowledge be narrowly held 
throughout the company, it is equally true to state that knowledge will not be considered "special" or "advanced" 
if it is universally or even widely held throughout a company. Here, the petitioner's argued standard for advanced 
knowledge appears to require nothing more than an extended period of service performing duties related to the 
U.S. position, qualifications that may be widely held by the petitioner's Japanese workforce. 
It is also appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 117, 120 (Comm. 1981) (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 618 
(R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.c. 1971)). As stated by the Commissioner in Matter 
of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 (Comm. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed 
specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find that the occupations inherently 
qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have 
unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the 
following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business' operation. 
Id. at 53. In the present matter, the evidence of record demonstrates that the beneficiary is more akin to an 
employee whose skills and experience enable him to provide a service, rather than an employee who has 
unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. 
Here, the petitioner, through counsel, continually claims that Japanese seafood processing technicians like the 
beneficiary are of crucial importance to the petitioner's business. However, the petitioner has not provided 
any information pertaining to others employed by the petitioner, despite the director's specific request for such 
information. Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds 
for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14). 
Page 14 
Nor did the petitioner distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge, work experience, or training from the other 
employees. Without such evidence, the AAO cannot conclude that the beneficiary's knowledge is "advanced" 
and, for the reasons discussed above, cannot accept the blanket assertion that all Japanese processing 
specialists employed by the foreign entity possess "advanced knowledge" of the petitioner's processes and 
procedures. 
It appears that the petitioner's business thrives on providing high quality seafood to the Japanese market. Its 
practice of providing a small number of native Japanese technicians to U.S.-based seafood processing 
operations undertaken by its affiliates and suppliers may assist the company in reaching its objectives. 
However, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's training, work experience, or knowledge 
of processing crabs and crab products for the Japanese market is more advanced than the knowledge possessed by 
others employed by the petitioner, or in the industry. It is clear that the petitioner considers the beneficiary to be a 
skilled and important employee of the organization. The AAO does not dispute the fact that the beneficiary's 
knowledge has allowed him to competently perform his duties for the foreign entity for many years. However, 
the successful completion of one's job duties does not distinguish the beneficiary as an employee possessing 
advanced knowledge of the petitioner's processes and procedures, nor does it establish employment in a 
specialized knowledge capacity with the foreign entity. 
Nor does the record establish that the proposed u.s. position requires specialized knowledge. While the 
position of seafood processing technical advisor may require a comprehensive knowledge of the manner in 
which to process crab and other seafood products in a manner which conforms to the requirements of the 
Japanese export market and the petitioner's quality standards, the petitioner has not established that this 
position requires "specialized knowledge" as defined in the regulations and the Act. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive interpretation 
of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary should be considered a 
member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. 
Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded that the beneficiary does 
not possess specialized knowledge, nor would the beneficiary be employed in a capacity requiring specialized 
knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
Finally, the AAO acknowledges counsel's claim that USCIS has approved over a dozen similar petitions filed by 
the petitioning company on behalf of Japanese seafood processing specialists. The record of proceeding does not 
contain copies of the visa petitions that the petitioner claims were previously approved. Each nonimmigrant 
petition filing is a separate proceeding with a separate record and a separate burden of proof. See 8 C.F.R. § 
103 .8( d). In making a determination of statutory eligibility, USCIS is limited to the information contained in that 
individual record of proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. § 103 .2(b )(16)(ii). 
In the present matter, the director reviewed the record of proceeding and concluded that the instant 
beneficiary is ineligible for the benefit sought. In both the request for evidence and the final denial, the 
director clearly articulated the objective statutory and regulatory requirements and applied them to the case at 
hand. If the previous nonimmigrant petitions were approved based on the same unsupported assertions that 
are contained in the current record, the approvals would constitute material and gross error on the part of the 
director. The AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not been 
Page 15 
demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, e.g. Matter of Church 
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). It would be absurd to suggest that USCIS 
or any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery, 825 
F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.c. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.