dismissed L-1B Case: Technology Consulting

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
identifying data deleted to 
 Office of Administrative Appeals, MS 2090 
prevent clearly unwarranted 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
invasion of personal privacy 
 U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
PUBLIC COPY 
File: WAC 08 1 14 51 5 16 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: AUG 0 4 2009 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 8 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form 1-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
JO~. Grissom 
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
WAC 08 114 51516 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimrnigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office ("AAO") on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the 
appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimrnigrant visa petition to employ the beneficiary as an L-1B intracompany transferee 
with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("the Act"), 
8 U.S.C. !$ 1 101 (a)(15)(L). 
 The petitioner, a technology, marketing and strategy consulting company 
incorporated in the State of Washington, states that it is the parent company of the beneficiary's foreign employer 
located in India. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary as an Application Development and Business 
Productivity Consultant for a period of three years. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. 
In denying the petition, the director observed that the beneficiary's duties appear to be those of a programmer 
analyst and that the performance of the described duties would not require specialized or advanced knowledge 
specific to the petitioning organization. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director misapplied the law as it applies to specialized 
knowledge workers and failed to fully address the evidence submitted in support of the petitioner's claims that 
the beneficiary possesses both specialized knowledge of the petitioner's proprietary process and advanced 
knowledge of the petitioner's processes and procedures. Counsel asserts that the director gave undue weight 
to unpublished AAO decisions involving "generic IT workers" working for software development and 
information technology firms, emphasizing that the director mischaracterized the nature of the petitioner's 
business. Counsel also contends that the director inappropriately dismissed claims that were based on a 1994 
legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) policy memorandum addressing the interpretation of 
specialized knowledge.' Counsel submits a detailed brief and additional documentary evidence in support of 
the appeal. 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must demonstrate that the 
beneficiary, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, has 
been employed abroad in a qualifylng managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge, for one continuous year by a qualifylng organization. The petitioner must also demonstrate that the 
beneficiary seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. !$ 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
1 
See Memorandum from James A. Puleo, Assoc. Comm., INS, Interpretation of Special Knowledge, March 
4, 1994. (hereinafter "Puleo memorandum"). 
* WAC 08 114 51516 
Page 3 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himther to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The primary issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary has been or 
will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity and whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge. 8 C.F.R. $5 214.2(1)(3)(ii) and (iv). 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), provides: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
The petitioner filed the nonimrnigrant visa petition on March 14, 2008. The petitioner stated on Form 1-129 that 
the beneficiary will serve in the position of "Application Development and Business Productivity Consultant" in 
the United States. 
Counsel for the petitioner submitted a brief in support of the petition in which he described the beneficiary's 
experience with the petitioner's foreign subsidiary and claimed specialized knowledge as follows: 
[The beneficiary] has been employed in the management consulting business by [the foreign 
entity] since July 2005. [He] is currently employed as an Application Development and Business 
Productivity Consultant. In this role, [the beneficiary] applies his skills in technology application 
and communication with knowledge of business processes and technology capabilities for 
delivering sofiware artifacts to satisfy customer requirements, which include technology 
architecture and presentations for Technical Decision Makers and technology professionals, 
* WAC 08 114 51516 
Page 4 
including demos and prototypes. He also is responsible for preparing deliverable outlines 
(taxonomies, TOC etc.), as well as documenting methodologies for technology implementation, 
frameworks for solution delivery, solution specifications and requirements documentation, and 
guidance and training materials on methodologies developed. 
Counsel stated that the beneficiary's specific duties include the following: 
Perform information collection, literature survey, reference validation, research and 
relevant knowledge acquisition about a variety of existing and emerging technologies. 
Gain expert level understanding of technology frameworks and standards like Infrastructure 
Optimization and appreciate their relevance, impact and implementation. 
Perform hands-on development and deployment tasks to gain understanding of technology 
features, functionalities and architecture. 
Conduct interviews, market surveys, research, etc. to gain information about solution needs, 
technology trends and business contexts. 
Build plans for appropriate technology implementation phases as per business priorities. 
Identify benefits and capabilities of emerging technologies. Gain in-depth understanding of 
technology architecture, inter-relationships and dependencies. 
Gain understanding of technology solution provisioning processes and support with 
relevant analysis at all stages of project life cycle. 
Create and validate requirement, functional and technical specifications. 
IdentifL technology readiness and demonstration projects and perform required 
development, deployment and documentation tasks. 
Build proof-of-concept programs and deployments to assess and demonstrate capabilities of 
emerging technologies in different contexts. 
Contribute to all stages of SDLC, including development and testing leading to product 
development/project execution. 
Work with clients (externallinternal) to identify their needs and transform the same into 
presentable, effective, relevant and workable deliverable descriptions and execution 
approach. 
Gather requirements and establish solution needs. Manage product specifications. 
Maintain communication with all project stakeholders and remain abreast with the relevant 
information about project progress and deliverable statuses. 
Validate critical deliverables, resolve customer issues and ensure relevant action on 
feedback received. 
Provide knowledge leadership by keeping abreast of technological changes and obtaining 
in-depth architectural insight. 
Impart technical, process and methodology training to developers, architects and 
administrators and make presentations about technology applications to audiences, 
including technology decision makers and lT professionals. 
Counsel explained that the petitioner "is not a software development or IT consulting company," but rather assists 
technology companies with "the roll out and adoption of emerging technology products and solutions by 
providing . . . marketing and channel strategy analyses, followed by campaign planning and execution." Counsel 
emphasized that the petitioner does not assist in technological design activities, but does provide services such as 
WAC 08 114 51516 
Page 5 
creating presentations, data sheets, demonstrations, code samples, components, white papers, technical guides, 
marketing, selling and delivery guides. Counsel Mer explained that the petitioner helps build and execute 
successful business models for new technologies and provides training, presales and delivery support to 
accelerate end-user adoption. 
Counsel stated that the petitioner "has committed to a strong Microsoft focus in its effort to serve as a strategic 
catalyst in the adoption of new technology for the Microsoft internal and external partner eco system" and noted 
that the petitioner "works closely with the Microsoft corporate teams to build strategic marketing guidance, 
technical thought leadership, solution vision, and marketinglreadiness content." 
Counsel further stated that the petitioner has developed its own internal processes that are "unique and 
proprietary." In this regard, counsel further described the petitioner's internal processes as follows: 
[The petitioner] has a unique ability to address a client's entire range of product development, 
marketing and roll out capabilities in one turnkey location. These internal processes are critical 
to [the petitioner's] ability to develop a sound and stylish marketing strategy for its clients, fiom a 
marketing, design and technology perspective. Such processes are also critical to ensure [the 
petitioner] maintains its position of prominence in the international marketplace. 
In sum, [the petitioner] has developed a unique process by which it can not only understand a 
client's business situation, but design a full range of scalable solutions to assist technology 
companies in the roll out of new technologies. [The petitioner] brings together expertise in 
design, development and support skills in sales and marketing, Enterprise Project Management, 
the incorporation of Microsoft technology and strategies and developed its own "proprietary" 
processes [and] systems to assist clients in handling the full range of roll out issues associated 
with new technologies. 
Counsel cited to the 1994 Puleo memorandum and stated that "the current standards to be used to determine 
whether an employee has specialized knowledge" are whether the employee: (1) possesses knowledge that is 
valuable to the employer's competitiveness in the market place; (2) is uniquely qualified to contribute to the U.S. 
employer's knowledge of foreign operating conditions; (3) has been utilized as a key employee abroad and has 
been given significant assignments which have enhanced the employer's productivity, competitiveness, image or 
financial position; and (4) possesses knowledge which can be gained only through extensive prior experience 
with the employer. 
Counsel explained that, generally, the petitioner's consultants are transferred to the United States to assist with 
projects for U.S. customers and to help cross-train the U.S. employees in processes and procedures used by the 
Indian subsidiary (and vice versa). Counsel stated that such employees would clearly meet the criteria for 
specialized knowledge set forth in the Puleo memorandum. Counsel indicated that the beneficiary in particular 
has an advanced level of knowledge of the foreign entity's proprietary processes and procedures that can only be 
obtained through employment with the foreign entity, and which will allow him to contribute to the U.S. 
company's knowledge of the foreign entity's operating conditions. 
In support of the petition, the petitioner submitted a copy of a company overview provided to new hires of the 
U.S. company, which describes the company's four-part strategy of providing strategic consulting, supporting 
. WAC 08 114 51516 
Page 6 
content, training and communications services, and technology adoption services for Microsoft, its subsidiaries, 
partners and customers. 
Finally, the petitioner submitted a copy of the beneficiary's resume, which shows that he joined the foreign entity 
in 2005 after completing a Bachelor of Science degree, a post-graduate diploma in computer applications, and a 
Master of Science degree in information technology. The beneficiary lists his technical skills as: experience in 
solution development using Microsoft technologies such as SharePoint Server 2007, Office 2007, LCS 2005; 
Windows application development using C#; Web Application development using ASPNET with C#; SQL 
server database; experience in requirements analysis, system analysis and design; preparation of prototypes, 
functional and technical specifications; and experience in installation of small client/server networks. 
The beneficiary indicates that he works as a "project manager'' with the foreign entity, where he utilizes 
"expertise in requirement analysis, solution designing, development, SharePoint Technology and Architecture," 
and "sound knowledge" of .NET applications, implementing web applications and other tools. The beneficiary's 
resume describes six projects on which he has worked as project manager, team leader and team member. The 
projects involved: a research and analysis project comparing features of Microsoft and IBM products; a project 
involving the migration of three applications fiom Lotus Notes to Microsoft Technologies; automation of a 
Finance External Reporting Process according to SEC requirements; a Unified Communication Solution; a 
Proposals Management Solution; and an Electronic Records Management Solution. 
The director issued a request for additional evidence (RFE) on March 19,2008, in which she requested, inter alia, 
evidence regarding the organizational structure of the U.S. and foreign entities and the locations of the 
beneficiary's current and proposed positions. The director also requested additional information regarding the 
number of foreign nationals the petitioner employs in the United States, the positions they hold, and the types of 
visas they hold, if applicable, as well as information regarding the number of persons holding the same or similar 
position as the beneficiary in the United States. 
In addition, the director instructed the petitioner to: (1) explain any special or advanced duties the beneficiary 
performs and will perform and how they are different fiom those performed by other similarly employed workers; 
(2) explain how the beneficiary's training or experience is uncommon, noteworthy or distinguished by some 
unusual quality compared to the rest of the petitioner's employees; (3) describe in detail the training the 
beneficiary will provide to U.S. workers and the specialized knowledge involved; (4) explain in more detail 
exactly what is the equipment, system, product, technique or service of which the beneficiary has specialized 
knowledge; and (5) explain what alternative action the petitioner will take if unable to obtain the beneficiary's 
services. 
Counsel submitted a brief in reply to the RFE on June 9, 2008. Counsel stated that the petitioner employs 36 
personnel of which seven hold positions that are the same or similar to the beneficiary's proposed role, which is 
"generically termed 'Enterprise Technology Strategist' or 'ETS."' Counsel noted that the petitioner's 
organizational chart shows five ETS positions currently available in the United states2 Counsel remarked that 
The U.S. organizational chart to which counsel referred actually shows that the beneficiary will fill an open 
"Project Manager" position and will report directly to an "Engagement Manager." The chart shows a total of 
four project manager positions and four engagement manager positions which report to a "PMO Director." 
The ETS positions have an entirely different reporting structure. 
WAC 08 114 51516 
Page 7 
"all ETS personnel generally provide the same services to [the petitioner's] customers," but noted that the 
beneficiary's skills are considered unique due to his experience with and architectural knowledge of Microsoft 
Unified Communications Technology gained during multiple projects. Counsel stated that this technology is 
utilized by "high-end corporate accounts," and is not a retail product that is readily utilized by companies that use 
Microsoft products to operate their businesses. Counsel asserted that "any individual or company that can provide 
extensive expertise in this area is unique in the industry." 
Counsel explained that the petitioner's "unique" service is its "4-prong strategy for rolling out their new 
technologies," which includes: (1) Strategic Consulting; (2) Content Preparation; (3) Training and 
"Evangelism"; and (4) Pre-Sales Support. Counsel stated that the petitioner's services are "unique in that all 
other management consulting companies specialize in just one or two of these four aspects of technology roll- 
outs." 
Counsel emphasized that the beneficiary, during his three years with the petitioner's foreign subsidiary, has 
learned to understand and effectively utilize the petitioner's internally-developed 4-prong strategy. Counsel stated 
that such knowledge is "specialized" because it can only be gained through extensive prior experience with the 
employer. Counsel mher stated that the knowledge is specialized because it makes the beneficiary "uniquely 
qualified to contribute to the U.S. employer's knowledge of foreign operating conditions." Counsel explained that 
the knowledge will enable the beneficiary to train U.S. personnel in the 4-pronged management system and in 
how the foreign entity conducts business. Counsel noted that the U.S. company does not perform all of the 
technical functions performed by the foreign entity, and stated that the cross training is necessary to ensure 
smooth collaboration between team members, understanding of U.S. customer requirements and environment by 
foreign employees, facilitation of communications, and to ensure U.S. team members' understanding of the 
capabilities of the Indian team. 
The petitioner's response also included an e-mail message addressed to counsel which further addresses the 
inquiries made in the RFE. In response to the director's inquiry regarding the training the beneficiary would 
provide to U.S. employees, the petitioner stated: 
[The beneficiary] has worked on many US projects fiom India. As part of training, he is going to 
share the best practices on how to work with the global team for technology related projects. He 
will also train associates in the US on various US UC technologies. 
The petitioner stated that the beneficiary would receive the following training while in the United States: 
During his stay in the US, [the beneficiary] will receive training on customer interactions. He 
will also receive additional training in the competitive technologies of Microsoft Unified 
Communications. This will help him in understanding the competitive advantages and architect 
integrated environments better. 
The director denied the petition on June 20, 2008, concluding that the petitioner had failed to establish that the 
beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a capacity requiring 
specialized knowledge. In denying the petition, the director acknowledged the position description submitted and 
found that such duties appear to be the "normal duties of a programmer analyst" rather than duties that require 
knowledge of the petitioner's products, equipment, service, process or procedures. With respect to whether the 
. WAC 08 114 51516 
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beneficiary performs advanced duties, the director acknowledged the petitioner's claim that the beneficiary's 
experience with Microsol? Unified Communication Technology is "unique in the industry." However, the director 
observed: (1) that the petitioner did not state that this knowledge is required to perform the proposed duties in the 
United States; and (2) that expertise in Microsol? technologies is not specific to the petitioning organization. 
Accordingly, the director determined that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary has unusual, 
advanced or specialized knowledge of the petitioning organization that would be gained only by the completion 
of substantial or extensive specialized training, education or experience directly related to the duties of the 
proffered position. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner, objects to the director's conclusion that the proffered position is that of a 
"programmer analyst," and that as such cannot qualify as a position requiring specialized knowledge. Counsel 
notes that the director did not acknowledge the petitioner's "unique 4-prong strategy" for helping its clients launch 
products and emphasizes that "it was the beneficiary's knowledge of [the petitioner's] 4-prong strategy that was 
critical to the performance of his duties and was, as such, the beneficiary's specialized knowledge in this 
instance." 
Counsel further contends that the director misapplied a series of unpublished AAO decisions issued on February 
1, 2008, which address extension requests for "generic" lT employees of IT consulting companies and software 
development companies. Counsel asserts that the director "appears to have taken these decisions and expanded 
upon them to conclude that no IT worker in any position with any company can quality as a "specialized 
knowledge" employee, irrespective of the facts of the specific petition." 
Counsel explains that the petitioner is not an IT consulting company that develops solutions to solve internal 
client problems or develops sohare for use by its customers or its customer's clients. Counsel again notes that it 
the petitioner is unique among management consulting companies because it offers a more complete solution to 
assist its clients with rolling out new technologies, compared to other companies which offer fewer services. 
Counsel identifies its four largest competitors and explains how its services differ from those provided by each 
company. 
Counsel also asserts that the director did not give proper weight to the Puleo memorandum in determining 
whether the instant beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. Counsel notes that the above-referenced 
unpublished AAO decisions relied on the standards set forth in the Puleo memorandum, and therefore, the 
petitioner should be permitted to rely upon the same policy to determine the same issue. Counsel asserts that the 
petitioner submitted evidence to establish that the beneficiary possesses knowledge that is valuable to the 
employer's competitiveness in the market place; is uniquely qualified to contribute to the U.S. employer's 
knowledge of foreign operating conditions; and possesses knowledge which can be gained only through extensive 
prior experience with the employer. 
Counsel contends that the beneficiary has been employed by the foreign entity almost since its inception and "not 
only has an advanced knowledge of [the petitioner's] internal processes, he has helped develop [the petitioner's] 
internal processes. Counsel, citing to Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (BIA 1982), asserts that "such 
knowledge demonstrates the beneficiary's ability to carry out a key process or hction within [the company] 
which is essential to [the petitioner's] operations." Counsel states that the beneficiary's advanced knowledge is 
further evidenced by the petitioner's desire to utilize the beneficiary to train U.S. personnel, and notes that "the 
WAC 08 114 51516 
Page 9 
knowledge of how to integrate IT solutions in the other four prongs of [the petitioner's] 4-prong process cannot be 
learned without working for [the petitioner]." Counsel asserts that "logic dictates that the beneficiary possesses 
knowledge that is valuable to the employer's competitiveness in the marketplace and that such knowledge can be 
gained only through extensive prior experience with the employer." 
In addition, counsel contends that the director ignored the training aspect of the proposed intracompany transfer. 
Counsel asserts that the petitioner explained the need to cross train its personnel and the challenges the company 
would face if it could not do so. Counsel asserts that the beneficiary "has helped develop the 4-prong strategy that 
is the center of [the petitioner's] economic success," and that such experience "clearly qualifies the beneficiary to 
train [the petitioner's] U.S. personnel on how to integrate IT solutions and technology into a new product launch." 
Counsel contends that, as such, the beneficiary is "uniquely qualified to contribute to the U.S. employer's 
knowledge of foreign operating conditions." 
Finally, counsel asserts that it would not be economically viable to train U.S. personnel for the beneficiary's 
position. Counsel explains that the petitioner has a formal training program for newly-hired IT professionals 
which is designed to ensure that a newly-hired IT professional "has a minimum competency in working with [the 
petitioner's] 4-prong strategy." Counsel indicates that the training consists of 522 hours of instruction which 
amounts to approximately 3.5 months of training "just to bring a new IT employee 'up to speed' so that they can 
start performing the services being provided by existing personnel." However, counsel emphasizes that a newly- 
trained employee would not be qualified to perform the training the petitioner wishes the beneficiary to provide to 
U.S. personnel. Counsel notes that one of the reasons the petitioner seeks to transfer the beneficiary is to allow the 
U.S. company to replicate the range of services provided in India, and contends that such a desire constitutes 
evidence that the petitioner would suffer economic disruption if it were necessary to hire someone else, and 
demonstrates that the beneficiary has advanced knowledge of the petitioner's processes and procedures. 
Counsel asserts in conclusion that the evidence clearly demonstrates that the beneficiary possesses knowledge 
that sets him apart from the elementary or basic knowledge held by others within the petitioning organization, and 
as such qualifies for the requested L-1B classification. 
In support of the appeal, the petitioner submits a copy of its "Learning Curriculum'' for IT professionals, which is 
divided into three components. The "Fundamental" training encompasses 60 hours and includes 12 courses in 
technology standards and guidelines and "process and communications." The training includes 2 hours in intanal 
company acronyms and two hours of training focused on the company's website/FTP site and knowledge base 
servers. The remainder of the fundamental training includes more general topics, such as understanding the phone 
and e-mail systems, timesheets, MS Office, Visio, MS Guidelines, MS Project Professional, and how to write 
white papers, use cases, archtecture guides, guidance documents and installation documents. The 
"Comprehensive" component includes 10 hours of training in object oriented programming using C#; 27 hours of 
training in HTML, XHTML, CSS and Scripting Languages; 29 hours of training in XML; 40 hours of training in 
MS.NET and AJAX; 22 hours of training in RDBMS (SQL Server); 34 hours of training in MS Sharepoint; and 
42 hours of training in Project Planning and Resource Allocation. 
Finally, the "Leading" component of the training includes 10 additional hours of training in object oriented 
programming; 28 hours of training in UML (Rational RoseNisio); 46 additional hours of training in MS.Net and 
AJAX; 36 additional hours of training in RDBMX (SQL Server); 44 additional hours of training in MS Share 
. WAC 08 114 51516 
Page 10 
Point; 36 hours of training in WindowsiWeb Server; and 58 hours of training in System Analysis and Design, 
which involves, as a final project, creating a database in SQL Server and developing a web-based application. 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive. The petitioner has not established that the beneficiary 
has specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity as 
defined at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
Looking to the language of the statutory definition, Congress has provided USCIS with an ambiguous definition 
of specialized knowledge. In this regard, one Federal district court explained the infeasibility of applying a 
bright-line test to define what constitutes specialized knowledge: 
This ambiguity is not merely the result of an unfortunate choice of dictionaries. It reflects the 
relativistic nature of the concept special. An item is special only in the sense that it is not 
ordinary; to define special one must first define what is ordinary. . . . There is no logical or 
principled way to determine which baseline of ordmary knowledge is a more appropriate reading 
of the statute, and there are countless other baselines which are equally plausible. Simply put, 
specialized knowledge is a relative and empty idea which cannot have a plain meaning. CJ: 
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1982). 
1 756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 9, 14- 1 5 (D.D.C., 1990).~ 
While Congress did not provide explicit guidance for what should be considered ordinary knowledge, the 
principles of statutory interpretation provide some clue as to the intended scope of the L-1B specialized 
knowledge category. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 1 12, 123 (1 987) 
(citing INSv. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207,94 L.Ed2d 434 (1987)). 
First, the AAO must look to the language of section 214(c)(2)(B) itself, that is, the terms "special" and 
"advanced." Like the courts, the AAO customarily turns to dictionaries for help in determining whether a word in 
a statute has a plain or common meaning. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 109 F.3d 965,967-68 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(using Webster's Dictionary for "therefore"). According to Webster's New College Dictionary, the word "special" 
is commonly found to mean "surpassing the usual" or "exceptional." Webster's New College Dictionary, 1084 
(3rd Ed. 2008). The dictionary defines the word "advanced" as "highly developed or complex" or "at a higher 
level than others." Id. at 17. 
Second, looking at the term's placement within the text of section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the AAO notes that 
specialized knowledge is used to describe the nature of a person's employment and that the term is listed among 
the higher levels of the employment hierarchy together with "managerial" and "executive" employees. Based on 
the context of the term within the statute, the AAO therefore would expect a specialized knowledge employee to 
occupy an elevated position within a company that rises above that of an ordinary or average employee. See 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 14. 
3 
 Although 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General was decided prior to enactment of the statutory definition of 
specialized knowledge by the Immigration Act of 1990, the court's discussion of the ambiguity in the legacy 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) definition is equally illuminating when applied to the definition 
created by Congress. 
WAC 08 114 51516 
Page 11 
Third, a review of the legislative history for both the original 1970 statute and the subsequent 1990 statute 
indicates that Congress intended for USCIS to closely administer the L-1B category. Specifically, the original 
drafters of section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Act intended that the class of persons eligible for the L- 1 classification 
would be "narrowly drawn" and "carellly regulated and monitored" by USCIS. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91- 
85 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750,2754, 1970 WL 5815. The legislative history of the 1970 Act 
plainly states that "the number of temporary admissions under the proposed 'L' category will not be large." Id. In 
addition, the Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key personnel." 
See generally, id. The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "[olf 
crucial importance." Webster's New College Dictionary 620 (3rd ed., Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing 
Co. 2008). Moreover, during the course of the sub-committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically 
questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response 
to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow 
"high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower 
categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." See H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comrn., Immigration 
Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445,91" Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (Nov. 12, 1969). 
Neither in 1970 nor in 1990 did Congress provide a controlling, unambiguous definition of "specialized 
knowledge," and a narrow interpretation is consistent with so much of the legislative intent as it is possible to 
determine. H. Rep. No. 91-851 at 6, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2754. This interpretation is consistent with legislative 
history, which has been largely supportive of a narrow reading of the definition of specialized knowledge and the 
L-1 visa classification in general. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 15-16; Boi Na Braza 
Atlanta, LLC v. Upchurch, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2372846 at *4 (N.D.Tex., 2005), afd 194 
Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006); Fibermaster, Ltd. v. I.N.S., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1990 WL 99327 (D.D.C., 
1990); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Action 00-2977-LFO (D.D.C. April 6, 2001)(on file with 
AAO). 
Further, although the Imrmgration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized 
knowledge" in section 214(c)(2) of the Act, the definition did not generally expand the class of persons eligible 
for L-1B specialized knowledge visas. Pub.L. No. 101-649, 5 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1990). Instead, 
the legislative history indicates that Congress created the statutory definition of specialized knowledge for the 
express purpose of clarifying a previously undefined term £rom the Immigration Act of 1970. H.R. Rep. 101- 
723(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6749, 1990 WL 200418 ("One area within the L visa that 
requires more specificity relates to the term 'specialized knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have 
exacerbated the problem."). While the 1990 Act declined to codify the "proprietary knowledge" and "United 
States labor market" references that had existed in the previous agency definition found at 8 C.F.R. 
5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) (1988), there is no indication that Congress intended to liberalize its own 1970 definition of 
the L- 1 visa classification. 
If any conclusion can be drawn fiom the enactment of the statutory definition of specialized knowledge in section 
214(c)(2)(B), it would be based on the nature of the Congressional clarification itself. By not including any strict 
criterion in the ultimate statutory definition and further emphasizing the relativistic aspect of "special knowledge," 
Congress created a standard that requires USCIS to make a factual determination that can only be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, based on the agency's expertise and discretion. Rather than a bright-line standard that would 
support a more rigid application of the law, Congress gave the INS a more flexible standard that requires an 
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adjudication based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. CJ: Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 33 1 F.3d 
369,377 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89,91 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
To determine what is special or advanced, USCIS must first determine the baseline of ordinary. As a 
baseline, the terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than simply "skilled" or "experienced." By 
itself, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex products will not equal "special 
knowledge." See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Cornm. 1982). In general, all employees can 
reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the 
overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. 
An employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average 
employee. In other words, specialized knowledge generally requires more than a short period of experience; 
otherwise special or advanced knowledge would include every employee in an organization with the 
exception of trainees and entry-level staff. If everyone in an organization is specialized, then no one can be 
considered truly specialized. Such an interpretation strips the statutory language of any efficacy and cannot 
have been what Congress intended. 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's, not USCIS's, burden to articulate 
and establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1184(c)(2)(B). USCIS cannot make a factual 
determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, 
articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is 
typically gained within the organization, and explain how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
Once the petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of 
evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. A 
petitioner's assertion that the beneficiary possesses advanced knowledge of the processes and procedures of 
the company must be supported by evidence describing and distinguishing that knowledge from the 
elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" are comparative 
terms, the petitioner should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary's knowledge 
relative to others in the petitioner's workforce or relative to similarly employed workers in the petitioner's 
specific industry. 
The inherently subjective standard serves to make the L-1B classification more flexible and capable of 
responding to changing economic models. Depending on the facts of the specific case, a petitioner may put 
forward a novel argument that is based on the employer's specific situation. Or, as in the present case, a 
knowledgeable petitioner may choose to rely on aspects of the INS memoranda to frame his or her argument. 
Even though the Puleo memorandum does not constitute a binding legal "standard," it does describe possible 
attributes that would support a claim of specialized knowledge. However, the petitioner would be unwise to 
simply parrot the memorandum, without submitting supporting evidence, and expect USCIS to approve a 
petition. Or, as observed in the Puleo memorandum: 
. . . a petitioner's assertion that the alien possesses an advanced level of knowledge of the 
processes and procedures of the company must be supported by evidence describing and 
setting apart that knowledge from the elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. It 
is the weight and type of evidence, which establishes whether or not the beneficiary possesses 
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specialized knowledge. 
Pursuant to section 291 of the Act, the petitioner bears the burden of proof in these proceedings. The 
petitioner must submit relevant, probative, and credible evidence that would lead the director to believe that 
the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not." Matter of E-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 
1989). 
In examining the specialized knowledge of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's description of 
the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R.' 
4 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services to be performed sufficient to 
establish specialized knowledge. At a minimum, the petitioner must articulate with specificity the nature of the 
claimed specialized knowledge. Merely asserting that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge will not suffice to meet the petitioner's burden of proof. 
Upon review, the petitioner in this case has failed to establish either that the beneficiary's position in the 
United States or abroad requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has 
specialized knowledge. Although the petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary has been and will be 
employed in a "specialized knowledge" capacity, the petitioner has not adequately articulated any basis for 
this claim. The beneficiary uses his knowledge of and skills with widely available computer and information 
technologies to "deliver software artifacts to satisfy customer requirements." While such duties may require 
him to become intimately familiar with the client's products in order to develop presentations, demos, 
prototypes, training materials, requirements documentation, and solution delivery frameworks for the client's 
latest technologies, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary possesses, or that his duties 
require, any special or advanced body of knowledge which would distinguish the beneficiary's role from that 
of other similarly experienced software consultants employed by the petitioning organization or in the 
industry at-large. Going on record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting 
the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing 
Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Specifics are clearly an 
important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties involve specialized knowledge; otherwise, meeting the 
definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. See Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724, F. 
Supp. 1 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), am, 905, F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
The petitioner's basic claims regarding the beneficiary's specialized knowledge are three-fold. First, the 
petitioner claims that its "four-prong strategy" is unique because its competitors do not offer the same 
combination of service offerings. Second, the petitioner claims that the beneficiary possesses advanced 
knowledge of the petitioner's processes due to his long tenure with the -foreign entity. Finally, the petitioner 
states that the beneficiary possesses critical knowledge of Microsoft's Unified Communications Technology 
which is unique among the petitioner's consultants and not widely known in the industry. 
With respect to the petitioner's "four-prong strategy," the petitioner highlights the fact that none of its major 
competitors offer the same range of services it provides, and emphasizes that it has developed "unique and 
proprietary" internal processes which give it a "unique ability to address a client's entire range of product 
development, marketing, and roll out capabilities in one turnkey location." Counsel indicated that the 
company's "unique process" allows it to understand a client's business situation and to design scalable 
solutions to assist technology companies in the rollout of new technologies." The AAO acknowledges the 
WAC 08 114 51516 
Page 14 
argument that the petitioner may offer a particular combination of services that it is uncommon or even 
unique in the technology consulting market. However, the types of services the petitioner provides, i.e., 
strategic consulting, content preparation training, and pre-sales support for new technologies, are in fact 
provided by other consulting companies, while some technology companies would likely perform the same 
functions in-house. 
The petitioner frequently refers to its proprietary and unique internal processes, but has failed to distinguish or 
explain its proprietary processes other than highlighting its "four-prong" strategy, and its business decision to 
bring together a "diverse talent pool," specializing in all aspects of marketing, sales and technology. Based on 
the information materials provided, it is evident that the petitioner's employees have defined roles within the 
four-prong strategy and work within their area of expertise to deliver the client's solutions. There is nothing in 
the record to suggest that the duties performed by individual employees within the process are significantly 
different from those who are similarly employed as consultants in the industry at large. Employment 
experience within a company that offers an unusual combination of services, without more, is insufficient to 
establish that any individual employee within the company possesses or is required to utilize specialized 
knowledge. 
The petitioner's Learning Curriculum submitted on appeal fiu-ther highlights that an IT consultant within the 
petitioning company is first and foremost required to possess certain technical knowledge and skills, none of 
which are specific to the petitioning company. The vast majority of the 3.5 months of training provided to the 
petitioner's IT professionals is focused on technologies that are commonly used by consultants in the field. 
The curriculum indicates that employees designated as "IT Professionals" receive two hours of training in 
company-specific acronyms, two hours of training in the petitioner's web site and knowledge base servers, 
and 42 hours of training in project planning and resource allocations, while the remaining 482 hours of 
training are in common web, database and Microsoft technologies. The petitioner has not explained how 
training in the "4-Prong strategy" is delivered within this framework. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the petitioner has not established that the knowledge of the petitioner's 
four-prong strategy can be considered "specialized knowledge." Overall, based on the petitioner's 
representations, its four-prong management process, while highly effective and valuable to the petitioner, can 
be readily learned on-the-job by employees who otherwise possess the requisite professional background in 
technical consulting. For this reason, the petitioner has not established that knowledge of its processes and 
procedures alone constitutes specialized knowledge. 
However, counsel fbrther argues that the beneficiary's knowledge should be considered specialized because 
he possesses advanced knowledge of the company's processes and procedures, and even helped to develop the 
company's internal processes. In this regard, counsel argues that the director ignored the "training aspect" of 
the beneficiary's proposed assignment, and states that the petitioner's desire to have the beneficiary train its 
personnel is evidence of the beneficiary's advanced knowledge of the four-prong strategy. 
The AAO notes that, at the time of filing, counsel had indicated that, generally, the petitioner's consultants are 
transferred to the United States to assist with projects for U.S. customers and to help cross-train the U.S. 
employees in processes and procedures used by the Indian subsidary (and vice versa). Counsel stated that the 
beneficiary has an "advanced level of knowledge of the foreign entity's proprietary processes and procedures." 
This was the extent of the petitioner's claims regarding the beneficiary's proposed role as a trainer and with 
WAC 08 114 51516 
Page 15 
respect to the beneficiary's "advanced knowledge." If the primary reason for the beneficiary's assignment were to 
train United States workers in the foreign entity's processes it is not clear why this aspect of the assignment was 
not discussed in more detail. The petitioner provided a lengthy list of job duties the beneficiary would perform, 
none of which appeared to relate to training the petitioner's own employees. Similarly, if the beneficiary did in 
fact assist in developing the 4-prong strategy that was discussed in such detail throughout the record, the AAO is 
left to question why the petitioner or counsel would not have mentioned this fact at the time the petition was filed, 
rather than just vaguely asserting that the beneficiary has "an advanced level of knowledge" of the process. 
The AAO does not doubt that the beneficiary has been working with the petitioner's processes longer than some 
other employees within the organization, or that some cross-training will occur while he is in the United States. 
However, the AAO is not persuaded that the beneficiary played a significant role in developing the 4-prong 
strategy or that the primary purpose of his transfer is to provide training in this strategy to U.S. workers, as 
opposed to providing client services. These claims have been made for the first time on appeal and are not 
adequately supported by the evidence of record or any new evidence. The petitioner was given an opportunity 
when responding to the RFE to elaborate upon how the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's processes and 
procedures is advanced, and to describe in detail any training he will provide while in the United States. In this 
regard, the petitioner stated the following: 
[The beneficiary] has worked on many US projects from India. As part of training, he is going to 
share the best practices on how to work with the global team for technology related projects. 
If the director "ignored" the training aspect of the U.S. assignment, it was because the petitioner itself placed little 
emphasis on the relative importance of this part of the assignment. Instead, when responding to the RFE, the 
petitioner highlighted the beneficiary's experience with Unified Communications technologies as the factor which 
sets him apart from similarly employed workers within the organization. While the petitioner asserts that the U.S. 
and Indian offices do not have the exact same capabilities in terms of providing services within the 4-pronged 
management system, the evidence in the record suggests that the same processes have in fact been implemented 
company-wide. Absent some explanation regarding the knowledge gap that exists between U.S. personnel and 
Indian personnel with respect to the 4-prong process, the AAO cannot conclude that the U.S. assignment will 
require the beneficiary to provide training requiring advanced knowledge of the four-prong management system 
not possessed by other company employees. 
The petitioner's final argument that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge is based on "his experience 
with and architectural knowledge of Microsoft Unified Communications Technology gained during multiple 
projects." Counsel indicated in response to the request for evidence that all of the petitioner's "Enterprise 
Technology Strategists" generally provide the same services to the petitioner's customers. Counsel stated that the 
Unified Communications technology is utilized by "high-end corporate accounts," and that it is "not a retail 
product that is readily utilized by companies that use Microsoft products to operate their businesses." Finally, 
counsel asserted that "any individual or company that can provide extensive expertise in this area is unique in the 
industry." The petitioner indicated that the beneficiary would provide some training to U.S. associates regarding 
Unified Communications Technologies, but it is not clear whether the beneficiary would be working in this 
domain with respect to client projects. 
As noted above, in denying the petition, the director acknowledged the petitioner's claim that the beneficiary's 
experience with Unified Communications technologies is "unique in the industry" but determined: (1) that the 
WAC 08 114 51516 
Page 16 
petitioner did not state that this knowledge is required to perform the proposed duties in the United States; and (2) 
that expertise in Microsoft technologies is not specific to the petitioning organization. On appeal, counsel makes 
no reference to the beneficiary's claimed specialized knowledge of Microsoft Unified Communications 
technologies. 
Upon review, the petitioner's claim that knowledge of Microsoft's Unified Communications technologies is 
"unique" in the industry and that the beneficiary possesses such knowledge is not persuasive in establishing 
that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. The record shows that the beneficiary has worked on at 
least one Unified Communications project while employed by the foreign entity. The record does not contain 
persuasive evidence to establish that knowledge of this technology is unique or scarce, either within the 
petitioning company or within the industry, or that it is not possessed by workers employed by Microsoft and 
other companies who work with Microsoft technologies. Even if the knowledge is relatively rare within the 
petitioning organization, the beneficiary's familiarity with its client's technologies, while valuable to the 
petitioner, cannot be considered knowledge specific to the petitioning organization and cannot form the basis 
of a determination that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. 
All employees can be said to possess unique skill or experience to some degree. Moreover, the proprietary 
qualities of the petitioner's process or product do not establish that any knowledge of this process is 
"specialized." Rather, the petitioner must establish that qualities of the unique process or product require this 
employee to have knowledge beyond what is common in the industry. This has not been established in this 
matter. The fact that other workers may not have the same level of experience with the petitioner's 
methodologies as applied to a specific client project is not enough to establish the beneficiary as an employee 
possessing specialized knowledge. While the AAO acknowledges that there will be exceptions based on the 
facts of individual cases, an argument that an alien is unique among a small subset of workers, (i.e., the only, 
or one of a few, technical resources who has worked on Microsoft Unified Communications projects) will not 
be deemed facially persuasive if a petitioner's definition of specialized knowledge is so broad that it would 
include the majority of its workforce. 
It is appropriate for USCIS to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. at 120 (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. at 618 and Matter of 
LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. at 8 16). As stated by the Commissioner in Matter of Penner, when considering 
whether the beneficiaries possessed specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find 
that the occupations inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled 
worker. Id. 
The AAO acknowledges that the specialized knowledge need not be narrowly held within the organization in 
order to be considered "advanced." However, it is equally true to state that knowledge will not be considered 
"special" or "advanced" if it is universally or even widely held throughout a company. If all similarly 
employed workers within the petitioner's organization receive essentially the same training, then mere 
possession of knowledge of the petitioner's processes and methodologies does not rise to the level of 
specialized knowledge. The L-1B visa category was not created in order to allow the transfer of all 
employees with any degree of knowledge of a company's processes. If all employees are deemed to possess 
"special" or "advanced" knowledge, then that knowledge would necessarily be ordinary and commonplace. 
WAC 08 114 51516 
Page 17 
The petitioner has not successfully demonstrated that the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's processes 
and procedures gained during employment with the foreign entity is advanced compared to other similarly 
employed workers within the organization. As noted above, the petitioner's attempts to distinguish the 
beneficiary's knowledge as advanced relative to a specific Microsoft technology are not persuasive, nor has 
the petitioner established that the beneficiary's knowledge of the foreign entity's operating processes and 
procedures is advanced compared to the remainder of the workforce. All of the foreign entity's technical 
employees would reasonably have project-specific knowledge in addition to knowledge ,of the company's 
tools and processes for implementing projects. By this logic, any of them would qualify for L-1B 
classification if offered a position working on the same project in the United States. 
According to the reasoning of Matter of Penner, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex 
products, by itself will not equal "special knowledge."4 An expansive interpretation of specialized knowledge in 
which any experienced employee would qualify as having special or advanced knowledge would be untenable, 
since it would allow a petitioner to transfer any experienced employee to the United States in L-1B classification. 
The term "special" or "advanced" must mean more than experienced or skilled. In other terms, specialized 
knowledge requires more than a short period of experience, otherwise, "special" or "advanced" knowledge would 
include every employee with the exception of trainees and recent recruits. 
The AAO does not dispute the possibility that the beneficiary is a skilled employee who has been, and would 
be, a valuable asset to the petitioner. However, as explained above, the record does not distinguish the 
beneficiary's knowledge as more advanced than the knowledge possessed by other people employed by the 
petitioning organization or by workers who are similarly employed elsewhere. The beneficiary's duties and 
technical skills, while impressive, demonstrate that he possesses knowledge that is common among 
consultants in the information technology consulting field. Furthermore, it is not clear that the performance of 
the beneficiary's duties would require more than basic proficiency with the company's internal processes and 
methodologies. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's training, work experience, or 
knowledge of the company's processes is more advanced than the knowledge possessed by others employed 
by the petitioner, or that the processes used by the petitioner are substantially different from those used by 
other technology consulting companies. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's 
knowledge is any more advanced or special than the knowledge held by a skilled worker. See Matter of 
Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
4 
 As observed above, the AAO notes that the precedent decisions that predate the 1990 Act are not categorically 
superseded by the statutory definition of specialized knowledge, and the general issues and case facts themselves 
remain cogent as examples of how the INS applied the law to the real world facts of individual adjudications. 
USCIS must distinguish between skilled workers and specialized knowledge workers when making a 
determination on an L-1B visa petition. The distinction between skilled and specialized workers has been a 
recurring issue in the L-1B program and is discussed at length in the INS precedent decisions, including Matter of 
Penner. See 18 I&N Dee. at 50-53. (discussing the legislative history and prior precedents as they relate to the 
distinction between skilled and specialized knowledge workers). 
WAC 08 114 51516 
Page 18 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1 756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. 
Finally, regarding the petitioner's reliance, in part, on the Puleo memorandum, it must be noted that in making 
a determination as to whether the knowledge possessed by a beneficiary is special or advanced, the AAO 
relies on the statute and regulations, legislative history and prior precedent. Although counsel suggests that 
USCIS is bound to base its decision on the above-referenced memorandum, it is noted that the memorandum 
was issued as guidance to assist USCIS employees in interpreting a term that is not clearly defined in the 
statute, not as a replacement for the statute or the original intentions of Congress in creating the specialized 
knowledge classification, or to overturn prior precedent decisions that continue to prove instructive in 
adjudicating L-1B visa petitions. The AAO will weigh guidance outlined in the policy memoranda 
accordingly, but not to the exclusion of the statutory and regulatory definitions, legislative history or prior 
precedents.5 
Therefore, based on the evidence presented and applying the statute, regulations, and binding precedents, the 
petitioner has not established that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge or that he has been or would be 
employed in the United States in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will 
be dismissed. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
5 
 USCIS memoranda articulate internal guidelines for agency personnel; they do not establish judicially 
enforceable standards. Agency interpretations that are not arrived at through precedent decision or notice- 
and-comment rulemaking - such as those in opinion letters, policy statements, agency manuals, and 
enforcement guidelines - lack the force of law and do not warrant Chevron-style deference. Christensen v. 
Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). An agency's internal guidelines "neither confer upon [plaintiffs] 
substantive rights nor provide procedures upon which [they] may rely." Lou-Herrera v. Trominski, 231 F.3d 
984, 989 (5th Cir. 2000)(quoting Fano v. O'Neill, 806 F.2d 1262, 1264 (5th Cir. 1987)). Agency policy 
memorandum and unpublished decisions do not confer substantive legal benefits upon aliens or bind CIS. 
Romeiro de Silva v. Smith, 773 F.2d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Prokopenko v. Ashcroft, 372 F.3d 
941,944 (8th Cir. 2004). 
In contrast to agency memoranda, a legacy INS or USCIS decision is binding as a precedent decision once it 
is published in accordance with 8 C.F.R. 
 103.3(c). 
 The INS precedent decisions relating to L-1B 
specialized knowledge are considered "interpretive rules" under the APA. See Spencer Entelprises, Inc. v. 
US., 229 F.Supp.2d 1025, 1044 (E.D.Ca1. 2001), ufd 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also R.L. Znv. Ltd. 
Partners v. INS, 86 F.Supp.2d 1014 (D.Hawaii 2000).