dismissed L-1B Case: Sports Construction

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
MATTER OF T-G-P-, LLC 
APPEAL OF VERMONT SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: NOV. 9, 2016 
PETITION: FORM I-129, PETITION FOR A NONIMMIGRANT WORKER 
The Petitioner, a sports construction and surfacing company, seeks to temporarily employ the 
Beneficiary as a lead installer under the L-1 B nonimmigrant classification for intracompany 
transferees. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 101(a)(l5)(L), 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(15)(L). The L-IB classification allows a corporation or other legal entity (including its 
affiliate or subsidiary) to transfer a qualifying foreign employee with "specialized knowledge" to 
( 
work temporarily in the United States. 
The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petitiOn. The Director concluded that the. 
evidence of record did not establish that the Beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge and that he 
was employed. abroad and will be employed in the United States in a specialized knowledge 
capacity. 
The matter is now before us on appeal. In its appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the Director did not 
apply the appropriate standard of proof or consider all of the evidence submitted in support of the 
petition. 
Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the Beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge 
capacity, for one continuous year within three years preceding the Beneficiary's application for 
admission into the United States. Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. In addition, the Beneficiary 
must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge 
capacity. !d. 
If an individual will be serving the United States employer in a managerial or executive capacity, a 
qualified beneficiary may be classified as an L-IA nonimmigrant alien. If a qualified beneficiary 
will be rendering services in a capacity that involves "specialized knowledge," the beneficiary may be 
classified as an L-1 B nonimmigrant alien. !d. 
Matter ofT-G-P-, LLC 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the statutory definition of 
specialized knowledge: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level ofknowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as: 
[S]pecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's 
product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its 
application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in 
the organization's processes and procedures. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form. I-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will 
employ the alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph 
(l)(l)(ii)(G) ofthis section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or 
specialized knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the 
services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time 
employment abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years 
preceding the filing of the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position 
that was managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the 
alien's prior education, training and employment qualifies him/her to perform 
the intended services in the United States; however the work in the United 
States need not be the same work which the alien performed abroad. 
II. SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE 
The Director denied the petition based on a finding that the Petitioner did not establish that the 
Beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that he has been employed abroad and would be 
employed in the United States in a specialized knowledge capacity. 
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Matter ofT-G-P-, LLC 
A. Evidence of Record 
The Petitioner filed the Form I-129 on February 23, 2016. The Petitioner stated on the Form I-129 
that it has five employees and is engaged in the "construction and installation of synthetic turf 
products, polyurethane and latex running tracks, acrylic coating systems for tennis courts, and sports 
lighting systems." The Petitioner indicated that it is a subsidiary of located in 
El Salvador, and stated that this entity has employed the Beneficiary since October 2007. 
In a letter submitted in support of the petition, the Petitioner described the duties and requirements 
for the Beneficiary's proposed position of lead installer as follows: 
In this capacity, [the Beneficiary] will be responsible for leading the construction and 
installation of tennis courts, tracks, Sport Courts, and synthetic turf fields. This 
includes everything from foundation and drainage to finishing each field surface and 
installing specialized sport lighting. As [the Petitioner] focuses on installing highly 
specialized, unique products, we require an individual with technical intimacy of our 
business and clientele. Any external candidate would require approximately three to 
five years of training in the fundamentals ofthe products we use, the clients we serve, 
and the techniques required to professionally install each surface. 
[The Beneficiary] is extensively familiar with our products and has the expertise to 
implement state of the art solutions for clients in this sector. [The Beneficiary] will 
expand our market share as he is trained across different sports surfaces and can 
provide cost effective, high quality services to our clients. He will be responsible for 
overseeing junior installation crews and working with management . . . . He will be 
installing a proprietary drainage tile system that is not currently used in the U.S. 
Also, [the Beneficiary] is proficient in sewing turf seams as compared to our 
competitors who mostly glue seams. The result in [the Beneficiary's] advanced 
knowledge of sewing turf seams is a more cost effective and durable installation .... 
The Petitioner explained that the Beneficiary has served as a "Master Installer" with the foreign 
entity since October 2007 1 and "has gained in depth knowledge of our clients, our product line, and 
gained superior skills in drainage and installation work related to different kinds of sports fields, 
arenas, and tracks." In addition, the Petitioner highlighted that, in addition to installation experience, 
the Beneficiary is experienced in construction of field bases and drainage systems, induding a 
proprietary drainage system that is used only by the petitioning company in the United States. 
Finally, the Petitioner described 
the Beneficiary's training: 
[The Beneficiary] has undergone extensive hands on training in the products for 
which we have distribution rights in our geographic area. These include 
and 
1 
The Petitioner stated elsewhere in its letter that the foreign entity has employed the Beneficiary since January 20 12. 
Otherwise, the Petitioner has consistently stated that the Beneficiary joined the foreign entity in October 2007. 
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Matter ojT-G-P-, LLC 
. . . He has learned multiple unique techniques for different surfaces, 
including foundation and drainage. [The Beneficiary] has received extensive training 
in foundation, drainage, lighting track, and turf technology, including standard 
drainage base and tile drainage base. It would take [the foreign entity and the 
Petitioner] three to five years to develop and train an installer to a similar level of 
specialized knowledge that [the Beneficiary] possesses. 
The Petitioner's initial evidence included a copy of the Beneficiary's passport page, the Petitioner's 
articles of organization, and a copy of the Petitioner's license to operate as a building and 
construction company specializing in recreation and sporting facilities. 
The Director issued a request for evidence (RFE). The Director instructed the Petitioner to provide 
evidence that the Beneficiary has specialized knowledge and evidence that he has been employed 
abroad and would be employed in the United States in a specialized knowledge capacity. The 
Director acknowledged the Petitioner's letter but determined that it did not substantively describe the 
Beneficiary's foreign or U.S. positions or his claimed specialized knowledge, nor did it differentiate 
the Beneficiary's knowledge from that held by others in the company or in the Petitioner's industry, 
such that his knowledge could be considered special or advanced. The Director requested additional 
information regarding the nature ofthe Petitioner's industry, products and services, the nature of the 
specialized knowledge involved, and the minimum time required to obtain that knowledge through 
training and experience. 
In response, the Petitioner submitted a letter with additional information regarding its industry and 
the company's area of specialization. It explained that the "sports and construction industry is a 
specialty industry in and of itself' with some companies offering turnkey services (including base 
work, site work, and sports surfacing), and other companies offering typically one type of sports 
surfacing (specializing in turf, track, or tennis courts). The Petitioner noted that it offers turnkey 
solutions for all types of sport surfaces, and is also a general contractor able to do all base and site 
work, giving it a competitive advantage. 
The Petitioner went on to explain that its installers are required to have advanced skill and 
knowledge in the following-areas: 
• Turf base work, including multiple drainage systems such as 
• Drain mats over cement stabilized decks 
• Drain & Shock Pad combinations 
• Traditional Crushed Stone and Perimeter Trench Bases 
• Crushed Stone and Flat drain systems 
• Turf Panel Sewing 
• Most local companies can only glue seams 
• Sewn turf panel seaming last[ s] longer 
• Track Paver Op~ration for mat type tracks 
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Matter ofT-G-P-, LLC 
• Use of automatic paver machines 
• Skill and knowledge of hand paving 
• Track Sprayer Operation for spray type tracks 
• Knowledge of sealed structural sprays 
• Knowledge of porous structural sprays 
• Track Full Pour Technologies for "poured in place" tracks 
• Use of traditional Two component PU tracks 
• Use of Water based track products 
• Tennis Court 
Installation for Acrylic Coat type courts 
• Traditional 
acrylic coatings 
• Cushioned tennis Coating 
• Free Floating, Cushioned Tennis Coatings 
• Concrete and Asphalt patch work and/or grinding to strict 
tolerances 
The Petitioner stated that "to develop an advanced knowledge of all of the above listed technologies 
requires a minimum of five years to learn and approximately seven years [to] master." Further, the 
Petitioner explained that knowledge of all of these technologies is uncommon in the industry due to 
I 
a tendency towards specialization in the U.S. market, as some businesses will choose to specialize in 
one type of surface and rely on third parties suppliers for projects involving multiple surfaces. 
With respect to the surfacing products themselves, the Petitioner stated that it and the foreign entity 
"have exclusive distribution rights to use products from several distributors including 
by and 'and that "the only way to gain 
experience working with these products is to work for [a company] authorized to distribute them." 
The Petitioner submitted copies of its distribution agreements, product information from its 
suppliers, as well as letters from each of these companies, confirming that the Petitioner and foreign 
entity are authorized dealers/distributors of their products, and that the Beneficiary is a trained 
installer. Managing Director of confirmed that the 
Beneficiary has "an advanced level of knowledge, experience and skiil to install our 
and sport surfacing systems." He noted that the company provides continued 
training and technical assistance to its distributors. 
In addition, of confirmed that the Beneficiary has "an 
advanced level of knowledge and experience and skill to install our PU track systems," and 
of stated that the Beneficiary has "an advanced level of knowledge, 
experience and skill to install our tufted and woven artificial turf systems" and is a "trained installer 
of our patented system .... " He noted that provides continuous training on 
installation methods and techniques. 
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Matter ojT-G-P-, LLC 
The Petitioner submitted evidence that the Beneficiary was among the foreign entity's personnel 
selected to work on company projects in and and Finally, the 
Petitioner emphasized that the Beneficiary possess all of the characteristics of an L-1 B specialized 
knowledge according to the latest U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) policy guidance 
on this visa classification. 2 Specifically, the Petitioner stated that "the highly technical nature related 
to the installation of these products, products for which the company has exclusive distribution rights, 
establishes that the only way to have gained experience working on these surfaces is by working with 
the company abroad." 
The Director ultimately denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner did not establish that the 
Beneficiary has specialized knowledge and that he was employed abroad and would be employed in 
the United States in a specialized knowledge capacity. In denying the petition, the Director 
determined that the record did not establish that the Beneficiary's knowledge and skills are 
demonstrably different, distinct, or uncommon comparison to that generally found within the 
Petitioner's industry, or that he possesses knowledge which is more advanced than that generally 
found within petitioning company. The Director noted that the Petitioner did not sufficiently 
document the Beneficiary's training or support its claim that it would take three to five years of 
training to perform the duties of a lead installer. 
On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the Director did not apply the preponderance of evidence 
standard to the facts presented or review all of the evidence in the record. The Petitioner emphasizes 
that the products it installs are only available through exclusive distribution agreements, that its 
industry is strictly regulated by various sports federations, and that the products themselves require 
highly technical installation methods. Further, the Petitioner states that its services are "unique" 
because it is capable of installing all types of sports surfaces and has the general contracting skills to 
perform base work and site work. Finally, the Petitioner asserts that the denial of the petition would 
adversely impact its ability to comply with currently contracted work. 
B. Analysis 
Upon review of the evidence of record, including the Petitioner's submission on appeal, the record 
does not establish that the Beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that he was employed 
abroad and would be employed in the United States in a specialized knowledge capacity as defined 
at 8 C.F .R. § 214.2(1)(1 )(ii)(D). 
In visa petition proceedings, 
the burden is on the petitioner to establish eligibility. Matter of 
Brantigan, 11 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 1966). The petitioner must prove by a preponderance of evidence 
that the beneficiary is fully qualified for the benefit sought. Matter ofChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 
376 (AAO 2010). In evaluating the evidence, eligibility is to be determined not by the quantity of 
evidence alone but by its quality. !d. USCIS examines each piece of evidence for relevance, 
2 
The Petitioner cites to USCIS Policy Memorandum PM-602-0111, L-IB Adjudications Policy (Aug. 17, 2015), 
"https://www.uscis.gov/laws/policy-memoranda. 
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Matter ofT-G-P-. LLC 
probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the 
evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. 
In order to establish eligibility, a petitioner must show that the individual beneficiary will be 
employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The statutory definition 
of specialized knowledge at Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act is comprised of two equal but distinct 
subparts. First, an individual is considered to be employed in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge if that person "has a special knowledge of the company product and its application in 
international markets." Second, an individual is considered to be serving in a capacity involving 
specialized knowledge if that person "has an advanced level of knowledge of processes and 
~procedures of the company." See also 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(D). A petitioner may establish 
eligibility by submitting evidence that the beneficiary and the proffered position satisfy either prong 
of the definition. 
Once a petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and 
type of evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized 
knowledge. users cannot make a factual determination regarding a given beneficiary's specialized 
knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature of the its 
products and services or processes and procedures, "the nature of the specific industry or field 
involved, and the nature of the beneficiary's knowledge. A petitioner should also describe how such 
knowledge is typically gained within the organization, and explain how and when the beneficiary 
gained such knowledge. 
As both "special" and "advanced" are relative terms, determining whether a given beneficiary's 
knowledge is "special" or "advanced" inherently requires a comparison of the beneficiary's 
knowledge against that of others. With respect to either special or advanced knowledge, the 
petitioner ordinarily must demonstrate that a beneficiary's knowledge is not commonly held 
throughout the particular industry and cannot be easily imparted from one person to another. The 
ultimate question is whether the petitioner has met its burden of demonstrating by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the beneficiary's knowledge or expertise is advanced or special, and that the 
beneficiary's position requires such knowledge. 
Here, the Petitioner states that the Beneficiary has special knowledge of third-party manufacturers' 
turf, track, and court surfacing products, as well as knowledge of a proprietary drainage system. The 
Petitioner also claims that the Beneficiary has advanced knowledge of the processes and techniques 
it uses to plan and install these products for its customers. 
Because "special knowledge" concerns knowledge of the petitioning organization's products or 
services and its application in international markets, the Petitioner may meet its burden through 
evidence that the Beneficiary has knowledge that is distinct or uncommon in comparison to the 
knowledge of other similarly employed workers in the particular industry. 
Here, the record does not support the Petitioner's claim that the Beneficiary's knowledge of the 
third-party turf, track, and court surfacing products it distributes and installs is distinct or uncommon 
'7 
Matter ofT-G-P-, LLC 
in comparison to that possessed by other installers in the sports construction and installation 
industry. The Petitioner relies, in part, on the fact that it is a turnkey solution provider with both 
general contracting and surfacing installation capabilities, which allow it to offer complete surfacing 
solution without using contractors to perform construction or installation services. However, it 
acknowledges that this "turnkey" approach is one of the "main categories" of business models in the 
sports construction industry. While some companies may offer installation services for fewer types 
of surfaces, there is insufficient evidence to support the Petitioner's claim that the combination of 
experience with general contracting techniques used in the industry and different third-party 
surfacing products constitutes "special krwwledge" of the Petitioner's products as defined in the 
statute and regulations. 
The Petitioner refers to an advanced "turf sewing" technique used by the Beneficiary but has not 
claimed or documented that it was developed in house or provided information regarding the length 
of training involved in learning the technique. In addition, the Petitioner mentioned that the 
Beneficiary has knowledge of a "proprietary" drainage system, but again did not submit any 
information to document this system, evidence that it developed the system in-house, or evidence to 
show the amount and type of training needed to learn these installation techniques. As stated above, 
once a petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and 
type of evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized 
knowledge. The evidence does not adequately support the Petitioner's claims regarding the 
Beneficiary's company-sp~cific or proprietary knowledge. 
Further, the Petitioner suggests that the knowledge required to install· the third-party surfacing 
products it distributes and installs must be learned within the Petitioner's group ofcompanies due to 
its exclusive distribution agreements with the manufacturers. However, the record does not establish 
that the Petitioner exclusively distributes and installs any of these products in the United States; 
rather, the record shows that it has distribution rights in a limited territory of three to four U.S. states. 
The record therefore does not support the Petitioner's claim that work experience with the foreign 
entity is the only way to learn the installation techniques for these primarily U.S.-manufactured 
products. Rather, the letters from the manufacturers indicate that the manufacturers themselves 
provide training to their distributors and their distributors' installers. 
We also acknowledge the Petitioner's claim that the sports construction and surfacing industry itself 
is a niche industry within the larger construction industry. However, again, the Petitioner has not 
submitted evidence to support a claim that the knowledge is so specialized that the knowledge 
required for the lead installer position is truly different or uncommon. With respect to either special 
or advanced knowledge, the petitioner ordinarily must demonstrate that a beneficiary's knowledge is 
not commonly held throughout the particular industry and cannot be easily imparted from one person 
to another. In addition, the Petitioner must describe how such knowledge is typically gained within 
the organization, and explain how and when the Beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
Here, the Petitioner merely describes the Beneficiary as a "trained installer." It initially stated that it 
would take three to five years to train someone to his level, and later stated that it takes five years to 
learn the skills and knowledge he possesses and seven years to master them. However, it did not 
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Matter ofT-G-P-, LLC 
provide the details of his specific education and prior employment history, describe or document 
when he received specific training during his period of employment abroad, identify the training 
courses he has completed or otherwise explained or documented how and when he gained such 
knowledge. In fact, the Petitioner stated that he has held the title "Master Installer" since the foreign 
entity hired him in 2007 and has not provided any description of his training or progressive work 
experience with the foreign entity. Therefore, we cannot evaluate the Petitioner's claims that it 
actually takes three, five, or seven years of training and experience to learn to install the products the 
Petitioner and foreign entity distribute. 
As noted, it appears that the manufacturers actually provide the product training to their authorized 
dealers and installers, but the Petitioner has not provided evidence of the amount or type of training 
they typically provide ~nd, again, relies on a general claim that the Beneficiary received training 
during his long tenure with the foreign entity. The evidence indicates that these manufacturers offer 
the same training to other U.S. dealers and installers, as the Petitioner operates in a limited 
geographic territory of a few states. Further, we find it reasonable to believe that the Petitioner's 
suppliers are not the only companies that offer sports surfacing products and we cannot determine if 
other installers working in the sports surfacing industry, or even general contractors, could readily 
learn the techniques needed to set up and install these types of products. The Petitioner indicated 
that some companies in its field hire contractors on a project basis if the project requires installation 
skills they lack. In other words, the Petitioner appears to concede that there are contractors who 
specialize in these types of sports surfacing installations. 
Overall, for the reasons discussed, the Petitioner's claims that the Beneficiary's knowledge of its 
products and techniques is special knowledge are not supported by sufficient evidence. A 
petitioner's unsupported statements are of very limited weight and normally will be insufficient to 
carry its burden of proof, particularly when supporting documentary evidence would reasonably be 
available. See Matter ofSo.ffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing Matter ofTreasure 
Craft of Cal., 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg'l Comm'r 1972)); see also Matter ofChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 
369, 376 (AAO 201 0). The Petitioner must support its assertions with relevant, probative, and 
credible evidence. See Matter ofChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 376. 
Here, while evidence submitted confirms that the Beneficiary is skilled and well-versed in the 
installation of the third-party products offered by the Petitioner and foreign entity, the evidence 
submitted to support its claims that his knowledge and skills qualify as "special" knowledge within 
the industry is insufficient. Based on the evidence submitted, we cannot evaluate whether this 
knowledge is truly distinct or uncommon or whether it could be easily imparted to another person in 
the Beneficiary's profession. For the foregoing reasons, the evidence does not establish the 
Beneficiary possesses special knowledge. \ 
The Petitioner also claims that the Beneficiary's "Master Installer" role and his experience with its 
claimed foreign parent company have resulted in his acquisition of advanced knowledge of the 
Petitioner's processes and procedures. Because "advanced knowledge" concerns knowledge of an 
organization's processes and procedures, the Petitioner may meet its burden through evidence that 
the Beneficiary has knowledge gf or expertise in the organization's processes and procedures that is 
9 
Matter ofT-G-P-, LLC 
greatly developed or further along in progress, complexity and understanding in comparison to other 
workers in the employer's operations. Such advanced knowledge must be supported by evidence 
setting that knowledge apart from the elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. 
The Petitioner states that the Beneficiary is a master installer with the advanced knowledge needed 
to implement solutions for its clients and, because he is trained across different sports surfaces, he 
can provide cost-effective services to clients. The Petitioner also emphasizes that he will be 
"overseeing junior installation crews and working with management." However, the record does not 
include information regarding the other employees working for the U.S. and foreign entities, such as 
their training, professional backgrounds, duties, and length of experience with the respective entities. 
Again, the Petitioner must support its assertions with relevant, probative, and credible evidence. See 
Matter ofChawathe, is I&N Dec. at 376. We cannot determine that the Beneficiary's knowledge is 
advanced in relation to the Petitioner's or foreign entity's other employees if we have no evidence 
regarding those employees' relative knowledge and experience. 
In fact, the Petitioner has not provided any information regarding the staffing of the U.S. or foreign 
companies, other than noting that the Petitioner has five employees. If the Petitioner has been 
operating in the United States for four to five years, as claimed, it is reasonable to believe that it 
actually employs qualified installers who are able to deliver the company's turnkey solutions. Or, 
alternatively, it may be able to fulfill its obligations to customers by using contractors who have no 
experience with the foreign entity. As noted, the companies that supply the surfacing products are 
primarily U.S.-based entities-who provide training to their dealers; it is unclear why the Petitioner 
cannot train its employees in the United States or why the offered position would require advanced 
knowledge that can only be gained abroad, as claimed by the Petitioner. 
While we do not question the owners' business decision to transfer the Beneficiary to the United 
States, we cannot determine based on the evidence submitted that his knowledge is advanced in 
comparison to the Petitioner's and foreign entity's workers; the length of his tenure alone is not 
sufficient to establish his advanced knowledge. For these reasons, the evidence is insufficient to 
establish that the Beneficiary's expertise in the organization's processes and procedures is greatly 
developed or further along/in progress, complexity, and understanding in comparison to other 
workers in the Petitioner's operations, either in the United States or in El Salvador. The Petitioner's 
claims are not supported by evidence setting the Beneficiary's knowledge of company processes 
apart from the elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. 
Finally, we acknowledge the Petitioner's claim that the Beneficiary possesses the characteristics of a 
worker with qualifying specialized knowledge" as set forth in US CIS Policy Memorandum PM-60 l­
Oll, supra, at 8. For the reasons discussed above, the Petitioner has not submitted sufficient 
evidence to establish that the Beneficiary possesses knowledge that is either special or advanced. 
While the Beneficiary may be filling a role that would be beneficial to the Petitioner's 
competitiveness in the marketplace, this characteristic alone is not probative of his specialized 
knowledge. As noted in the memorandum, the "characteristics" listed by the Petitioner are only 
"factors that USCIS may consider when determining whether a beneficiary's knowledge is 
specialized" and such factors must be supported by evidence. !d. The memorandum highlights that 
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Matter ofT-G-P- . LLC 
"ultimately, it is the weight and type of evidence that establishes whether the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge. " !d. at 10. 
We do not doubt that the Beneficiary is a highly skilled employee who is well-qualified for the 
offered position. However , for the reasons discussed above, the evidence submitted does not 
establish that the Beneficiar y possesses specialized knowledge and that he has been employed 
abroad and will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity with the Petitioner in the United 
States. See Section 214( c )(2)(B) of the Act. 
III. QUALIFYING RELATIONSHIP 
Beyond the decision of the Director, the Petitioner has not provided evidence that it has a qualifying 
relationship with the Beneficiary's foreign employer, 
To establish a "qualifying relationship " under the Act and the regulations , a petitioner must show 
that the beneficiary ' s foreign employer and the proposed U.S. employer are the same employer (i.e. 
one entity with "branch" offices), or related as a "parent and subsidiary " or as "affiliates. " See 
generally section 101 ( a)(l5)(L) ofthe Act; 8 C.F .R. § 214.2(1). 
The pertinent regulations at 8 C.F .R. § 214.2(1)(1 )(ii) define these terms as follows: 
(K) Subsidiary means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent 
owns, directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the 
· entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, half of the entity and controls the entity; 
or owns, directly or indirectly , 50 percent of a 50-50 joint venture and has 
equal control and veto power over the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly , 
less than half of the entity, but in fact controls the entity. 
(L) Affiliat e means 
(I) One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by 
the same parent or individual , or 
(2) One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group 
of individuals, each individual owning and controlling 
approximately the same share or proportion of each entity. 
On the Form 1-179 the Petitioner stated that it is a wholly owned subsidiary of the foreign entity. 
However, in its letter in support of the Petition, it described the ownership of each company as 
follows: 
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Matter ofT-G-P-, LLC 
Shareholder L_ %shares [The Petitioner] %shares 
I 20% 0 
I 20% 25% 
I 20% 25% 
II 20% -- 25% 
20% 0 
I 0 25% 
The Petitioner explained: 
The regulations clearly state that a subsidiary qualifies if is in indirectly controlled by 
a parent company. Under the applicable analysis the majority ownership of 
in El Salvador is held by the same individuals who exercise control over [the­
Petitioner] in the United States; therefore, the foreign entity has indirect control over 
more than half of U.S. entity. More specifically, 75% of the U.S. entity is owned by 
the 60% shareholders of therefore, indirectly controls more than 
50% ofthe U.S. entity .... 
The Petitioner stated that, in the alternative, the two entities qualify as affiliates as they are "owned 
and controlled by the same group of individuals." It indicated that it was submitting evidence of the 
ownership of both companies. The Petitioner submitted a copy of a notice of change to its articles of 
organization filed with the Louisiana Secretary of States which identifies the company's four 
members as and Although the 
Petitioner stated that it was including translated corporate documents showing the ownership of the 
foreign entity, we are unable to locate this evidence in the record of proceeding. 
Regardless, the ownership arrangement described in the above chart does not establish that the 
foreign entity directly or indirectly owns the petitioning company and the ownership structure 
described does not meet the definition of"subsidiary" at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(K). 
The Petitioner has not established, in the alternative that it has an affiliate relationship with the 
foreign entity. The Petitioner states that it has four individual owners, the foreign entity has five 
owners, and that three individuals, collectively, own a majority interest in both companies. 
However, this ownership structure does not fall within the definition of affiliate at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(L) because the entities are not owned and controlled by the same group of 
individuals with each individual owning and controlling approximately the same share or proportion 
of each entity. 
USCIS does not accept as a combination of individual shareholders as a single entity, so that the 
group may claim majority ownership, unless the group members have been shown to be legally 
bound together as a unit within the company by voting agreements or proxies. Therefore, absent 
documentary evidence such as voting proxies or agreements to vote in concert to establish a 
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Matter ofT-G-P-, LLC 
controlling interest, the Petitioner has not established that the same individuals control both entities 
as necessary to establish a qualifying affiliate relationship. 
Based on the evidence submitted, the Petitioner has not established that it has a qualifying 
relationship with the Beneficiary's foreign employer. For this additional reason, the petition cannot 
be approved. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each 
considered as an independent and alternative basis for the decision.3 In visa petition proceedings, 
the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains with the petitioner. Section 291 of 
the Act, 8 US.C. § 136; Matter ofOtiende, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013). Here that burden has 
not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed., 
Cite as Matter ofT-G-P-, LLC, ID# 68447 (AAO Nov. 9, 2016) 
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We n:tay deny an application or petition that does not comply with the technical requirements of the law even if the 
Director does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See Spencer Enters., Inc. v. United States, 
229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, I 043 (E. D. Cal. 200 I). 
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