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PUBLIC COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Rm. 3042 
Wash~ngton, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: SRC 04 159 5 1249 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
M Robert P. Wiemann. Director 
Tf 
dministrative Appeals Office 
SRC 04 159 51249 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to temporarily employ the beneficiary as an L-1B 
nonimrnigrant intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1 10 1(a)(15)(L). The petitioner, a Georga corporation, is a 
provider of technology-based solutions for supply chain management. It claims to be the parent company of 
located in Bangalore, India. The petitioner 
seeks to employ the beneficiary as a senior analyst for a period of three years. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that the prospective position requires an individual with specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion, and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director 
"arbitrarily defined 'specialized knowledge' contrary to regulation," and utilized a definition narrower than 
that found at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). Counsel further contends that the director failed to consider 
probative evidence documenting the beneficiary's specialized knowledge of proprietary processes and 
procedures. Counsel submits a brief, but no additional evidence, in support of the appeal. 
To establish L-1 eligibility, the petitioner must meet the criteria outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(15)(L). Specifically, within three years 
preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary in a qualiijling managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized 
knowledge capacity, for one continuous year. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States 
temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof 
in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
SRC 04 159 51249 
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education, training, and employment qualifies hirnher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
This matter presents two related, but distinct, issues: (1) whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge; and, (2) whether the proposed employment is in a capacity that requires specialized knowledge. 
Section 2 14(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. fj 1 184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
In a May 11, 2004 letter, the petitioner described the beneficiary's specialized knowledge and 
employment abroad with the petitioner's foreign subsidiary as follows: 
For the last year, the beneficiary has been working with a team of software professionals 
tasked to enhancing [sic] the Transportation Management System ("TMS") - one of the three 
critical components of our Supply Chain Execution solution system, and integrating TMS 
into other . . . solutions, including our Warehouse Management System. This involved 
obtaining thorough knowledge of, and development of our proprietary software solutions. 
As an Analyst, [the beneficiary] is key in development of Shipment and Order Services 
development for the new fourth generation shipment planning optimization tool using sate 
[sic] of the art algorithms for even the most complex transportation networks, as well as 
keying the product to internalization. This development is so important as to be highlighted 
on page 21 of our 2003 Annual Report. 
The beneficiary has been employed with [the foreign entity] in India since April 2003 as a 
Software Analyst. He has been responsible for the development of new functionalities for key 
modules of our proprietary Transportation Management application products (TMS). This is a 
position which has involved specialized knowledge of our proprietary software solutions. . . . 
SRC 04 159 5 1249 
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The petitioner provided the following description of the beneficiary's proposed position in the United States: 
We wish to transfer [the beneficiary] to the United States as a Senior Analyst. He will 
continue to work specifically on the TMS of our Transportation Management application 
products to develop and extend those offerings. He will utilize the proprietary knowledge he 
gained during his employment with our wholly owned subsidiary on this same product line to 
continue with the development and enhancement of our product lines. 
This is a position which requires detailed knowledge of our proprietary software systems and 
implementation methodologies. 
The petitioner stated that it offers three principal product groups, Warehouse Management, Transportation 
Management, and Trading Partner Management, which are integrated into a supply chain execution system. 
The petitioner indicated that in order to protect its proprietary products and rights, it enters into confidentiality 
agreements with its employees, consultants, clients and potential clients. 
Finally, the petitioner submitted a May 11, 2004 letter from its foreign subsidiary confirming that the 
beneficiary was hired as a software analyst on March 3 1, 2003, and has been performing the following duties: 
[Hlis responsibilities in the TP&E (Shipment & Order Services) team included understanding 
the customer's requirements, [dlesigning solutions and [dleveloping them. Has worked on 
Core Shipment and Order services and Globalization for TMS, using J2EE, JSP, Oracle, 
XML, Webmethods and other Java related Technologies. 
On May 26, 2004, the director requested additional evidence related to the beneficiary's claimed specialized 
knowledge. Specifically, the director instructed the petitioner to: 
Submit evidence relating to the unique methodologies, tools, programs, and/or applications 
that your company uses. . . . Please describe in detail how these are different from the 
methodologies, tools, programs and/or applications used by other companies. 
Explain in more detail, exactly what is the equipment, system, product, technique, or service 
of which the beneficiary of this petition has specialized knowledge, and indicate if it is used 
or produced by other employers in the United States and abroad. 
Please submit a record - as opposed to merely a letter- from [your] human resources 
department detailing the manner in which the beneficiary has gained hisher specialized 
knowledge. Documentation should indicate the pertinent training courses in which the 
beneficiary has been enrolled while working for your company, as well as the duration of the 
courses, the number of hours spent taking the courses each day, and the certificates of 
completion of these courses. 
SRC 04 159 51249 
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Indicate the minimum amount of time required to train an employee to fill the proffered 
position. Specify how many workers are similarly employed by your organization. Of these 
employees, please indicate how many have received training comparable to the training 
administered to the beneficiary. 
If the specialized knowledge was attained through the course of on-the-job experience, please 
clarify exactly what knowledge was attained through the beneficiary's past employment with 
the company. For each facet of specialized knowledge, please explain how the particular 
knowledge attained at that particular time was different from knowledge attained by 
individuals in the identical or similar position for the company. 
The director noted that the evidence submitted with the initial petition did not establish that the beneficiary's 
knowledge is beyond that which is normally held by individuals in similar occupations. The director noted 
that "[k]nowledge of proprietary systems or software does not equate to specialized knowledge when there is 
no evidence that the system or software are fundamentally different from other, similar systems or software." 
In a response dated June 11, 2004, counsel for the petitioner indicated that some of the requested evidence, 
such as detailed records pertaining to the beneficiary's training, was not available. Counsel emphasized that 
the petitioner spent $27.4 million in research and development in 2003, a portion of which was allocated to 
enhancement of its Transportation Management Solution. Counsel noted that the beneficiary was a member of 
the team that worked on these enhancements for the previous year and stated: "He obtained his specialized 
knowledge in part because he helped create the solution (which is proprietary in nature) and in part because in 
order to do his work on changes to these modules of an integrated solution, he had access to [the petitioner's] 
proprietary technology as part of his development efforts." 
The petitioner submitted a June 10, 2004 letter from its director, human resources, who further described the 
beneficiary's work assignment with the foreign entity: 
Since his hire, [the beneficiary] has been working on the development of enhancements for 
Release 2004R1 of our Transportation Planning & Execution for Open Systems (TPnE). He 
gained functional and technical knowledge as part of the development of these enhancements. 
His work has included TMS Internationalization. He has worked with a U.S. lead and 
together they designed and developed the Internationalization framework for this offering. 
The U.S. lead has since left the company, and [the beneficiary] is now the only resource 
within [the petitioning company] with detailed knowledge and expertise in this particular 
area. His latest work has been on Shipment and Order Services which are basic elements of 
the TPnE product and as the result of his work he has become well versed in this area. 
To document the proprietary nature of the products on which [the beneficiary] has worked, 
we are attaching the Release Notes prepared for customers, employees, partners, and 
prospective customers on TPnE. This was released in April, 2004. 
SRC 04 159 51249 
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The petitioner indicated that most of the petitioner's development work is performed in the United States, 
while "certain development tasks" are performed by its Indian subsidiary, which employs 40 developers 
working on product enhancements and new products, as well as 30 software quality assurance analysts. 
The petitioner stated that it takes "six to nine months minimum" for a qualified developer to obtain detailed 
specialized knowledge of its products, but emphasized that the beneficiary has been working on "critical 
enhancements which help shape our entire Supply Chain Management and Execution offerings," and which 
will be shared with developers in the United States. 
To demonstrate the proprietary nature of the company's products, the petitioner submitted general product 
brochures, highlighted pages of its latest annual report which discussed enhancements to the Transportation 
Procurement application, and submitted the above-referenced Release Notes for the Transportation Planning 
& Execution Systems for Open Systems, Release 2004R1. 
The director denied the petition on June 28, 2004, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the 
beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that the prospective position requires an individual with 
specialized knowledge. The director observed that the proposed duties outlined by the petitioner do not 
appear to be significantly different from those of any other senior analyst employed by the petitioner or any 
other software development company in the petitioner's industry. The director also noted that the petitioner 
had submitted no supporting evidence to establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy 
or distinguished compared to other employees in the petitioning company or in the beneficiary's field. The 
director found that the petitioner had not furnished evidence to demonstrate that the beneficiary's duties 
involve knowledge or expertise that make him key personnel to the company, and suggested that the 
beneficiary is merely a "highly skilled worker." 
In an appeal filed on July 26, 2004, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director utilized a definition of 
"specialized knowledge" narrower than that found in the regulations, arbitrarily defined "specialized 
knowledge,'' and failed to apply the definition of specialized knowledge found at 8 C.F.R. 9 
2 14.2(1)(1)(1)(ii)(D). Counsel further contends: 
The Director failed to consider probative evidence (not only from supporting letters and 
documents, but from annual report) that the beneficiary had "special knowledge" of critical 
processes and procedures of the organization, that the petitioner spent over $20,000,000 
developing those processes, and that the processes were complex and proprietary as 
documented by detailed internal specifications.' 
Counsel asserts that the director referred to the "plain meaning" of specialized knowledge as knowledge 
"beyond the ordinary," rather than relying on the statutory definition, and "ignore[d] the knowledge beyond 
the ordinary of an Analyst who actually developed the process and function." Counsel concludes that the 
I 
 Counsel further observes that the director referred to 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 9, 15 
(D.D.C. 1990), in her Notice of Decision, but failed to provide a citation for the case. The referenced decision 
and its relevance to the instant matter will be included in the discussion below. 
SRC 04 159 51249 
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evidence submitted established that the beneficiary has "detailed and specialized knowledge of the processes 
of the petitioner." 
On review, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary's prospective position requires 
"specialized knowledge" as defined in section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), and the 
regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). Instead, the petitioner consistently describes the position as one 
requiring an experienced and skilled software developer, rather than someone who possesses specialized 
knowledge. 
As a preliminary matter, the AAO acknowledges counsel's suggestion that the director relied on a definition 
of "specialized knowledge" that is narrower than or contrary to the regulatory definition. It must be noted that 
in making a determination as to whether knowledge possessed by a beneficiary is special or advanced, CIS 
relies on the statute and regulations, legislative history and prior precedent. This approach allows CIS to take 
into consideration the original intentions of Congress in creating the specialized knowledge classification, as 
well as prior precedent decisions that continue to prove instructive in adjudicating L-1B visa petitions. Upon 
review of the record, there is no indication that the director disregarded the statutory definition of specialized 
knowledge in adjudicating this matter or otherwise applied a narrower definition than that intended by 
Congress or established by precedent decisions. 
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. 
See 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed description of the services to be performed 
sufficient to establish that it involves specialized knowledge. Id. 
In the present matter, the petitioner has provided only general descriptions of the beneficiary's current and 
proposed roles as a software analyst that convey little understanding of the type or extent of specialized 
knowledge that would be required to successfully perform the purported job duties. For example, the 
petitioner's description of the beneficiary's duties in his proposed role as a senior analyst consists solely of a 
statement that "he will continue to work specifically on the TMS of our Transportation Management 
application products to develop and extend those offerings" utilizing "proprietary knowledge he gained during 
his employment with our wholly owned subsidiary on the same product line." This vague description does not 
assist the AAO in identifying the actual duties to be performed by the beneficiary in the United States or 
specifically identify the need for the services of an individual with specialized knowledge of the petitioner's 
products, or an advanced knowledge of the petitioner's processes. The petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of 
proof with a blanket assertion that the U.S. position requires proprietary knowledge. As noted above, the 
regulations require a detailed description of the duties to be performed. Id. 
With respect to the beneficiary's claimed employment abroad in a position involving specialized knowledge, 
the petitioner submitted a letter from the foreign entity indicating that the beneficiary had worked on its 
"TP&E (Shipment & Order Services) Team" where he "designed and developed solutions" using such 
standard programming languages and technologies as J2EE, JSP, Oracle, XML, Webmethods and "other Java 
related [t]echnologies." Without further explanation, this job description could describe any software 
developer or analyst trained in web-enabled database technologies. 
SRC04 15951249 
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The petitioner also noted that the beneficiary was a member of a team responsible for developing 
enhancements to its Transportation Management System and stated that the beneficiary is "key in the 
development for the new fourth generation shipment planning optimization tool using [state] of the art 
algorithms to plan for even the most complex transportation networks, as well as keying the product to 
internalization." In response to the director's request for additional evidence, the petitioner indicated that the 
beneficiary had developed enhancements for TPnE, participated in developing a "TMS Internationalization" 
framework with a U.S.-based lead developer, and worked on "Shipment and Order Services." 
However, the petitioner provided no further clarification of the beneficiary's function within these various 
projects, no clear explanation of what the beneficiary actually developed, the complexity involved, or the 
knowledge required to perform the vaguely described tasks. Due to the lack of detail in the petitioner's 
description of the beneficiary's foreign and proposed employment, it is unclear exactly what role the 
beneficiary has played in the development of the TPnE release or TMS Internationalization, what specialized 
knowledge the beneficiary possesses, how this knowledge would be applied in the proffered position, or what 
actual duties he would be performing in the United States. Going on record without supporting documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sofjci, 
22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. 
Comm. 1972)). 
Upon review of the limited descriptions and evidence submitted in support of the initial filing, the director 
issued a very specific request in an attempt to identify whether the beneficiary's knowledge was advanced in 
comparison to other similarly qualified employees. Specifically, the director instructed the petitioner to 
provide evidence regarding: the length of time and amount of training necessary for an employee to work in 
the beneficiary's position, a record detailing the manner in which the beneficiary has gained his specialized 
knowledge, the types of training courses and/or on-the-job training the beneficiary received while working 
abroad, the type of training he would receive fi-om andlor provide to fellow employees in the United States, 
the number of similarly employed workers within its organization, and the number of workers who have 
received training similar to that provided to the beneficiary. The director also advised the petitioner that 
knowledge of proprietary systems or software alone does not equate to specialized knowledge, and 
specifically requested that the petitioner describe in detail how its methodologies, tools, programs and/or 
applications differ from those used by similar companies. 
In response, counsel indicated, without explanation, that "some of what [the director] asked for is not 
available." Counsel stated that the beneficiary obtained his specialized knowledge in part because he "helped 
create" the Transportation Management Solution, and "in part because in order to do his work on changes to 
these modules of an integrated solution, he had access to [the petitioner's] proprietary technology as part of 
his development efforts." Similarly, rather than responding to the director's detailed request for information, 
the petitioner indicated: (1) that it employs 40 software developers working on product enhancements in 
India, but did not specify how many developers have knowledge similar to that held by the beneficiary; (2) 
that the beneficiary has "specialized knowledge" of its products because he spent the last year "developing 
enhancements to parts of those products" and that (3) the beneficiary is "now the only resource within [the 
petitioner's group] with detailed knowledge and expertise in [TMS Internationalization.]." Rather than 
submitting the requested detailed description of the how the petitioner's software and products differ from 
SRC 04 159 51249 
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those offered by its competitors in the industry, the petitioner submitted what it referred to as "very general 
product brochures" and highlighted a few pages of its annual report that refer to its Transportation 
Management solution in order to "document the proprietary nature of our products." 
Despite counsel's reference on appeal to the "probative evidence" submitted by the petitioner, the petitioner's 
submission was largely non-responsive to the director's request and did not provide the required level of 
detail or supporting evidence. The regulation states that the petitioner shall submit additional evidence as the 
director, in his or her discretion, may deem necessary. The purpose of the request for evidence is to elicit 
further information that clarifies whether eligibility for the benefit sought has been established, as of the time 
the petition is filed. See 8 C.F.R. $9 103.2(b)(8) and (12). The failure to submit requested evidence that 
precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(14). 
Without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's 
burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 
I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter oflaureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter ofRamirez-Sanchez, 
17 I&N Dec. 503,506 (BIA 1980). 
Based on the petitioner's failure to provide a detailed response to the director's request for evidence, the 
record is devoid of evidence that would substantiate the contentions of the petitioner and of counsel. As stated 
by the director in the request for additional evidence, inside knowledge of a company's products does not 
automatically constitute special or advanced knowledge. It is to be expected that on-the-job training 
completed with any company will provide an employee with knowledge that is germane to that organization. 
As in the present matter, when a petitioner asserts that a beneficiary has experience with proprietary products 
or procedures, CIS must carefully evaluate the claimed knowledge and the depth of the beneficiary's 
experience in order to determine whether it rises to the level of specialized knowledge as contemplated by 8 
C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). Therefore, the petitioner's failure to provide evidence of the training received and 
the manner in which the beneficiary's knowledge was distinguished from that of other software analysts 
prohibits a finding in the petitioner's favor. Although specifically requested by the director, the petitioner did 
not provide any evidence of the beneficiary's training, experience, daily duties, or level of expertise relative to 
the remainder of its workforce. Accordingly, the petition must be denied. 8 C.F.R. 4 103.2(b)(14). 
Furthermore, the limited information the petitioner provided with respect to its on-the-job training 
requirements precludes a finding that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a position involving specialized 
knowledge for one continuous year in the three years preceding the date of filing the instant petition as 
required by 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3)(iv). The beneficiary in this matter was hired by the foreign entity on 
March 3 1, 2003, and the instant petition was filed on May 17, 2004. Based on the petitioner's representations 
in its June 10, 2004 letter, it takes a qualified developer "six to nine months minimum" to obtain "detailed 
functional specialized knowledge" of the petitioner's products. Since the beneficiary had been employed by 
the foreign entity for less than 14 months, and there is no evidence in the record to indicate that he had prior 
experience with the petitioner's products, it is reasonable to assume that he did not develop "specialized 
knowledge" of the petitioner's products until at least six months after he commenced employment with the 
foreign entity, and no more than eight months prior to the filing of the instant petition. In addition, it is noted 
that the petitioner has not explained how the beneficiary was able to work on "critical enhancements" of its 
products for the previous year without first completing the six to nine-month period of employment required 
SRC 04 159 5 1249 
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to develop "detailed functional specialized knowledge" of such products. Accordingly, the petitioner has not 
established that the beneficiary was employed in a qualifying capacity for one year. 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3)(iv). 
For this additional reason, the petition cannot be approved. 
It is also appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-mahng 
process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 1 17, 120 (Comm. 1981) (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8 
(R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)).~ As stated by the Commissioner in 
Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 (Comm. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed 
specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find that the occupations inherently 
qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have 
unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the 
following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business' operation. 
Id. at 53. In the present matter, the evidence of record demonstrates that the beneficiary is more akin to an 
employee whose skills and experience enable him to provide a specialized service, rather than an employee 
who has unusual duties, skills or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized knowledge" 
is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 
"[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 F.Supp. 
9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key 
personnel." See generally, H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key personnel" 
denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's II New College 
Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be considered 
2 
 Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," the AAO 
finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had to be 
"proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized knowledge" from the prior 
INS interpretation of the term. The 1990 Committee Report does not reject, criticize, or even refer to any 
specific INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The Committee Report simply states that 
the Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vlarying [i.e., not specifically incorrect] 
interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the 
Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO 
concludes, therefore, that the cited cases, including Matter of Penner, remain useful guidance concerning the 
intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-1B classification. 
SRC 04 159 51249 
Page 11 
"important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic success of 
an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of "crucial 
importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. Accordingly, 
based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the Congressional record related to that term, the 
AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and the general 
labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. 
Here, the petitioner's only contention that the beneficiary's knowledge is more advanced than other software 
analysts is its assertion that the beneficiary's "work has included TMS Internationalization." Specifically, the 
petitioner states that the beneficiary and a U.S.-based lead developer developed the "Internationalization 
framework" for TMS, and that, following the departure of the U.S. developer, the beneficiary is "the only 
resource" within the petitioner's international organization with "detailed knowledge and expertise in this. 
particular area." The petitioner has submitted no explanation or documentary evidence to corroborate this 
assertion, or to otherwise clarify the importance of this claimed exclusive knowledge. The petitioner 
indicated that most of its development work is performed by the U.S. company, which appears to employ over 
300 research and development personnel. Overall, given the size of the petitioning company, the nature of its 
business, its descriptions of its integrated products and solutions, and the limited information provided 
regarding the beneficiary and his experience, the AAO does not find it credible that the beneficiary, who has 
been employed with the petitioner's group for only 13 months, is the "only resource" within the petitioner's 
international organization who possesses knowledge of and/or has experience with a major component of one 
of its primary product offerings. If CIS fails to believe that a fact stated in the petition is true, CIS may reject 
that fact. See, e.g., Anetekhai v. I.N.S., 876 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir.1989); Lu-Ann Bakely Shop, Inc. v. 
Nelson, 705 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D.D.C.1988); Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). 
Additionally, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of 
the specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982). Although the definition of "specialized 
knowledge" in effect at the time of Matter of Penner was superseded by the 1990 Act to the extent that the 
former definition required a showing of "proprietary" knowledge, the reasoning behind Matter of Penner 
remains applicable to the current matter. The decision noted that the 1970 House Report, H.R. No. 91-851, 
was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge, but that during the course of the sub-committee hearings 
on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the 
proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they 
understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and 
that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." Matter of Penner, supra at 
50 (citing H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445, 91st 
Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded that an expansive reading of the 
specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is not warranted. 
The Commissioner emphasized that the specialized knowledge worker classification was not intended for "all 
employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 53. Or, as noted in 
Matter of Colley, "[mlost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given specialized 
knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees with 
SRC 04 159 51249 
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specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as intracompany 
transferees." 18 I&N Dec. at 119. According to Matter of Penner, "[s]uch a conclusion would permit 
extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-I' visa" rather than the "key personnel" that 
Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also, 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 15 (concluding that 
Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees with specialized 
knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives.") 
The record does not distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge as different or more advanced than the 
knowledge possessed by other similarly employed software analysts supporting development of the same 
types of products for similar companies in the petitioner's industry. By itself, work experience and knowledge 
of a firm's technically complex products will not equal "special knowledge." See Matter of Penner at 53. 
Likewise, the petitioner has submitted no evidence that would distinguish the beneficiary from any other 
software analyst employed within its international organization. Based on the petitioner's assertions, anyone 
who has worked as a software analyst with the petitioner's group for six to nine months would possess 
"specialized knowledge" of its products sufficient to prepare them to perform product enhancements and 
related duties. 
Moreover, the petitioner offered no information regarding other employees working for the foreign company, 
such that the director or the AAO could make a meaningful comparison between the beneficiary's claimed 
"specialized knowledge" and the knowledge possessed by other workers within the petitioner's organization. 
Although knowledge need not be narrowly held within an organization in order to be specialized knowledge, 
the L-1B visa category was not created in order to allow the transfer of employees with any degree of 
knowledge of a company's products and processes. The petitioner identifies the beneficiary as a member of a 
team of software developers working on a specific product enhancement project, but offered no information 
regarding the number of employees on the team, the beneficiary's specific role within the team, or how the 
India-based team fits into the overall product development function. The lack of evidence in the record makes 
it impossible to classify the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's products or procedures as advanced, 
and precludes a finding that the beneficiary's role is "of crucial importance" to the organization. While it may 
be correct to say that the beneficiary is a skilled and experienced employee, the petitioner has not established 
that the beneficiary rises to the level of a specialized knowledge or "key" employee, as contemplated by the 
statute. See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 53. 
Finally, even if the petitioner had established that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge, the record 
contains a minimal description of the duties to be performed by him in the United States and is insufficient to 
establish that the petitioner would employ him in a specialized knowledge capacity. Based on the record, it is 
impossible to classify the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's software products and systems as 
advanced or special or to find that the beneficiary's role is of crucial importance to the organization. As stated 
previously, simply going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for the purpose 
of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sof$ci, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
SRC 04 159 51249 
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knowledge. 
 See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. 
 The record does not establish that the 
beneficiary has specialized knowledge or that the position offered with the United States entity requires 
specialized knowledge. 
The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an 
independent and alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving 
eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1361. 
Here, that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.