dismissed L-1B Case: Sports Construction

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
\ 
MATTER OF T-G-P-, LLC 
APPEAL OF VERMONT SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: JAN. 9, 2017 
PETITION: FORM 1-129, PETITION FOR A NONIMMIGRANT WORKER 
The Petitioner, a sports construction and surfacing company, seeks to temporarily employ the 
Beneficiary as a lead installer under the L-1 B nonimmigrant classification for intracompany 
transferees. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 101(a)(l5)(L), 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(l5)(L). The L-IB classification allows a corporation or other legal entity (including its 
affiliate or subsidiary) to transfer a qualifying foreign employee with "specialized knowledge" to 
work temporarily in the United States. 
The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition. The Director concluded that the 
evidence of record did not establish that the Petitioner has a qualifying relationship with the foreign 
entity. 
The matter is now before us on appeal. In its appeal, the Petitioner submits additional evidence and 
asserts that it has presented sufficient evidence to establish that it has a qualifying affiliate 
relationship with the Beneficiary's foreign employer based on common majority ownership by the 
same three individuals. 
Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the Beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge 
capacity, for one continuous year within three years preceding the Beneficiary's application for 
admission into the United States. Section 10l(a)(l5)(L) of the Act. In addition, the Beneficiary 
must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge 
capacity. Id. 
If an individual will be serving the United States employer. in a managerial or executive capacity, a 
qualified beneficiary may be classified as an L-1 A nonimmigrant alien. If a qualified beneficiary 
will be rendering services in a capacity that involves "specialized knowledge," the beneficiary may be 
classified as an L-1 B nonimmigrant alien. !d. 
Matter ofT-G-P-, LLC 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the statutory definition of 
specialized knowledge: 
For purposes of section 10l(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level ofknowledge of processes and procedures ofthe company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as: 
[S]pecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's 
product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its 
application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in 
the organization's processes and procedures. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form I-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will 
employ the alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph 
(l)(l)(ii)(G) ofthis section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or 
specialized knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the 
services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time 
employment abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years 
preceding the filing of the petition. 
~ (iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position 
that was managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the 
alien's prior education, training and employment qualifies him/her to perform 
the intended services in the United States; however the work in the United 
States need not be the same work which the alien performed abroad. 
II. QUALIFYING RELATIONSHIP 
The Director denied the petition based on a finding that the Petitioner did not establish that it has a 
qualifying relationship with the Beneficiary's foreign employer. ' 
To establish a "qualifying relationship" under the Act and the regulations, a petitioner must show 
that the beneficiary's foreign employer and the proposed U.S. employer are the same employer (i.e. 
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one entity with "branch " offices), or related as a "parent and subsidiary" or as "affiliates." See 
gef}erally section 101(a)(15)(L) ofthe Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1). 
The pertinent regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii) define the term "qualifying organization" and 
related terms as follows: 
(G) Qualtfying organization means a United States or foreign firm, corporation , or 
other legal entity which: 
(1) Meets exactly one of the qualifying relationships specified in the 
definitions of a parent, branch, affiliate or subsidiary specified in 
paragraph (1)( 1 )(ii) of this section; 
(I) Parent means a firm, corporation , or other legal entity which has subsidiaries. 
(J) Branch means an operating division or office of the same organization housed 
in a different location. 
(L) Subsidiary means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent 
owns, directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the 
entity; or owns, directly or indirectly , half of the entity and controls the entity; 
or owns, directly or indirectly , 50 percent of a 50-50 joint venture and has 
equal control and veto power over the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly , 
less than half of the entity, but in fact controls the entity. 
(M) Affiliat e means 
(I) One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the 
same parent or individual, or 
(2) One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of 
individuals , each individual owning and controllin g approximatel y the 
same share or proportion of each entity .... 
A. Evidence of Record 
On the L Classification Supplement to Form 1-129, the Petitioner stated that. it is a "wholly owned 
subsidiary" of the Beneficiary's foreign employer , located in El Salvador. 
In its letter in support of the petition, the Petitioner described the ownership of each company as 
follows: 
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Matter ofT-G-P- , LLC 
Shareholder L_ %shares [The Petitioner] %shares 
I 20% 0 
I 20% 25% 
,r 20% 25% r 20% 25% 
I 20% 0 
0 25% 
The Petitioner explained: 
The regulations clearly state that a subsidiary qualifies if is in indirectly controlled by 
a parent company. Under the applicable analysis the majority ownership of 
in El Salvador is held by the same individuals .who exercise control over [the 
Petitioner] in the United States ; therefore , the foreign entity has 
indirect control over 
more than half of U.S. entity. More specifically , 75% of the U.S. entity is owned by 
the 60% shareholders of therefore, indirectly controls more than 
50% of the U.S. entity .... 
The Petitioner stated that, in the alternative, the two entities qualify as affiliates as they are "owned 
and controlled by the same group of individuals ." 
In response to a request for evidence (RFE), the Petitioner submitted additional evidence sufficient 
to document the stated ownership .of each company , including its operating agreement and the 
foreign entity's articles of incorporation . The Petitioner again claimed that the two entities are 
affiliates as they are "owned by the same group of individuals, each owning and controlling 
approximately the same share or proportion of each entity." 
The Director denied the petition, concluding that the evidence of record did not establish that the 
Petitioner has a qualifying relationship with the foreign entity. In denying the petition, the Director 
observed that the ownership structures described in the record do not support a findi'ng that the two 
entities are affiliates that are owned 
by the same group of individuals with each individual holding 
approximately the same proportion of ownership in each company . The Director noted that both 
companies are owned in part by individuals who have no ownership interest in the other entity. 
On appeal, the Petitioner submits additional evidence and asserts that it has established that three 
shareholders commonly own and control both entities as follows: 
Shareholder %shares [Petitioner] % shares 
I 20% 25% 
II 20% 25% 
20% 25% 
Total 60% 75% 
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The Petitioner further states: 
[T]here is sufficient evidence to prove that the majority three common owners in both 
companies have approximate shares in each entity, that at least two of these common 
shareholders, and exercise actual control 
and enjoy vast authorities and powers in both entities, and that both companies are 
bound to one another by substantial AND majority ownership by the same group of 
individuals, which satisfy the meaning of "affiliate." 
In addition, the Petitioner objects to the Director's finding that the evid~nce shows that "no one 
individual exerts control'' over either the foreign or U.S. entities and that "any grouping" of two to 
three owners could control the entities. The Petitioner emphasizes that Section 3.3 of its operating 
agreement states: "At any meeting at which a quorum is present, a vote of not less than 7% of the 
total voting power of the Members shall constitute the act of the Company." The Petitioner asserts 
that this clause leads to a conclusion that "[t]he vote of the three controlling majority shareholders or 
at least two of them is required each time" in order for a company action to be taken. 
The Petitioner further asserts that section 3. 9 of the operating agreement establishes that 
is the Petitioner's president and managing partner, giving him "vast authority to manage, 
direct, act and legally bind [the Petitioner] by signing most of its contracts with third partners." 
Similarly, the Petitioner asserts that ' ... possesses actual and de facto control 
over as he is the foreign entity's deputy sole administrator and has a general power of 
attorney from the company's general assembly of shareholders which gives him power over the 
entity's assets, contracts, representation, bank accounts and loans, among other powers. The 
Petitioner emphasizes that "is, at the same time, among the majority common 
shareholders of [the Petitioner] where no decision which can affect the company- directly or 
indirectly- can be taken without a majority vote of 75% of the voting powers of the members." 
Finally, the Petitioner emphasizes the close ties between th~ two companies, noting that they employ 
the same business model, deal with the same products in El Salvador and in the United States, 
procure business for each other, and "have three majority common shareholders with approximate 
shares in each company and at least two of these common shareholders enjoy de facto control in 
running and managing both companies." 
The Petitioner also submits a "Credential for Sole Administrator and Deputy Sole Administrator" 
indicating that and were elected by the foreign entity's 
General Assembly of Shareholders to the roles of Sole Administrator and Deputy Sole 
Administrator, respectively, on March 31, 2016. The referenced general power of attorney is also 
submitted in support of the appeal, and states that on May 13,2016, conferred his 
duties as sole administrator to 
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Matter ofT-G-P- , LLC 
B. Analysis 
Upon review ofthe petition and the evidence ofrecord, including the additional evidence submitted 
on appeal, the Petitioner has not established that it has a qualifying relationship w·ith the 
Beneficiary's foreign employer. 
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be 
examined in determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign 
entities for purposes of this visa classification . See Matter of Church Scientology International , 19 
I&N Dec. 593 (Comm 'r 1988); see also Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 
(Comm'r 1986); }vfatter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec . 289 (Comm'r 1982). In the context of this visa 
petition, ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of possession of the assets of an entity 
with full power and authority to control; control means the direct or indirect legal right and authority 
to direct the establishment , management , and o6erations of an entity. Matter of Church Scientology 
International, 19 I&N Dec. at 595. 
Although the Petitioner initially stated on the Form I-129 that it is a wholly-owned subsidiar y of the 
foreign entity, the ownership arrangement described and documented in the record does not establi sh 
that the foreign entity directly or indirectly owns any interest in the petitioning company and the 
ownership structure described does not meet the definition of "subsidiary" at 8 C.F.R . 
§ 214.2(1)(1 )(ii)(K) . 
The Petitioner has not established , in the alternative that it has an affiliate relationship with the 
foreign entity. The Petitioner has documented that it has four individual owners and the foreign 
entity has five individual owners. There are three individuals who each own a minority interest in 
both companies , two individuals who own an interest in the foreign entity only, and one individual 
who owns an interest in the petitioning company only. We agree with the Director's conclusion that 
this ownership structure does not fall within the definition of "affiliate" at 8 C.F .R. § 
214.2(1)( 1 )(ii)(L) because the entities are not owned and controlled by the same group of individuals 
with each individual owning and controlling approximately the same share or proportion of each 
entity. 
The Petitioner asserts that we should accept the combined minorit y ownership interests of 
and as evidence that this group of shareholders owns 
a majority interest in both the foreign entity U.S. entities. However , the regulations do not allow us 
to consider a comb ination of individual shareholders as a single entity , so that the group may claim 
majority ownership , unless the group members have been shown to be legally bound together as a 
unit within the company by voting agreements or proxies. 
The Petitioner cites A1atter ofTessel , Inc., l71& N Dec. 631 (Acting Assoc. Comm'r 1981) on 
appeal stating that the Commissioner determined that common majority stock ownership in both 
companies is sufficient for the purposes of establishing a qualifying relationship . In the Tessel 
decision, the beneficiar y solely owned 93% of the foreign entity and 60% of the petitioner, thereby 
establishing a "high percentage of common ownership and common management .. . . " The 
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Matter ofT-G-P-, LLC 
decision further' stated that "[ w ]here there is a high percentage of ownership and common 
management between two companies, either directly or indirectly or through a third entity, those 
companies are 'affiliated' within the meaning of that term as used in section 10l(a)(15)(L) of the 
Act." !d. at 633. However, the facts in the present matter can be distinguished from Matter· of 
Tessel as no one shareholder holds a majority interest in either corporation. 
The Petitioner also cites one of our unpublished decisions, stating that "the AAO has recognized that 
where persons own different amounts of shares in parent and affiliate but vote in a majority block by 
agreement, the affiliate relationship would be approved because there is no danger in one group 
controlling the foreign entity and another the US entity." However, the facts of this matter can be 
distinguished from those in this non-precedent decision, as the Petitioner has neither stated nor 
provided evidence that and have any 
agreement to vote in a block regarding the affairs of either the Petitioner or the foreign entity. While 
8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) provides that our precedent decisions are binding on all USCIS (U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services) employees in the administration of the Act, unpublished decisions are not 
similarly binding. 
To establish eligibility in this case, it must be shown that the foreign employer and the petitioning 
entity share common ownership and control. Control may be "de jure" by reason of ownership of 51 
percent of outstanding stocks of the other entity or it may be "de facto" by reason of control of 
voting shares through partial ownership and possession of proxy votes. Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N 
Dec. 289 (Comm'r 1982). 
Here, the Petitioner has not submitted any evidence that would impact the voting of shares by the 
individual owners of either the U.S. or foreign companies to show "de facto" control by the three 
individual common shareholders. The Petitioner maintains that, based on the terms of its operating 
agreement, the votes of "at least two" of the common owners of both entities would be needed in 
order for the members of the company to take any action. While this may be true, the Petitioner 
claims common ownership and control by the same three individuals, and has not claimed that these 
three members have agreed to vote in concert. 
Similarly, the foreign entity's articles of incorporation indicate that a General Assembly, while it 
may choose to entrust the company's administration to a Sole Administrator, maintains the authority 
to approve or disapprove the actions of the Sole Administrator. As the company has five 
shareholders, with each shareholder holding a 20% interest in the company, any one of 
and could join with the remaining two shareholders to 
reach a majority vote. Further, the articles of incorporation states that certain company actions 
require a decision to be made by the owners of no less than 75% of the outstanding sh(lres. 
On appeal, the Petitioner suggests that alone exercises de facto control over the 
petitioning company based on his role as president and managing member, while 
exercises de facto control over the foreign entity based on a power of attorney granting him authority 
to perform duties a~ Sole Administrator. Even if this claim were supported in the record, it is 
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Matter ofT-G-P-, LLC 
l 
unclear how the existence of some common ownership, with actual control resting with two different 
individuals, would establish the claimed affiliate relationship between the two companies. 
Nevertheless, as noted, the record establishes that the actions of the foreign entity's Sole 
Administrator are subject to the approval or disapproval of the company's General Assembly, and 
the record does not establish that' the common shareholders have an agreement to vote in a block in 
meetings of the General Assembly. With respect to the U.S. entity, the Petitioner's operating 
agreement does not actually set forth the power of the president or managing member, but does 
clearly state that the company will be managed by its members. As noted, the votes of at least three 
members are required to move forward with any company action, and the Petitioner has not 
submitted evidence that and have any agreement to 
vote together in member meetings. 
Based on the evidence submitted and the deficiencies discussed above, the Petitioner has not 
established that it has a qualifying relationship with the Beneficiary's foreign employer. 
III. SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE 
In addition to the ground for denial enumerated in the Director's decision, the Petitioner has not 
established {hat the Beneficiary has been or would be employed in a position that requires 
specialized knowledge, as defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(D). 
A. Evidence of Record 
On the Form I-129, the Petitioner stated that has employed the Beneficiary 
since May 2012. In the letter submitted in support of the petition, the Petitioner described the duties 
and requirements for the Beneficiary's proposed position of lead installer as follows: 
In this capacity, [the Beneficiary] will be responsible for leading the construction and 
installation of tennis courts, tracks, Sport Courts, and synthetic turf fields. This 
includes everything from foundation and drainage to finishing each field surface and 
installing specialized sport lighting. As [the Petitioner] focuses on installing highly 
specialized, unique products, we require an individual with technical intimacy of our 
business and clientele. Any external candidate would require approximately three to 
five years of training in the fundamentals of the products we use, the clients we serve, 
and the techniques required to professionally install each surface. 
[The Beneficiary] is extensively familiar with our products and has the expertise to 
implement state of the art solutions for clients in this sector. [The, Beneficiary] will 
expand our market share as he is trained across different sports surfaces and can 
provide cost effective, high quality services to our clients. He will be responsible for 
overseeing junior installation crews and working with management . . . . He will be 
/installing a proprietary drainage tile system that is not currently used in the U.S. 
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Matter ofT-G-P-. LLC 
Also, [the Beneficiary] is proficient in sewing turf seams as compared to our 
competitors who mostly glue seams. The result in [the Beneficiary's] advanced 
knowledge of sewing turf seams is a more cost effective and durable installation .... 
The Petitioner explained that the Beneficiary has served as a "Master Installer" with the foreign 
entity since May 2012 and "has gained in depth knowledge of our clients, our product line, and 
gained superior skills in drainage and installation \Vork related to different kinds of sports fields, 
arenas, and tracks." In addition, the Petitioner highlighted that, in addition to installation experience, 
the Beneficiary is experienced in construction of field bases and drainage systems, including a 
proprietary drainage system that is used only by the petitioning company in the United States. 
Finally, the Petitioner described the Beneficiary's training: 
[The Beneficiary] has undergone extensive hands on training in the products for 
which we have distribution rights in our geographic area. These include 
artificial turf and 
systems . . . . He has learned multiple unique techniques for difierent surfaces, 
including foundation and drainage. [The Beneficiary] has received extensive training 
in foundation, drainage, lighting track, anq turf technology, including standard 
drainage base and tile drainage base. It would take [the foreign entity and the 
Petitioner] three to five years to develop and train an installer to a similar level of 
specialized knowledge that [the Beneficiary] possesses. 
In response to an RFE, the Petitioner submitted a letter with additional information regarding its 
industry and the company's area of specialization. It explained that the "sports and construction 
industry is a specialty industry in and of itself' with some companies offering turnkey services 
(including base work, site work, and sports surfacing), and other companies offering typically one 
type of sports surfacing (specializing in turf, track, or tennis courts). The Petitioner noted that it 
offers turnkey solutions (or all types of sport surfaces, and is also a general contractor able to 
perform base and site work, giving it a competitive advantage. 
The Petitioner went on to explain that its installers are required to have advanced skill and 
knowledge in the following areas: turf base work, including multiple drainage systems; turf panel 
sewing; truck paver operation for mat type tracks; truck sprayer operation for spray type tracks; track 
full pour technologies for "poured in place" tracks; and tennis court installation for acrylic coat type 
courts. 
The Petitioner stated that "to develop an advanced knowledge of all of the above listed technologies 
requires a minimum of five years to learn and approximately seven years [to] master." Further, the 
Petitioner explained that knowledge of all of these technologies is uncommon in the industry due to 
a tendency towards specialization in the U.S. market, as some businesses will choose to specialize in 
one type of surface and rely on third party suppliers for projects involving multiple surfaces. 
With respect to the surfacing products themselves, the Petitioner stated that it and the foreign entity 
"have exclusive distribution rights to use products from several distributors including 
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Matter ofT-G-P-. LLC 
by and and that "the only way to gain 
experience working with these products is to work for [a company] authorized to distribute them." 
The Petitioner submitted copies of its distribution agreements, product information from its 
suppliers, as well as endorsement letters from and 
confirming that the Petitioner and foreign entity are authorized 
dealers/distributors of their products, and that the Beneficiary is a trained installer. The 
manufacturers' representatives noted that their companies provide continued training and technical 
assistance to their distributors and their installers. 
The Petitioner submitted evidence that the Beneficiary was among the foreign entity's personnel 
selected to work on a company project in Finally, the Petitioner emphasized that the 
Beneficiary possess all of the characteristics of an L-1 B specialized knowledge according to the latest 
USCIS policy guidance on this visa classification.1 Specifically, the Petitioner stated that "the highly 
technical nature related to the installation of these products, products tor which the company has 
exclusive 
distribution rights, establishes that the only way to have gained experience working on these 
surfaces is by working with the company abroad." 
B. Analysis 
Upon review of the evidence of record, including the Petitioner's response to the Director's RFE, we 
find the Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge or that he was employed abroad and would be employed in the 
United States in a specialized knowledge capacity as definecl at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(D). 
In order to establish eligibility, a petitioner must show that the individual beneficiary will be 
employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. 8 C.F .R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The statutory definition 
of specialized knowledge at Section 214( c )(2)(B) of the Act is comprised of two equal but distinct 
subparts. First, an individual is considered to be employed in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge if that person "has a special knowledge of the company product and its application in 
international markets." Second, an individual is considered to be serving in a capacity involving 
specialized knowledge if that person "has an advanced level of knowledge of processes and 
procedures of the company." See also 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(D). A petitioner may establish 
eligibility by submitting evidence that the beneficiary and the proffered position satisfy either prong 
of the definition. 
Once a petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and 
type of evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized 
knowledge. USCIS cannot make a factual determination regarding a given beneficiary's specialized 
knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature of the its 
products and services or processes and procedures, the nature of the specific industry or field 
1 
The Petitioner cited to USCIS Policy Memorandum PM-602-0111, L-18 Adjudications Policy (Aug. 17, 2015), 
https:/ /www. uscis.gov /laws/pol icy-memoranda. 
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Matter ofT-G-P-, LLC 
involved, and the nature of the beneficiary's knowledge. A petitioner should also describe how such 
knowledge is typically gained within the organization, and explain how and when the beneficiary 
gained such knowledge. 
As both "special" and "advanced" are relative terms, determining whether a given beneficiary's 
knowledge is "special" or "advanced" inherently requires a comparison of the beneficiary's 
knowledge against that of others. With respect to either special or advanced knowledge, the 
petitioner ordinarily must demonstrate that a beneficiary's knowledge is not commonly held 
throughout the particular industry and cannot be easily imparted from one person to another. The 
ultimate question is whether the petitioner has met its burden of demonstrating by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the beneficiary's knowledge or expertise is advanced or special, and that the 
beneficiary's position requires such knowledge. 
Here, the Petitioner states that the Beneficiary has special knowledge of third-party manufacturers' 
turf, track, and court surfacing products, as well as knowledge of a proprietary drainage system. The 
Petitioner also claims that the Beneficiary has advanced knowledge of the processes and techniques 
it.uses to plan and install these products for its custolllers. 
Because "special knowledge" concerns knowledge of the petitioning organization's products or 
services and its application in international markets, the Petitioner may meet its burden through 
evidence that the Beneficiary has knowledge that is distinct or uncommon in comparison to the 
knowledge of other similarly employed workers in the particular industry. 
Here, the record does not support the Petitioner's claim that the Beneficiary's knowledge of the 
third-party turf, track, and court surfacing products it distributes and installs is distinct or uncommon 
in comparison to that possessed by other installers in the sports construction and installation 
industry. The Petitioner relies, in part, on the fact that it is a turnkey solution provider with both 
general contracting and surfacing installation capabilities, which allow it to offer complete surfacing 
solution without using contractors to perform construction or installation services. However, it 
acknowledges that this "turnkey" approach is one of the "main categories" of business models in the 
sports construction industry. While some companies may offer installation services for fewer types 
of surfaces, there is insufficient evidence to support the Petitioner's claim that the combination of 
experience with general contracting techniques used in the industry and different third-party 
surfacing products constitutes "special knowledge" of the Petitioner's products as defined in the 
statute and regulations. 
The Petitioner refers to an advanced "turf sewing" technique used by the Beneficiary but has not 
claimed or documented that it was developed in house or provided information regarding the length 
of training involved in learning the technique. In addition, the Petitioner mentioned that the 
Beneficiary has knowledge of a "proprietary" drainage system, but again did not submit any 
information to document this system, evidence that it developed the system in-house, or evidence to 
show the amount and type of training needed to learn these installation techniques. As stated above, 
once a pet1tioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and 
type of evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized 
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Matter ofT-G-P-, LLC 
knowledge. The evidence does not adequately support the Petitioner's claims regarding the 
Beneficiary's company-specific or proprietary knowledge. 
Further, the Petitioner suggests that the knowledge required to install the third-party surfacing 
products it distribute~ and installs must be learned within the Petitioner's group of companies due to 
its exclusive distribution agreements with the manufacturers. However, the record does not establish 
that the Petitioner exclusively distributes and installs any of these products in the United States; 
rather, the record shows that it has distribution rights in a limited territory of three to four U.S. states. 
The record therefore does not support the Petitioner's claim that work experience with the foreign 
entity is the only way to learn the installation techniques for these primarily U.S.-manufactured 
products. Rather, the letters from the manufacturers indicate that the manufacturers themselves 
provide training to their distributors and their distributors' installers. 
We also acknowledge the Petitioner's claim that the sports construction and surfacing industry itself 
is a niche industry within the larger construction industry. However, again, the Petitioner has not 
submitted evidence to support a claim that the knowledge required for the lead installer position is 
truly different or uncommon. With respect to either special or advanced knowledge, the petitioner 
ordinarily must demonstrate that a beneficiary's knowledge is not commonly held throughout the 
particular industry and cannot be easily imparted from one person to another. In addition, the 
Petitioner must describe how such knowledge is typically gained within the organization, and 
explain how and when the Beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
Here, the Petitioner merely describes the Beneficiary as a "trained installer." It initially stated that it 
would take three to five years to train someone to his level, and later stated that it takes five years to 
learn the skills and knowledge he possesses and seven years to master them. At the time of filing, 
the Beneficiary had been employed by the foreign entity for three years and nine months, and based 
on the Petitioner's own claims, is well short of the five years of training or experience needed to 
learn the needed skills. It did not provide the details of his specific education and prior employment 
history, describe or document when he received specific training during his period of employment 
abroad, identify the training courses he has completed or otherwise explain or document how and 
when he gained such knowledge. In fact, the Petitioner stated that he has held the title "Master 
Installer" since the foreign entity hired him in 2012 and has not provided any description of his 
training or progressive work experience with the foreign entity. Therefore, we cannot evaluate the 
Petitioner's claims that it actually takes three, five, or seven years of training and experience to learn 
to install the products the Petitioner and foreign entity distribute. 
As noted, it appears that the manufacturers actually provide the product training to their authorized 
dealers and installers, but the Petitioner has not provided evidence of the amount or type of training 
they typically provide and, again, relies on a general claim that the Beneficiary received training 
during his tenure with the foreign entity. The evidence indicates that these manufacturers offer the 
same training to other U.S. dealers and installers, as the Petitioner operates in a limited geographic 
territory of a few states. Further, we find it reasonable to believe that the Petitioner's suppliers are 
not the only companies that offer sports surfacing products and we cannot determine if other 
installers working in the sports surfacing industry, or even general contractors, could readily learn 
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Matter ofT-G-P-, LLC 
the techniques needed to set up and install these types of products. The Petitioner indicated that 
some companies in its field hire contractors on a project basis if the project requires installation 
skills they lack. In other words, the Petitioner concedes that there are contractors who specialize in 
these types of sports surfacing installations. 
Overall, for the reasons discussed, the Petitioner's claims that the Beneficiary's knowledge of its 
products and techniques is special knowledge are not supported by sufficient evidence. A 
petitioner's unsupported statements are of very limited weight and normally will be insufficient to 
carry its burden of proof, particularly when supporting documentary evidence would reasonably be 
available. See Matter of So.ffici, 22 I&N Dec. 15 8, 165 (Comm 'r 1998) (citing 1Vfatter of Treasure 
Craft o.fCal., 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg'l Comm'r 1972)); see also Matter ofChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 
369, 376 (AAO 2010). The Petitioner must support its assertions with relevant, probative, and 
credible evidence. See Matter ofChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 376. 
Here, while evidence submitted confirms that the Beneficiary is skilled and well-versed in the 
installation of the third-party products offered by the Petitioner and foreign entity, the evidence 
submitted to support its claims that his knowledge and skills qualify as "special" knowledge within 
the industry is insufficient. Based on the evidence submitted, we cannot evaluate whether this 
knowledge is truly distinct or uncommon or whether it could be easily imparted to another person in 
the Beneficiary's profession. For the foregoing reasons, the evidence does not establish the 
Beneficiary possesses special knowledge. 
The Petitioner also claims that the Beneficiary's "Master Installer" role and his experience with its 
claimed foreign parent company have resulted in his acquisition of advanced knowledge of the 
Petitioner's processes and procedures. Because "advanced knowledge" concerns knowledge of an 
organization's processes and procedures, the Petitioner may meet its burden through evidence that 
the Beneficiary has knowledge of or expertise in the organization's processes and procedures that is 
greatly developed or further along in progress, complexity and understanding in comparison to other 
workers in the employer's operations. Such advanced knowledge must be supported by evidence 
setting that knowledge apart from the elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. 
The Petitioner states that the Beneficiary is a master installer with the advanced knowledge needed 
to implement solutions for its clients and, because he is trained across different sports surfaces, he 
can provide cost-effective services to clients. The Petitioner· also emphasizes that he will be 
"overseeing junior installation crews and working with management." However, the record does not 
include information regarding the other employees working for the U.S. and foreign entities, such as 
their training, professional backgrounds, duties, and length of experience with the respective entities. 
Again, the Petitioner must support its assertions with relevant, probative, and credible evidence. See 
Matter ofChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 376. We cannot determine that the Beneficiary's knowledge is 
advanced in relation to the Petitioner's or foreign entity's other employees if we have no evidence 
regarding those employees' relative knowledge and experience. 
In fact, the Petitioner has not provided any information regarding the staffing of the U.S. or foreign 
companies, other than noting that the Petitioner has five employees. If the Petitioner has been 
13 
Matter ofT-G-P-, LLC 
operating in the United States for four to five years, as claimed, it is reasonable to believe that it 
actually employs qualified installers who are able to deliver the company's turnkey solutions. Or, 
alternatively, it may be able to fulfill its obligations to customers by using contractors who have no 
experience with the foreign entity. As noted, the companies that supply the surfacing products are 
primarily U.S.-based entities who provide training to their. distributors; it is unclear why the 
Petitioner cannot train its employees in the United States or why the offered position would require 
advanced knowledge that can only be gained abroad, as claimed by the Petitioner. 
While we do not question the owne'rs' business decision to transfer the Beneficiary to the United 
States, we cannot determine based on the evidence submitted that his knowledge is advanced in 
comparison to the Petitioner's and foreign entity's \vorkers; the length of his tenure alone is not 
sufficient to establish his advanced knowledge. For these reasons, the evidence is insufficient to 
establish that the Beneficiary's expertise in the organization's processes and procedures is greatly 
developed or further along in progress, complexity, and understanding in comparison to other 
workers in the Petitioner's operations, either in the United States or in El Salvador. The Petitioner's 
claims are not supported by evidence setting the Beneficiary's knowledge of company processes 
apart from the elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. 
Finally, we acknowledge the Petitioner's claim that the Beneficiary possesses the characteristics of a 
worker with qualifying specialized knowledge as set forth in USCIS Policy Memorandum PM-601-
011, supra, at 8. For the reasons discussed above, the Petitioner has not submitted sufficient 
evidence to establish that the Beneficiary possesses knowledge that is either special or advanced. 
While the Beneficiary may be filling a role that would be beneficial to the Petitioner's 
competitiveness in the marketplace, this characteristic alone is not probative of his specialized 
knowledge. As noted in the memorandum, the "characteristics" listed by the Petitioner are only 
"factors that USCIS may consider when determining whether a beneficiary's knowledge is 
specialized" and such factors must be supported by evidence. Id. The memorandum highlights that 
"ultimately, it is the weight and type of evidence that establishes whether the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge." !d. at 13. 
We do not doubt that the Beneficiary is a highly skilled employee who is well-qualified for the 
offered position. However, for the reasons discussed above, the evidence submitted does not 
establish that the Beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge and that he has been employed 
abroad and will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity with the Petitioner in the United 
States. See Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. For this additional reason, the petition cannot be 
approved. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each 
considered as an independent and alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, the 
burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains with the petitioner. Section 291 of the 
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 136. Here that burden has not been met. 
14 
Matter ofT-G-P-, LLC 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
Cite as Matter ofT-G-P-, LLC, ID# 150983 (AAO Jan. 9, 2017) 
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