remanded L-1B Case: Seafood Processing

identifying data deleted to 
prevent clearly unwarr~nted. 
invasion of personal pnvac) 
PUBLIC COpy 
DATE: JUN 27 2011 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER FILE: •••••• 
INRE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 
PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker under Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents 
related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that 
any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office. 
Thank you, 
PerryRhew 
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
www.uscis.gov 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office ("AAO") on appeal. The AAO will withdraw the 
director's decision and remand the matter to the director for further action and entry of a new decision. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition to employ the beneficiary as an L-1 B intracompany transferee 
with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (lithe Act"), 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner, a seafood processing company, is a subsidiary 
_ The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary in the position of Seafood Processing Technical Advisor for a 
period of three years. The petitioner indicates that the beneficiary will work onsite at seafood processing plants 
operated by its affiliates and suppliers. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary has at least 
one continuous year of full-time employment abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years 
preceding the filing of the petition, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(iii). In denying the petition, the 
director observed that the beneficiary has been employed intermittently by the U.S. petitioner in E-1 status 
since 2002. The director further emphasized that the record contains no evidence that the beneficiary has been 
working for the petitioner's parent company in Japan. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director 
erred in denying the petition on grounds that were not raised in the Request for Evidence ("RFE") issued on 
February 20, 2009. Counsel contends that documentation previously submitted showed that the beneficiary 
began working for the petitioner's parent company in Japan in 1972 and that he has continued to work with 
the same company and its affiliates in Japan and the United States since that date. Counsel submits a brief and 
evidence to establish that the beneficiary has been on the Japanese company's payroll throughout the last five 
years. 
I. The Law 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must demonstrate that the 
beneficiary, within three years preceding the beneficiary'S application for admission into the United States, has 
been employed abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge, for one continuous year by a qualifying organization. The petitioner must also demonstrate that the 
beneficiary seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(1)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
Page 3 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 2 14.2(1) (l)(ii)(A) defines "intracompany transferee" as: 
An alien who, within three years preceding the time of his or her application for admission 
into the United States, has been employed abroad continuously for one year by a firm or 
corporation or other legal entity or parent, branch, affiliate or subsidiary thereof, and who 
seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to render his or her services to a branch 
of the same employer or a parent, affiliate, or subsidiary thereof in a capacity that is 
managerial, executive or involves specialized knowledge. Periods spent in the United States 
in lawfol status for a branch of the same employer or a parent, affiliate, or subsidiary thereof 
and brief trips to the United States for business or pleasure shall not be interruptive of the 
one year of continuous employment abroad but such periods shall not be counted toward 
fulfillment of that requirement. 
(Emphasis added). 
II. Facts and Procedural History 
The sole issue addressed by the director is whether the beneficiary had at least one continuous year of full­
time employment with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of the petition. 
The petitioner filed the Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, on January 30, 2009. The petitioner 
indicated on the Form 1-129 that the beneficiary was employed by its Japanese parent company, 
••••• , since March 1972. The petitioner also indicated that the beneficiary was admitted to the United 
States in E-l status on January 13, 2009, and requested that USC1S notify the U.S. Consulate in Tokyo upon 
approval of the petition so that the beneficiary could obtain an L-lB visa and be re-admitted. The petitioner 
stated that the beneficiary has 36 years of experience as a seafood processing technician for its Japanese parent 
company and its affiliates. 
In a letter dated January 23, 2009, the petitioner further described the beneficiary's employment history as 
follows: 
Page 4 
He joined [the foreign entity] in March 1972 and he is one of their most senior Seafood 
~ From 1972 to 1994, he worked mainly on processing 
______ in the Bering Sea and also shoreside plants in Alaska. From 1994 to 
2006, he engaged in processing of surimi on board the Ocean Phoenix and in shores ide plants in 
Alaska on a seasonal basis. From 2007 to present, he has engaged in processing of crab and 
Pollock roe in shoreside plants in Alaska on a seasonal basis. 
The director issued a request for additional evidence ("RFE") on February 20, 2009. The director did not 
specifically request additional evidence to establish that the beneficiary has the requisite one year of continuous, 
full-time employment with a qualifYing organization abroad. 
The director denied the petition on June 2, 2009, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the 
beneficiary possesses at least one continuous year of full-time employment abroad within the three years 
preceding the filing of the petition. 
In denying the petition, the director noted that the beneficiary has been granted E-l nonimmigrant status and has 
traveled to and from the United States since 2002. The director further found that the petitioner had not submitted 
documentation demonstrating that the beneficiary has been employed at the foreign entity in the preceding three 
years. The director noted that records show that the beneficiary typically enters the United States in January, 
departs in March, re-enters in June and subsequently departs in September of each year. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the director erred in denying the petition on grounds that were not raised in the 
Request for Evidence, and without giving the petitioner an opportunity to submit additional documentation 
concerning the beneficiary'S prior employment abroad. 
Counsel asserts: 
The documents previously submitted showed that the beneficiary began working with the 
petitioner's parent company in Japan in 1972 and that he has continued to work with the same 
company and its affiliates in Japan, the United States and other countries since that date. The 
petitioner is now submitting additional documents (including U.S. and Japanese withholding tax 
and payroll records and a list of his entry/exit dates to/from the United States) which show that 
the beneficiary has been on the payroll of the petitioner's parent company in Japan continuously 
during the past 5 years, that he has been sent to work with the petitioner in the United States on a 
seasonal basis as an E-l specialist, and that he has spent a total of more than one year in Japan 
during the past three years. 
Counsel's brief includes a chart detailing the beneficiary's dates in the United States from January 2006 through 
June 2009. The chart indicates that the beneficiary spent 179 days abroad in 2006, 168 days abroad in 2007,284 
days abroad in 2008, and 81 days abroad during the first five months of 2009. The petitioner also submits the 
"Withholding Statement of Wage Payment," for the years 2004 to 2008 issued by 
personnel department, as well as IRS Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, issued by the 
petitioner for the years 2004 to 2008. Counsel emphasizes that the evidence shows that only one-third of the 
beneficiary's gross salary is for services rendered in the United States. 
Page 5 
Counsel further asserts: 
It should be noted that even if [the beneficiary] had not been employed for more than 1 year in 
Japan during the past 3 years, he would still qualifY for the L-lB petition. As USCIS 
acknowledged in its decision, employment prior to the three-year period immediately preceding 
the filing of the petition may be counted if the alien was admitted to the United States during the 
past three years for employment with the same organization or a U.S. affiliate. In Matter of 
Continental Grain, 14 I&N Dec. 140 (D.D. 1972), the beneficiary was found to have the one 
year qualifYing experience even though it did not occur within the 3 years preceding the filing of 
the petition. In that case, the beneficiary had 7 months of employment abroad immediately prior 
to filing the petition, 28 months spent in the United States as an H-3 trainee prior to that, and 
more than 5 months of employment abroad prior to that. USCIS held that the beneficiary could 
tack the most recent 7 months to the prior 5 months of employment abroad, even though there 
was an intervening period of 28 months spent in the United States and even though the one year 
of employment abroad did not fall entirely within the three years immediately preceding the 
filing of the petition. [The beneficiary] has spent his entire career working for Nippon Suisan 
Kaisha Ltd. and its affiliates. Thus even if he did not spend a full year in Japan during the past 
three years, he could still quality based on his employment in Japan during the three years prior 
to his admission to the United States as an E-I specialist. For your information and reference, 
enclosed are documents showing that the petitioner's Japanese parent company owned the 
factory trawler vessel on which the beneficiary was employed abroad before he began coming to 
the United States on a seasonal basis as an E-1 specialist. 
The petitioner also submits a statement confirming the beneficiary's employment with the petitioner's group since 
1972. Specifically, the petitioner states: 
From 1972 to 1988, he was working on was 
owned and operated by [the foreign entity]. Beginnmg in 1990, he started coming to the United 
States on a seasonal basis to work as an E-1 specialist in [the foreign entity's] Unisea plant in 
Dutch Harbor, Alaska (previously named [The beneficiary] has remained 
an employee of [the foreign entity] and [the foreign entity] has continued to pay his full salary 
even when he is temporarily working in the USA on a seasonal basis. 
The petitioner submits an excerpt from the foreign entity's 1987 Annual Financial Report which contains a list of 
its seafood processing vessels, including the Mineshima-Maru. 
ill. Discussion 
Upon review, the AAO agrees, in part, with counsel's assertions and will withdraw the director's decision. 
Counsel has set forth two arguments in support of the appeal. First, counsel contends that the regulation at 8 
C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(A) allows USCIS to consider the cumulative number of days the beneficiary spent 
working outside the United States during the three years preceding the filing of the petition in determining 
whether he has accumulated a total of one year of foreign employment during that time period. In the alternative, 
Page 6 
counsel argues that the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(A) allows USC1S to look beyond or "reach over" 
the immediate three year period preceding the filing of the petition to determine whether the beneficiary had 
accumulated one year of continuous full-time employment abroad prior to his initial admission to work for the 
petitioner in a valid nonimmigrant status. The AAO finds the latter interpretation to be correct. 
To review the required one year of continuous employment abroad, USC1S must count back three years from 
the date that the L-IA petition is filed. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(I)(3)(iii) clearly requires that an 
individual petition filed on Form 1-129 be accompanied by evidence that the beneficiary "has at least one 
continuous year of full time employment abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years 
preceding the filing of the petition." The definition of "intracompany transferee" also indicates that, if the 
beneficiary has been employed abroad continuously for one year by a qualifying organization within three years 
preceding the time of the beneficiary's "application for admission into the United States," the beneficiary may be 
eligible for L-l classification. 8 C.F .R. § 214.2(1)(1 )(ii)(A). 
However, when the definition of "intracompany transferee" is construed together with the regulation at 8 
C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3) and section 101(a)(l5)(L) of the Act, the phrase "preceding the time of his or her 
application for admission into the United States" refers to a beneficiary whose admission or admissions pertained 
to the rendering of services "for a branch of the same employer or a parent, affiliate, or subsidiary thereof' or for 
"brief trips to the United States for business or pleasure." Statutes and regulations must be read as a whole, and 
interpretations should be consistent with the plain purpose of the Act to avoid absurd results. See generally 
Defensor v. Meissner, 201 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000). 
Therefore, according to the plain purpose of the Act and regulations, USC1S may not reach over any admission 
and subsequent stay, unless that admission was "for a branch of the same employer or a parent, affiliate, or 
subsidiary thereof [or] brief trips to the United States for business or pleasure." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(A). 
Unless the authorized period of stay in the United States is either brief or "on behalf' of the employer, the period 
of stay will be interruptive of the required one year of continuous employment abroad. See 52 Fed. Reg. 5738, 
5742 (Feb. 26, 1987) ("Time Spent in the United States Cannot Count Towards Eligibility for L Classification"); 
see also Matter of Continental Grain Company, 14 1&N Dec. 140 (D.D. 1972) (finding that an intervening period 
of stay is not interruptive when the beneficiary was in the United States as an H-3 trainee on behalf of the 
employer). 
Here, the petitioner claims that the beneficiary was employed for one continuous year with the petitioner's parent 
company during the three-year period immediately preceding his initial admission to the United States in E-l 
status in 1990. As the beneficiary was admitted to the United States for the purpose of employment with a United 
States subsidiary of his foreign employer, and the same employer or an affiliate now seeks to employ him in L-IB 
status, the beneficiary's employment in the United States is not interruptive of his one year of continuous 
employment abroad. 
In denying the petition, the director failed to take into account the provisions of 8 C.F.R. § 2l4.2(1)(l)(ii)(A), 
which states, in relevant part, that "periods spent in the United States in lawful status for a branch of the same 
employer or a parent, affiliate, or subsidiary thereof and brief trips to the United States for business or 
pleasure shall not be interruptive of the one year of continuous employment abroad but such periods shall not 
be counted toward fulfillment of that requirement" Had the beneficiary been admitted to the United States to 
Page 7 
work for an unrelated company in E-1 or other nonimmigrant status, the director's position would be correct. 
However, a beneficiary'S one year of continuous employment abroad, once established, remains continuous, 
despite the beneficiary'S subsequent stay in the United States for a branch, affiliate, subsidiary, or parent of 
the foreign entity in an authorized nonimmigrant status. Accordingly, the director's decision was in error and 
will be withdrawn. 
With respect to counsel's argument that USCIS should, in the alternative, consider the beneficiary'S 
accumulated time spent working outside the United States during the three years preceding the filing of the 
petition, we note that counsel has not advanced any support for the proposition that the regulatory definition 
of intracompany transferee was intended to create an exception to the statutory requirement that the 
beneficiary be employed continuously for one year with a qualifying entity abroad within the three years 
preceding his application for admission. See section 101(a)(15)(L) ofthe Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L). The 
AAO cannot find that the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(A) contemplates a situation whereby a 
beneficiary could acquire one year of continuous qualifying employment abroad by aggregating periods of 
employment with a foreign entity while concurrently employed by a United States entity. 
Although the director's decision will be withdrawn, the AAO finds insufficient evidence in the record to 
warrant a conclusion that the beneficiary possessed the one year of continuous full-time employment abroad 
prior to undertaking his regular assignments to the United States. Accordingly, the petition will be remanded 
to the director for further review and action consistent with the discussion below. 
The critical facts in this matter relate to the exact period(s) of the beneficiary'S continuous and uninterrupted 
employment with a qualifying organization abroad .. As noted above, the beneficiary'S seasonal employment 
in the United States in E-l status for the petitioner or its U.S. affiliates or subsidiaries will not be considered 
interruptive of his qualifying employment abroad. Therefore, the petitioner need only establish that the 
beneficiary has been continuously employed within the petitioner's international group of companies and that 
he had at least one continuous year of employment abroad prior to undertaking his regular intermittent 
assignments in the United States. 
The petitioner has provided evidence that the beneficiary was on the payroll of from 
2004 to 2008, during a period of time in which he was also intermittently employed in the United States pursuant 
to an E-1 visa. The petitioner should be instructed to provide additional evidence of the beneficiary'S continuous 
full-time employment with the foreign entity that pre-dates his intermittent United States employment. 
The petitioner states that the beneficiary was employed on that 
was owned and operated by the foreign entity between 1972 and 1988, and that he has worked in the United 
States on a seasonal basis since 1990. Although the petitioner has provided evidence that the foreign entity owned 
of March 31, 2007, additional evidence will be necessary to document the 
beneficiary'S period of full-time continuous employment with the foreign entity during the relevant time period, 
within three years prior to his first U.S. assignment. 
The petitioner has submitted an "onboard 
beneficiary's work history with the foreign 
history" for the beneficiary which was provided to detail the 
. The document shows regular intermittent employment_ 
between March 1972 and June 1988. The chart shows no 
Page 8 
assignments between June 17, 1988 and October 1989, a period of training in Japan from January to April 1990, 
and then the beneficiary's first assignment to the petitioner's Alaskan affiliate in May 1990. Therefore, the 
relevant timeframe for the purposes of determining whether the beneficiary has one year of qualifYing 
employment abroad appears to be the period from May 1987 through May 1990. The director is instructed to 
request additional documentary evidence in support of the beneficiary's continuous employment abroad, 
including personnel or payroll records, tax records or other documentary evidence that would support the 
petitioner's claims that the beneficiary possesses the required one year of continuous full-time employment 
abroad. 
The petitioner should also provide evidence that the company's seafood processing technicians were treated as 
"full-time" employees during the relevant time period between May 1987 and May 1990, as it appears that the 
beneficiary typically had several weeks or months between on-board assignments, and one apparent gap in 
employment of more than one year between June 1988 and December 1989. The petitioner has not indicated 
what, if anything, the beneficiary did during these periods, or whether he was paid for those periods in which he 
did not have an onboard assignment. The plain language ofthe regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(iii) requires 
the petitioner to submit evidence of the beneficiary's "continuous year ofjull-time employment abroad." 
Further, the AAO finds that the record as presently constituted does not establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a capacity requiring specialized knowledge. 8 
C.F.R. §§ 214.2(l)(3)(ii) and (iv). 
Section 214( c )(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.c. § 1184( c )(2)(B), provides the statutory definition of specialized 
knowledge: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special knowledge 
of the company product and its application in international markets or has an advanced level of 
knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as: 
[S]pecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's, not USCIS', burden to articulate and 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.c. § 1184(c)(2)(B). USCIS cannot make a factual 
determination regarding the beneficiary'S specialized knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, 
articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is 
typically gained within the organization, and explain how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
Page 9 
Once the petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of 
evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. A 
petitioner's assertion that the beneficiary possesses advanced knowledge of the processes and procedures of 
the company must be supported by evidence describing and distinguishing that knowledge from the 
elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" are comparative 
terms, the petitioner should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary'S knowledge 
relative to others in the petitioner's workforce or relative to similarly employed workers in the petitioner's 
specific industry. 
Based on the evidence of record as presently constituted, the petitioner has failed to establish either that the 
beneficiary'S last position abroad (in the late 1980s) or his current position in the United States requires an 
employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge. Although the 
petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary has been and will be employed in a "specialized knowledge" 
capacity, the petitioner has failed to identify any special or advanced body of knowledge which would 
distinguish the beneficiary's role from that of other similarly experienced seafood processing specialists 
employed by the petitioning organization or in the petitioner's industry. Going on record without 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm'r. 1972)). Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary'S 
duties involve specialized knowledge; otherwise, meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of 
reiterating the regulations. See Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724, F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afi'd, 905, 
F .2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
The petitioner claims that the beneficiary's specialized knowledge is based upon his knowledge of the parent 
company's seafood processing systems and techniques, quality control standards and the special requirements 
of the Japanese market. However, the petitioner has not differentiated its processing methods or quality 
standards from those of any other seafood company. Merely claiming that the beneficiary is familiar with 
internal processes and standards is insufficient if those standards are not materially different from those that 
are generally known and used by similarly experienced workers. 
It is reasonable to believe that the petitioner's industry is highly regulated in the United States and Japan, with 
quality control standards that must be met by any licensed seafood processer. While the petitioner provided a 
fairly detailed description of the steps that occur during Pollock roe, surimi and salted roe processing at its 
affiliate's Alaskan plant, and noted that some additional steps are needed for certain products exported to Japan, it 
remains unclear what, if any, specialized knowledge is required to supervise these operations, or what differences 
exist between the Japanese market and other markets in terms of seafood processing, appearance and quality 
control. Even if the petitioner could establish that knowledge of Japanese market requirements constitutes 
specialized knowledge for the purposes of employment in the United States, the petitioner is also required to 
establish that the beneficiary'S qualifying period of employment abroad involved specialized knowledge. The 
petitioner has not claimed that Japanese seafood processing specialists working in Japan are unfamiliar with 
Japanese market requirements, and the AAO assumes that such knowledge is in fact commonly held among the 
foreign entity's workforce. 
Page 10 
As the petitioner has not specified the amount or type of training its technicians receive in the company's 
tools and procedures, it cannot be concluded that its processes are particularly complex or different compared 
to those utilized by other companies in the industry, or that it would take a significant amount oftime to train 
an experienced seafood processing specialist who is familiar with the Alaskan and Japanese seafood 
industries. 
Based on the current record, the evidence submitted does not establish that knowledge of the petitioner's 
processing or quality control techniques or familiarity with the Japanese seafood market constitutes specialized 
knowledge or that this knowledge is so complex that it could not be readily transferred to similarly trained and 
experienced employees from outside the petitioning organization. 
To establish eligibility in this proceeding, the petitioner must establish that the beneficiary possesses an advanced 
level of knowledge or expertise in the organization'S processes and procedures and that the position requires such 
knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. § 2 14.2(1) (l)(ii)(D). 
In this regard, the petitioner relies on the beneficiary's long tenure with the foreign entity working in its seafood 
processing operations all over the world. The petitioner has not explained in any detail the specific capacities in 
which the beneficiary has worked, and it is not clear to what extent he has been employed as a regular processing 
technician, or to what extent he has been employed in a "specialist" or "technical advisor" position. The evidence 
submitted does not demonstrate a progression in his skills, assignments or level of authority over his long tenure 
with the company or suggest that he has achieved a role that is reserved for those with an advanced knowledge of 
the company's policies and procedures. It is unclear at what point in the beneficiary'S 36-year tenure he was 
considered to have acquired specialized knowledge. The petitioner has also not provided any information that 
would assist USCIS in comparing the beneficiary'S skills and knowledge to that of other similarly employed 
workers within the organization, many of which may have a similarly long tenure with the company. The 
petitioner's argued standard for advanced knowledge appears to require nothing more than an extended period of 
service performing duties related to the u.s. position, qualifications that may be widely held by the petitioner's 
Japanese workforce. 
At this time, the AAO takes no position on whether the beneficiary qualifies for the classification sought. The 
director must make the initial determinations on those issues. So far, the director has not done so. By 
remanding this matter, the AAO does not necessarily find that the beneficiary is ineligible for the benefit 
sought. Rather, we remand the matter because the director based the decision on incorrect grounds. 
Therefore, the AAO will remand this matter to the director for a new decision. The director should request 
any additional evidence deemed warranted and allow the petitioner to submit such evidence within a 
reasonable period oftime. As always in these proceedings, the burden of proof rests solely with the petitioner. 
Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § l36l. 
ORDER: The director's decision is withdrawn. The petition is remanded to the director for further 
action in accordance with the foregoing and entry of a new decision which, if adverse to 
the petitioner, shall be certified to the Administrative Appeals Office for review.